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Chapter 1
Introduction to Early
Warning Systems
Since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the oc-
currence of currency crises has strongly increased (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klinge-
biel, and Martinez-Peria, 2001), fuelling academic literature on this topic. Until
the mid-1990s, research was mainly focussed on finding explanations for currency
crises. The first empirical models were based on Krugman (1979) and Flood and
Garber (1984), stressing that if macroeconomic policies are inconsistent with the
pegged exchange rate, a forced abandonment of the peg will occur. Specifically,
the behaviour of macroeconomic variables around periods of crisis or currency peg
abandonments is examined (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995, 1998; Frankel
and Rose, 1996; Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, Calvo, and Cooper, 1996). Especially right
after severe crises the call for early warning signals by governing bodies tends to
increase. This happened for example after the recent credit crunch crisis (Neuger
and Deen, 2008), but also after the Mexican (1994-1995) and Asian (1997) crises.
This has resulted in the emergence of two main types of Early Warning Systems
(EWSs). The first EWS was a signalling model proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo,
and Reinhart (1998) (KLR), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The other main type
of EWS is the limited dependent variable model, where the probit branch was ini-
tiated by Berg and Pattillo (1999) (BP) and the logit branch by Kumar, Moorthy,
and Perraudin (2003) (KMP).
Outside the academic world, most of the institutions are using (some improved
version of) these two main types of Early Warning System. At the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), three models are used. 1) A signalling approach model
very similar to the original model by KLR that monitors many macroeconomic
variables for ‘unusual’ behaviour. The probability of a crisis is then calculated
based on the number of signals of unusual behaviour; 2) the Developing Country
Studies Division (DCSD) model, which is a multivariate panel probit with the
macroeconomic factors that have had the best track record in the past as explana-
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tory variables; and 3) the Policy Development and Review (PDR) model, which is
the DCSD model extended with balance sheet and institutional variables. In the
private sector we have the GS-WATCH model of Goldman-Sachs, the Credit Suisse
First Boston Emerging Markets Risk Indicator (CSFB-EMRI) and the Deutsche
Bank Alarm Clock (DBAC). All of these are logit based early warning systems.
A short description of the models used in practice is given in Table 1.1. Although
the seminal EWSs have their fair share of extensions and improvements, many
alternatives have been proposed. These models will be discussed in turn.
Of course, in order to build a model to predict currency crises one first needs
to define what a currency crisis actually is. Strictly speaking, a currency crisis
can only occur under a fixed exchange rate regime. A crisis is then defined as a
forced abandonment of the current currency peg resulting either in a realignment
of the currency or even in a complete abandonment of the fixed exchange regime.
Does this then mean that currency crises can not occur under a floating exchange
rate regime? No. Even floating currencies can suffer from a strong depreciation
as a results of a speculative attack. Surely such a depreciation has a more dis-
ruptive effect on an economy than a controlled (minor) realignment of the fixed
exchange rate. Especially when the realignment is such that it brings the real ex-
change rate more in line with the fundamentals, thereby decreasing the possibility
of future speculative attacks. In most situations, it is sensible to define currency
crises as events occurring on the exchange market that have a disruptive effects
on a country’s economy. In many empirical studies a currency crisis is therefore
defined as a large depreciation (or devaluation). At this point two issues arise.
First, how large is a large depreciation? There is no clear rule on the definition
of a large depreciation. However, a depreciation is only likely to be disrupting
if it is substantially larger than most other depreciations. Therefore depreciation
is typically considered large when it exceeds its mean by more than two or three
standard deviations. The second issue is whether the definition of a crisis should
include unsuccessful speculative attacks. In response to a speculative attack on
the currency, authorities can decide to intervene on the foreign exchange market
in two ways. The intervention can be either directly by selling foreign currency
or indirectly by raising the interest rate. As these countering actions can have a
adverse effect on economic growth, one might decide to include these unsuccessful
attacks in the crisis definition.
Many empirical studies indeed use the above mentioned rationale to construct
a crisis indicator. The most commonly used approach for dating crises consists
in taking the changes in exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates.
Assign weights1 to each and combine them into an index of speculative exchange
rate pressure. A threshold level is then defined and a period of crisis is identified
when the index exceeds this threshold. This idea of an Exchange Market Pressure
Index (EMPI) was developed by Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1998) to capture pres-
sure on a currency under both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes. Under a
1Generally the inverse of their respective variances.
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1 Introduction to Early Warning Systems
pure floating regime, the EMPI will increase through a depreciating exchange rate,
while under a fixed exchange rate system the index will go up through a decrease
of international reserves and/or an increase of the interest rate as a response to
a speculative attack. Among the studies that use this approach, the exact defini-
tion of a crisis still varies considerably2. In particular, there are differences with
respect to the inclusion of the interest rate changes, the weighting of the index
components, the choice for real or nominal numbers and the threshold level.
Using the pressure index defined above, both successful and unsuccessful spec-
ulative attacks are identified. Others choose to restrict their analysis to successful
attacks, identifying periods of crisis as periods in which the currency depreciates
by more than a certain threshold percentage3. Often an additional requirement is
that the depreciation needs to have accelerated with respect to the previous period
in order to exclude periods immediately after a crisis and periods of controlled de-
preciation.
Yet other researchers use the pressure index in a slightly different manner.
Ghosh and Ghosh (2003) consider only periods that are identified via the EMPI,
but also have led to a decrease in GDP growth rate of minimum 3 percentage
points. As such, only currency crises that have had a real impact are studied.
Burkart and Coudert (2002) combine the dates found by KLR via the EMPI, with
the dates found by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) that are based on depreciations
larger than some threshold, and further revise the dates using ‘expert judgement’.
Zhang (2001) and Tudela (2004) avoid the decision about the weighting in the
EMPI altogether by using the components of the pressure index separately. A
crisis is then identified as a period when at least one of the components exceeds
its own threshold.
Regardless of how the binary series is constructed, Harding and Pagan (2011)
showed nevertheless that such constructed binary variables are not independently
distributed over time. A typical time series of the binary crisis indicator consists
of alternating sequences of zeros and ones, usually by default as a direct result of
the construction procedure. Failing to take into account this Markov process type
time dependence in an estimation of a regression on this data, may therefore lead
to potentially invalid inference.
Finally, some studies reject the use of a binary crisis indicator. Their main
argument is to avoid the loss of information relating to the severity of the spec-
ulative attack, that occurs when transforming a continuous index into the binary
crisis variable. When transforming to a binary variable, an episode of specula-
2These studies include Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo (2004), Berg and Coke (2004), Berg
and Pattillo (1999), Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006), Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2004),
Edison (2003), Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2007), Kaminsky et al. (1998), Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999), Krkoska (2001), Kwack (2000), Peltonen (2002) and Weller (2001)
3These include Edison (2003), Brueggemann and Linne (2002), Kumar et al. (2003), Esquivel
and Larrain (1998) and Osband and Van Rijckeghem (2000)
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tive pressure that remains just below the threshold is considered a tranquil period
similarly to times without speculative pressure. Alternatively, an extreme specu-
lative attack is treated equal to a moderate one that only marginally exceeds the
threshold. This alternative consists in using a continuous crisis variable such as
the EMPI4. Like with the binary crisis variable, some authors prefer to look only
at speculative attacks that have resulted in actual depreciations or reduced mar-
ket returns (Abiad, 2003; Grier and Grier, 2001). Finally, Martinez-Peria (2002)
combines the three components of the pressure index into a 3-dimensional VAR
in order to capture possible dynamic interlinkages between the exchange rate, in-
ternational reserves and interest rate differential. Unlike in the limited dependent
variable models, using a continuous dependent variable it is not immediately obvi-
ous to calculate the probability of crisis as the output of most continuous variable
models is not confined to the [0, 1] interval. An often arbitrary transformation is
then required to find a probability measure.
An overview of the type of models and crisis definitions used among the studies
is given in Table 1.2. In the following sections we will discuss the advantages and
limitations of the modelling techniques in the seminal Early Warning Systems and
their spin-offs, followed by proposed alternative models. Finally, an overview is
given of the topics that are addressed in this thesis.
1.1 Seminal Early Warning Systems
In this section the basic concepts and ideas behind the seminal Early Warning
Systems (EWS) are explained. We start with the origin of the Early Warning Sys-
tem after which the discussion will focus on the technical aspects of the proposed
models as well as their spin-offs. The section ends with a more empirical view.
1.1.1 Signalling Approach
In the ‘first generation’ models of Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984)
it is shown that under fixed exchange rates and excess money demand, a domes-
tic credit expansion leads to a gradual loss of international reserves. When the
amount of reserves has sufficiently decreased, a speculative attack occurs, depleting
the stock of international reserves instantaneously and forcing the governing body
to abandon the parity. Both papers noticed that most speculative attacks were
preceded by a real appreciation and the worsening of the trade balance, possibly
due to an expansionary fiscal policy. In contrast, the ‘second generation’ models
(e.g. Obstfeld, 1986) view currency crises as shifts between multiple equilibria in-
stigated by self-fulfilling speculative attacks. Due to the multiple equilibria, the
timing of the attack can no longer be determined. As a result, speculative at-
4For example Arias and Erlandsson (2004), Cerra and Saxena (2002), Krkoska (2001) and
Vlaar (2000)
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tacks can also occur even when the macroeconomic policy is consistent with the
currency peg. In the ‘second generation’ models therefore, the direct relationship
between ‘bad’ fundamentals and the crisis is loosened, whereas speculators’ beliefs
about other speculators’ actions are the corner factor, thereby opening up the
possibility for a contagion effect. Morris and Shin (1998) proved that a unique
equilibrium may nevertheless exist when information discrepancies exist between
speculators with respect to observing the fundamentals. In such a case, uncer-
tainty about other people’s expectations can still cause a speculative attack, even
when all speculators know that the fundamentals are consistent with the currency
peg. Not every economy appears to be equally susceptible to the contagion effect
of a crisis. In ‘third generation’ crisis models it is explored how problems in the
banking and financial sector interact with currency crises. Krugman (1999) ex-
plains the linkage between a financial crisis and a currency crisis through firms’
balance sheets. A weakening currency increases the domestic value of the foreign
debt of the firms, reducing their ability to invest and sparking a decrease in out-
put. A similar argument explains the linkage between banking crises and currency
crises through the foreign debt of banks. E.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2001, 2004) show that a high amount of foreign debt makes the banking system
as well as the currency vulnerable to speculative attacks. Bruinshoofd, Candelon,
and Raabe (2008) use the same rationale to show that the transmission of the
contagion effect to a country depends on the strength of its banking sector.
From the first generation models, one could state that the appropriate macroe-
conomic variables are expected to exhibit extreme behaviour just before a crisis.
These macroeconomic variables can therefore be used as a leading indicator for an
upcoming crisis. This has led to the Early Warning System based on the signalling
approach. The signalling approach has been developed by Kaminsky et al. (1998)
(KLR); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The main idea is to use macro-economic
variables that are related to the causes of financial crises as identified by Krugman
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), as early indicator for upcoming crises. Al-
though it is empirically not possible to capture speculators’ expectations directly,
variables that are expected to influence these expectations are included among the
105 candidate indicators. In particular, the indicators can be classified into seven
categories: (1) External Sector, (2) Financial Sector, (3) Real Sector, (4) Pub-
lic Finances, (5) Institutional and Structural indicators, (6) Political Variables,
and (7) a binary variable indicating a crisis elsewhere as a measure of contagion.
When an indicator shows extreme behaviour, i.e. it moves beyond a certain thresh-
old level, it signals the future occurrence of a crisis.
The desired signalling horizon is set to 24 months. This means that the indi-
cators are expected to lead a crisis by at most two years. If this is indeed the case,
it is a ‘correct signal’, otherwise it is a ‘false alarm’ or ‘noise’. In each month one
can classify the performance of an indicator into one of the categories in Table 1.3,
where an ideal indicator maximises categories A and D and minimises B and C.
This will help to endogenously determine the threshold levels of the indicators.
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Crisis No Crisis
(within 24 months) (within 24 months)
Signal was issued A B
No signal was issued C D
Table 1.3: Signal Classifications
As mentioned before, a warning signal is issued when an indicator moves be-
yond a certain threshold value. For each variable a joint threshold value is deter-
mined for all countries in the sample. It is set at the percentile that minimises the
noise-to-signal ratio5 such that the number of correct signals is as high as possi-
ble while keeping the number of false alarms as low as possible6. An indicator is
considered to be useful in predicting a crisis when the probability conditional on
a signal of that indicator is larger than the unconditional probability. The condi-
tional probability of crisis for an indicator is defined as the proportion of signals
that is followed by at least one period of crisis in the next 24 months, whereas the
unconditional probability is simply the number of crisis periods as a fraction of
the total number of observations7.
In an empirical exercise using a 1970-1995 monthly dataset with 15 emerging
and 5 developed economies KLR examine which of the indicators performs best
in terms of correct and false signals, in terms of average lead time and in terms
of persistence of the signals. Measured jointly over all countries, out of the 105
candidates, 15 indicators are found by KLR to be useful in terms of conditional
versus unconditional probability. Amongst them are the 12-month change of inter-
national reserves, real exchange rate, domestic credit, credit to the public sector
and inflation.
The signalling approach has several shortcomings. First, every indicator is con-
sidered on an individual basis. This makes it hardly possible to take into account
the interactions between the different macroeconomic characteristics. Second, the
threshold level of a signal for each variable is determined such that it optimises
the noise-to-signal ratio. Naturally, this ratio depends on the dataset. When
5The noise-to-signal ratio is defined as:
B/(B+D)
A/(A+C)
.
6This method has been criticised by Candelon, Dumitrescu, and Hurlin (2009) who claim
that mimimising the noise-to-signal ratio leads to numerous false alarms. They opt for another
method that maximises simultaneously the sensitivity (hit rate) and specificity (1 - false alarm
rate).
7The conditional and unconditional probabilities are given by:
P (Crisis | Signal) =
A
A+B
P (Crisis) =
A+C
A+B+C+D
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the sample is modified, most likely also the threshold value will change, making
it a very ad-hoc procedure. Third, because of the translation of the continuous
variables into binary signals, there is a loss of information in the sense that the
model does not distinguish between a minor and major deviations. Fourth, it is
very difficult in this model setup to find an accurate estimate of the probability
of a crisis. As the probability estimate depends directly on the performance of an
indicator in the sample, it is very likely that the estimate is subject to a sample
bias. Kaminsky (1999) controls for this problem calculating a different probability
for every indicator by forming one single composite crisis indicator. This com-
posite index is calculated as a weighted sum of the individual indicators with the
inverse noise-to-signal ratio as weights. As the weights do not add up to one, the
index can also not be used as probability measure leading to the impossibility of
calculating a conditional probability. Besides, this method does not remove the
sample dependency of the probability of crisis. Finally, the choice of weights in
the composite signal index remains somewhat arbitrary.
1.1.2 Limited Dependent Variable Model
To overcome some of the previous shortcomings, a limited dependent variable
framework was proposed as alternative. Within this framework the probability of
crisis is readily defined and the loss of information through the transformation of
the macroeconomic indicators into binary signals disappears.
Berg and Pattillo (1999) were the first to propose a probit model as an Early
Warning System. The model is a standard multivariate probit model with a bino-
mial dependent variable that takes the value one when there is a crisis in any of
the h subsequent periods. The variables that were used as indicator in the KLR
model are now used as explanatory factors. This single country model can be
represented as follows:
Cht = β
′Xt + εt, t = {1, . . . , T} (1.1)
where Cht is defined as the leading indicator of a crisis at time t with h = 24, and
Xt is a matrix containing the explanatory variables. The probability of a crisis
occurring within 24 months can easily be inferred from the estimated counter-
part of the dependent variable. The performance of the probit model is compared
to the original KLR model for the Asian Crisis. Both models are estimated on
monthly data from 1970-1995 on the same 20 countries as in KLR. Out-of-sample
predictions are then made for the period 1995:5-1997:12. To enhance the compar-
ison between the non-parametric signalling approach and the parametric probit
model, the probit is said to issue a warning signal for a crisis when the estimated
probability rises over a given cut-off level. For the signalling approach the same
is done with the probability corresponding to the composite crisis indicator. For
both models the binary warning signal is then evaluated as the percentage of cor-
rect signals in the months leading up to a crisis, where in terms of the matrix
in Table 1.3 the ideal model has only non-zero values in cells A and D. For both
9
1 Introduction to Early Warning Systems
(ad hoc) cut-off levels for the crisis probability of 50% and 25%, the probit model
outperforms the signalling model both in- and out-of-sample.
It may be clear that the results of a model heavily depend on the seemingly ar-
bitrary decision made by the researcher about the cut-off threshold that determines
at which probability of a crisis a warning signal is issued. When this threshold is
low, few crisis will be missed but this comes at the expense of more false alarms.
When the threshold is high, it is exactly the opposite. A researcher must therefore
make a trade-off between failing to identify crises (type II errors) and having many
false alarms (type I errors). Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo (2004) quantify this
trade-off via a loss function. It is defined as the sum of the percentage of missed
crises and the percentage of false alarms. With this loss function, the optimal
threshold level can be determined endogenously from the model.8 Nevertheless,
the loss function might serve a different purpose for different users of the Early
Warning System. One can imagine for example that a policy maker might be
more concerned about failing to signal a crisis than an impartial researcher as the
loss associated with a missed crisis has more severe economic consequences than
having a few extra false alarms. To capture these different levels of risk-aversion,
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006); Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007) allowed the weight
(θ) of the two components of the loss function to be determined by the user of
the EWS to determine which cutoff point TH gives the best trade-off between the
false alarms and the missed crises:
Loss(TH) = θ · P (No Signal | Crisis) + (1− θ) · P (Signal | No Crisis). (1.2)
Notice that θ close to 1 indicates a high aversion toward failing to signal a crisis,
while θ close to 0 puts indicates a stronger focus on not giving too many false
crisis signals.
The number of crises per country in a typical dataset can be as low as one
or even none, resulting in a very low variability in the dependent variable of the
probit models thus hampering a consistent estimation. To increase the number
of observations, the panel dimension is often exploited. Even though this im-
poses a homogeneity assumption on the causes of currency crises not only over
time, but also across countries. Most studies choose to pool, either with or with-
out country-specific effects (e.g. Esquivel and Larrain, 1998; Van Rijckeghem and
Weder, 2001, 2003; Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado, 2004; Kamin, Schindler, and
Samuel, 2007). The homogeneity assumption is not the only issue when using
panel data techniques in this setting however. The validity of the estimation is
guaranteed by assuming independence across the cross-section dimension. Most
likely when different countries make up the cross-section dimension, the indepen-
dence assumption is violated. In a way, the added considerations with respect to
the independence and homogeneity are the price to pay in order to get sufficient
8Candelon, Dumitrescu, and Hurlin (2009) propose an alternative perspective by maximising
the sensitivity (A/(A+C)) and specificity (D/(B+D)) of the model, which is in essence the inverse
of the loss function by Berg et al. (2004).
10
1.1 Seminal Early Warning Systems
observations to consistently estimate the probit model in this setting.
The dependent variable in the probit model in (1.1) is by construction strongly
serially correlated. Whenever this variable takes the value one, it will be one for the
next h− 1 periods as well. This artificially induces serial correlation in the errors
of the model. The probit estimates are still consistent but their standard errors
are underestimated. Berg and Coke (2004) propose two solutions to this problem.
The first solution is to estimate Heteroscedasticity- and Autocorrelation-Corrected
(HAC) standard errors. The second alternative is to use bootstrap estimates of the
standard errors. When applying the corrected estimators to the original data of
Berg and Pattillo (1999), it turns out that only three of five variables remain sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level because of the higher standard errors. Additionally,
it is noteworthy that the HAC and bootstrap estimates correspond fairly closely.
Crises are by definition extreme events. As such, they lie in the tail of the dis-
tribution of realisations. As an Early Warning System’s main concern is to model
these extreme observations, it seems appropriate to make use of a distribution that
has more weight on the tails. As the logit model is based on the extreme value
distribution as opposed to the normal distribution of the probit, it makes for a
good alternative (Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin, 2003). In the logit setup, the
estimated regression is the same as in the probit case. The dependent variable is
a binary variable that takes the value 1 when a crisis will occur in the near fu-
ture and several macroeconomic characteristics act as explanatory variables. The
probability of a crisis occurring in the near future can be found from the regression
results as follows:
P [Chi,t = 1] =
exp(βˆ′Xi,t)
exp(1 + βˆ′Xi,t)
, (1.3)
P [Chi,t = 0] =
1
exp(1 + βˆ′Xi,t)
i = {1, . . . , N}, t = {1, . . . , T}, (1.4)
where Chi,t is the dependent variable of the model as in the probit, βˆ is the logit
estimate of the parameters, and Xi,t the matrix of explanatory variables.
Kumar et al. (2003) opt for a different method by taking the point of view of
an investor. Episodes of crisis are therefore defined slightly different as well. On
the one hand there is the unanticipated depreciation crash, a situation in which
the return for an investor who goes short in the domestic currency and invests that
money in US bonds is higher than a certain percentage. On the other hand are the
total depreciation crashes, which are periods in which the depreciation vis-a`-vis
the US Dollar exceeds a certain percentage and this depreciation is more than
double of the previous period. Even though this definition is similar to Frankel
and Rose (1996) who use it to exclude periods of smooth but high depreciation,
the rationale for the acceleration requirement follows from the assumption that
markets’ expectations of the exchange rate are based on last month’s movements.
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The fat-tailed extreme value distribution underlying the logit model is expected
to pick up currency crashes (tail-end observations) better than the normal distri-
bution of the probit. Indeed, in terms of explanatory power, the logit model out-
performs the probit both in- and out-of-sample (Kumar et al., 2003). Nevertheless,
the logit suffers from the same concerns as the probit, such as the low variability
and the strong autocorrelation in the dependent variable described above9.
1.1.3 Extensions and Empirical Issues
One of the empirical issues mentioned above is how to deal with the period fol-
lowing a crisis. The fundamentals of an economy still need to go through an
adjustment process before they reach their long run steady state. A comparison
of the mean values of fundamentals in the pre-crisis year, the post-crisis year,
and the ‘tranquil’ periods, confirms this claim (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006).
Whereas in the tranquil and pre-crisis periods there is on average overvaluation
of the currency, it is found that in the 12 months following a crisis the exchange
rate is typically undervalued. Similarly, the growth of real GDP is negative in
the first year following crises, in contrast to the tranquil periods and even the
pre-crisis months. Further, the short-term debt to reserves ratio and domestic
credit growth are slightly higher than in tranquil months. Even though in these
periods the probability of a new crisis is not larger or smaller than in tranquil
months, the characteristics on the basis of which the predictions are made, still
exhibit contrasting patterns. If the EWS fails to recognise this difference, there is
a potential danger of a post-crisis bias. To cope with it, Bussiere and Fratzscher
(2006) transform the binomial dependent variable into a multinomial one. Based
on crisis dates determined via the Exchange Market Pressure Index, the dependent
variable distinguishes three states of the world. The 12 months leading up to a
crisis are State 1; the 12 months following a crisis are State 2; and the remaining
periods are the tranquil months (State 0). When compared to traditional (binary)
Early Warning Systems, the predictive performance for 32 emerging markets in
1993-2001 of the multinomial logit EWS is better both in- and out-of-sample.
As recognised by Berg and Coke (2004), the binary crisis indicator that acts
as the dependent variable in logit EWSs exhibits strong autocorrelation by con-
struction. It seems therefore logical that the lagged dependent variable is a good
predictor for a crisis in the current period. Candelon, Dumitrescu, and Hurlin
(2010) therefore choose to estimate a dynamic panel logit model to predict cur-
rency crises in fifteen developing economies. Using the unified testing framework
of Candelon et al. (2009), it is shown that the dynamic panel logit model outper-
forms a set of benchmark models, including a static version of the panel logit. A
critical remark must be made however. Because the binary dependent variable is
close to having a unit root, the estimation of this dynamic panel logit suffers from
9Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2010) show that cross-sectional dependence could
also be an issue when the variables in the model have a distribution with heavy tails.
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two problems. First, the estimator converges very slowly. This issue is tackled
by the authors through the use of a Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimator,
resulting in convergence for almost all estimated subsamples. The second problem
however, still holds. As a result of the manner in which it is constructed, the lagged
crisis indicator dominates the estimations. In almost all subsamples it is highly
significant, whereas a limited number of independent explanatory variables retain
their significance when the dynamics are introduced. This is a problem because
the explanatory power of the model then comes from the artificially constructed
time dependence in the dependent variable. All things considered, one needs to
be very careful when introducing dynamics into a limited dependent variable EWS.
Naturally, the set of crisis indicators is also a subject of discussion as well as
their robustness across different countries. As KLR based their set of indicators
on crisis episodes in industrial countries, it could very well be that a different set
of variables is required for developing or transition economies. One might con-
sider indicators of capital flight risk or banking sector fragility. For this purpose
Edison (2003) develops a benchmark model for the signalling approach of KLR
and performs several robustness checks using a 28 country dataset of developing
and industrialised economies for the period 1970-1999. The original indicators in-
tended for industrial countries also work well for the developing countries thereby
showing their robustness across country samples. Brueggemann and Linne (2002)
apply the model to 8 emerging economies. Aside from the KLR indicators, good
predictive power is also found for the ratio lending rate over deposit rate and the
size of deposits relative to GDP. The good performance of these banking sector
indicators is most likely caused by underdeveloped banking regulations in a fast
growing financial market. It also indicates an interlinkage between currency and
banking crises, thus highlighting the issue of a ‘twin crisis’ problem. This finding is
confirmed by Weller (2001) who finds financial liberalisation as one of the culprits
of the increased number of banking and currency crises in emerging economies.
Specifically, following liberalisation, more liquidity enters an emerging economy,
leading to an increase in speculative financing which in turn increases the likeli-
hood of borrower default. As such, the chance of an outflow of international capital
rises. Separate logit regressions on the pre- and post-liberalisation subsamples of
27 emerging economies show that the sensitivity to changes in indicators of vul-
nerability such as high short-term loans and a real exchange rate overvaluation
increases after financial liberalisation. However, the observation that the general
likelihood of a currency crisis occurrence decreases over time after liberalisation,
confirms the view that the vulnerability to crisis should decrease in stable financial
markets, where suitable institutions have been established. The increased vulner-
ability following financial liberalisation is then mainly caused through the lack of
appropriate financial regulations and institutions. Emerging economies are there-
fore more vulnerable to the ‘twin crisis’ problem.
The last application of the seminal crisis models we will discuss here is the
study of Kamin et al. (2007). They use probit models to identify the effect of do-
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mestic versus external factors on the probability of crisis in emerging markets. To
this end, a dataset of 26 countries from 1981-1999 is used. An interesting finding
of the study is that, compared to the domestic variables, the external variables
have on average a limited effect on the probability of crisis over time, but that they
contribute more to the spikes in the probability during the actual times of crisis. It
results that domestic variables are the main factors determining the vulnerability
of a country’s economy, but that swings in the external variables might just be
the factor that pushes an economy ‘over the edge’ into a crisis. This shows that a
government can have an impact on a countries’ proneness for crisis by managing
their fiscal and monetary policy, accumulating less debt and providing an environ-
ment for strong GDP growth. Even though the vulnerability of crisis under poor
(domestic) fundamentals is higher, this study links the occurrence of a crisis to
the swings of external variables.
A joint problem for all (static) limited dependent variable models is that it
is assumed that observations of the binary crisis indicator are independent over
time. As mentioned above, Harding and Pagan (2011) show that this assumption
is clearly violated. While the time dependence can theoretically be approximated
by estimating a dynamic version of the probit/logit, the exact formulation of such
a model is not straightforward. In most applications of limited dependent variable
models to predicting currency crises, a static model is estimated. It must therefore
be kept in mind that these models are possibly misspecified.
1.2 Other Methods
As discussed above, the seminal Early Warning Systems have not been flawless
in performance, both technically and in terms of empirical results. Because they
are based on the first-generation models of Krugman (1979) and Flood and Gar-
ber (1984), these EWSs have performed poorly for crises that are not evidently
caused by misaligned macroeconomic fundamentals only (e.g. the Asian Crisis).
However, it has been shown that a currency crisis does not necessarily need to
be preceded by ongoing fiscal deficits, rising debt or falling reserves. Bad news
alone about future deficits can trigger a currency crisis through the expectations
of agents (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999; Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Re-
belo, 2001; Lahiri and Vegh, 2003). In this situation there will be no sign of poor
fiscal policy in the periods preceding a crisis. In these models it is argued that
the government will bail out troubled banks and that this is financed (partly) by
printing money. When market agents find out that some banks are failing, they
anticipate the printing of money at some point in the future. The speculative
attack then takes place before the actual printing. Therefore, a currency crisis
can take place without being preceded by misalignments of the macroeconomic
fundamentals such as money growth, fiscal deficits, debt or reserves.
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The theory that agents’ expectations can trigger a speculative attack originally
comes from the multiple equilibria model by Obstfeld (1994, 1996). Within this
second-generation model the decisions of the central bank depend on the inflation
and the deviation of output from its natural rate, where the level of output is
determined through an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. This leads to the
possibility of self-fulfilling expectations. Suppose for some fixed exchange rate that
market agents expect a devaluation. The decision about maintaining or abandon-
ing the peg depends on the costs associated with either outcome. If the government
chooses not to devalue, inflation will be lower than expected. It follows that out-
put will be below its natural rate. So the cost of maintaining the currency peg is
the lost output. The costs of a devaluation are high inflation and possible loss of
credibility of any future peg. If these are sufficiently low, the government can fol-
low the expectations of agents and abandon the currency peg. Equivalently, when
expectations are that the exchange rate will remain fixed, the optimal strategy for
the government is to indeed maintain the fixed rate if the (short-term) gains from
an unexpected devaluation are not too large. For a more detailed discussion of
second-generation models and the exact requirements for more than one equilib-
rium and thereby self-fulfilling expectations, see Jeanne (2000).
The poor performance of the standard Early Warning Systems in explain-
ing currency crises that have no clear basis in bad macroeconomic fundamentals,
has led to a variety of alternative EWSs. These alternative models use different
methodologies, in part to deal with the technical issues the seminal models suffer
from and in part to include additional features that might capture the effects as-
sociated with the second-generation and third-generation models. The remainder
of this section discusses the types of models that have been proposed along with
their strengths and weaknesses.
1.2.1 Duration Approach
As discussed above, within the theory of second-generation models it is possible
that expectations of agents lie at the basis of a currency crisis. In their analysis
of fixed exchange rate regimes in Latin America, Klein and Marion (1997) dis-
covered that after filtering out exogenous effects, the likelihood of a breakdown
of the currency peg depends on the duration of the current regime. In the first
few months after the fixed exchange regime has been installed, the probability of
a devaluation increases and towards the end of the first year, it starts to decrease.
An explanation of this duration dependence could be that a newly formed fixed
exchange rate lacks credibility in the first months and only gains the confidence of
market agents later. Klein and Marion (1997) recognise the duration dependence
but explicitly reject a duration analysis as in the standard duration models the
explanatory variables are assumed fixed throughout an entire period in a certain
state. This is no problem when the aim of the study is to explain the duration
of unemployment and the explanatory variables are workers’ characteristics10, or
10For example in Kiefer (1988); Pudney and Thomas (1995); Grogan and Van den Berg (2001)
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when trying to determine the effect of a new drug on life expectancy and the ex-
planatory variables are the patient’s data11. However, when the aim is to explain
the duration until the next breakdown of the fixed exchange rate regime or the
next crisis, the determining factors (mostly macroeconomic variables) are most
likely to change regularly. To be able to apply a duration analysis to currency
crises and capture agent’s expectations through duration dependence, an alterna-
tive duration model has been proposed that accommodates the duration model to
time-varying explanatory factors.
Tudela (2004) strives to explain the origin of currency crises for the 20 OECD
countries during the period 1970-97. A semiparametric Cox-Proportional Hazards
(PH) duration model is used to relate the occurrence of crises to on the one hand,
macroeconomic explanatory variables, and on the other hand, the duration pat-
tern of the non-crisis or tranquil periods. Following the critic of Klein and Marion
(1997) on standard duration models, Tudela proposes a modified duration model
allowing for time-varying explanatory variables. Using this approach, one can
study a country’s probability to exit the state of tranquility into a currency crisis
state, while accounting for duration dependence as a determinant of the likelihood
of currency crises and also including macroeconomic explanatory variable as used
by other researchers. Regarding the macroeconomic variables, the results are sim-
ilar to findings throughout the literature. Variables influencing the probability of
exit into a currency crisis state are swings in import and export growth, openness,
bank deposits, claims on government and foreign portfolio investment, and the
real effective exchange rate. Regarding the duration dependence, it is found that
the probability of currency crisis decreases with the duration of the current period,
which supports the observation of Klein and Marion (1997) and the notion that a
currency gains credibility with agents when it is free of crisis for a longer period.
The semiparametric duration model as described above has two main weak-
nesses. The first weakness is the fact that the time dependent part of the Cox-PH
model is non-parametric. In such a model, only the impact of the macroeconomic
explanatory variables on the probability of crisis is estimated whereas the effect of
the time spent in the current period of tranquility is measured as the residual of
the estimation. Even though this method offers the greatest amount of flexibility
in the relationship between the time since last the crisis and the probability of
transition into crisis, it also means that the duration of the current spell plays no
role in determining the hazard rate, the probability of transition. The time depen-
dence that is found from the Cox-PH model has then a purely illustrative effect
to gain insights into the distribution of the times between two crisis periods. The
second weakness of the model is the lack of dynamics. This makes any conclusions
about expected future durations difficult to draw.
A possibility to include dynamics in a duration model is the Autoregressive
Conditional Duration (ACD) framework of Engle and Russell (1997, 1998). In the
11See for example Douglas and Hariharan (1994); Hamilton and Hamilton (1997).
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ACD the expected duration of the next period conditional on the past durations
is modelled as a function of lagged observed durations and of lagged conditional
expected durations. The ACD model however, does not allow for new information
about explanatory variables to enter the model during a spell between two events.
When applied to the type of data it was originally developed for, the duration be-
tween two observations in high frequency tick-by-tick data, the emergence of new
information between two events is not very likely. In contrast, the datasets in the
crisis literature are typically at a much lower frequency. The periods of tranquility
between two devaluations and/or currency crises span several months. As each
month new observations of the explanatory variables become available, the model
needs to be able to take into account this new information even if the period of
tranquility does not end. The Autoregressive Conditional Hazards (ACH) model
by Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) allows to model such a feature.
The ACH model is based on the same equation for the expected duration of
the next period as the ACD. This equation is transformed to calender time and
together with the time-varying explanatory variables included in the equation of
the hazard rate. Because Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) assume an Exponential
distribution of the durations, the hazard rate is defined as the inverse of the sum
of the expected duration and the explanatory variables. Zhang (2001) uses the
model to explain the Asian crisis and it is found that a shorter duration of the
previous period increases the hazard rate (=instantaneous probability) of a new
crisis, which indicates that recent turmoil decreases the confidence of agents in the
currency’s stability. The ACH model as defined and used by Hamilton and Jorda´
(2002) and Zhang (2001) has two major shortcomings. The first is the assumption
of an Exponential distribution of the durations. This effectively means that the
time spent in the current period, no longer has an effect on the probability of crisis.
The second shortcoming is that through the inclusion of the explanatory variables
additively, the hazard rate is not automatically guaranteed to be between 0 and
1. Even though this issue is circumvented by a smoothed cut-off rule, it seems
inappropriate that a probability value can take values outside the [0, 1] interval.
A solution to these issues is provided in Chapter 4.
1.2.2 Markov Switching Approach
As shown in Jeanne and Masson (2000), the multiple equilibria model of Obst-
feld (1994, 1996) can be modelled directly using a Markov-Switching model with
as many states as equilibria. In most applications that model the occurrence of
financial crises, the number of equilibria is assumed to be two. In the world and
the accompanying Markov-Switching model two states are defined: A tranquil
state and a high-volatility or speculative attack state.12 As a result, the Markov-
Switching model also has two states. The advantage of the Markov-Switching
framework over for example the limited dependent variable models is that many
12See for example Cerra and Saxena (2002), Martinez-Peria (2002), Abiad (2003), Arias and
Erlandsson (2004)
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of the ad hoc decisions can be avoided. For example, the dependent variable of
the logit and probit models is typically a binary variable that is derived from a
market pressure index or exchange rate changes. A crisis is then defined when the
respective series crosses a certain threshold. Determining such a threshold is not
necessary in a Markov-Switching setup. Besides eliminating the arbitrary decision
about the threshold, using the continuous pressure index also prevents any loss
of information about the severity of the pressure on the currency. The Markov-
Switching model has another advantage over most other model types, as it delivers
a probability of crisis as well as the state of the world as output. This last feature
is particularly convenient as it avoids the ad hoc decision that is required with
most other models to determine the periods of crisis. In other models, the periods
of crisis are determined as those periods in which the probability of crisis exceeds
some cut-off value. Because the state of the world is part of the output, there is
no need to define such a cut-off value under the Markov-Switching approach.13
While the empirical studies that employ the Markov-Switching approach vary
in different respects, the results also show common features. Martinez-Peria
(2002) examines speculative attacks in the European Monetary System using a
3-dimensional VAR for the three components of the pressure index by Eichen-
green et al. (1998); changes in exchange rate, international reserves, and interest
rate differential. Findings indicate that both variables related to the fundamental
stability of a country and variables related to agents’ expectations have a signifi-
cant impact on the probability of transition between the two states of tranquility
and speculative pressure. One would expect that this finding can be extended to
the Asian Crisis. Applied to Indonesia, Cerra and Saxena (2002) find using the
pressure index of ERW as dependent variable, that indeed domestic factors (finan-
cial and nonfinancial), political factors as well as contagion14 play an important
role in the occurrence of speculative attacks. Others (e.g. Abiad, 2003; Arias and
Erlandsson, 2004) have also examined other Asian countries. It is confirmed that
not only poor domestic fundamentals have caused the crisis, but that also external
shocks (political and non-political) and contagion played their part. However, an
important note must be made at this point. For the different countries, different
factors were found to be most influential. This finding supports our claim in Chap-
ter 2 that the homogeneity that is implicitly assumed when pooling data across
countries is most likely not going to hold.
A last remark must be made with respect to the Markov-Switching approach
when applied to currency crises. In empirical papers it is assumed that the world
can be in only two states, a tranquil state and a high-volatility or turmoil state.
As shown theoretically by Jeanne and Masson (2000) this assumption is not by
definition valid, nor is it necessary as the Markov-Switching model also works
13Harding and Pagan (2002) show that in the Markov-Switching model an unobserved thresh-
old is used to determine the state of the world.
14The pressure indices of Korea and Thailand are included as explanatory variables to capture
market sentiment not otherwise captured.
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with more than two states. The idea of more than two equilibria is empirically
supported by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006), who find success when defining a
third state of the world, namely the transition period in the months following a
crisis. Therefore caution is required when making assumptions about the states of
the world.
1.2.3 Less Commonly Used Alternatives
As no existing model is able to predict every currency crisis perfectly, or even
explain all crises with the same model ex-post, many alternative models are still
being developed. In this section we discuss other types of models that have been
used to explain and/or predict currency crises. For different reasons these alter-
natives have (not yet) had many follow-ups. Therefore there are often only one or
two studies mentioned per method.
The first alternative discussed here is the Fisher Discriminant Analysis (FDA),
employed by Burkart and Coudert (2002) to explain currency crises in 15 emerg-
ing market economies. There are two states of the world, the ‘crisis’ state and the
‘tranquil’ state. Periods of crisis are determined via one of the dating methods
explained in the introduction. The FDA tries to find a linear combination of the in-
cluded fundamentals that results in the highest difference in group means between
the two states relative to its variance. The performance is measured according
to this difference in means. There are a few issues associated with this method.
First, an issue linked to the score of an observation. As it is the value of the
linear combination of explanatory variables compared to the mean of the scores in
the tranquil state, the results heavily depend on the stationarity properties of the
explanatory variables. A second weakness is the fact that the probability of crisis
is not a continuous output, but a step function depending on the risk category in
which the score is classified. Third, the method does not allow for any economet-
ric testing of the significance of the included explanatory variables. The decision
to include a variable is based on a cut-off value completely at will of the researcher.
Ghosh and Ghosh (2003) aim to include structural variables into EWSs such as
rule of law, corporate sector governance and corporate financing structure. Given
that these structural variables only change occasionally, their ability to predict
crises in a time-series setting is by construction limited. However, by analysing
their interactions with macroeconomic fundamentals the vulnerable economies can
be identified. To incorporate these interactions, the Binary Recursive Tree (BRT)
technique is used. In this methodology, for each indicator a threshold is deter-
mined. The sample is then split into two branches based on the threshold of
the best indicator. For each of these branches, the process is repeated with the
best indicator for that branch until some stopping rule. The strength of the BRT
technique is clearly the possibility to model more accurately the complex interac-
tions between the governance, corporate and macroeconomic characteristics of a
country. This comes at the cost however, of reducing all explanatory variables to
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binary series and thereby losing a lot of information. A further weakness of the
model is the complexity of the estimations procedure because at each node the
threshold value must be determined for each variable. This makes the procedure
cumbersome, hence not attractive as Early Warning System.
The signalling and limited dependent variable EWSs are based on a binary
crisis variable. Not only is in the construction of this variable an ad hoc decision
required to determine the threshold level. A lot of information about the severity
of the crisis is lost as well. To avoid information loss, some authors refrain from
this transformation altogether and use a continuous dependent variable. Grier and
Grier (2001) use the exchange rate depreciation as dependent variable in an OLS
regression, while Krkoska (2001) develops a 5-dimensional VAR with the contin-
uous pressure index, real exchange rate, industrial production, FDI and current
account as the endogenous variables. Even without any additional exogenous pa-
rameters this gives 25 parameters to be estimated. For each additional variable,
five more parameters enter the model. Given the limited size of a typical dataset,
a large number of (ad hoc) restrictions need to be imposed on the VAR to keep the
model tractable. These restrictions need to be imposed a priori, thereby leaving
the method exposed to the discretion of the researcher. A general disadvantage
of using a continuous variable as a measure of currency crisis is that it becomes
very difficult to defer a sensible measure for the probability of crisis as it remains
unclear at which level of depreciation or other measure one speaks of a crisis.
Vlaar (2000) however proposes an alternative method with the continuous Ex-
change Market Pressure Index as dependent variable, but avoids these problems
by modelling the pressure index as a draw from a mixture of two normal distri-
butions. The distributions correspond to two regimes, one for tranquil times and
one for times of turmoil. Both the probability of entering the crisis regime and
the severity of the crisis depend on the economic situation. In practice, the model
has a tendency to generate relatively many false alarms. Due to the randomness
of the draw from the mixed distribution, it can happen that a crisis is signalled
for no apparent reason. For example, Vlaar (2000) falsely detects one third of the
tranquil periods as a crisis period.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are successfully employed to model other
binary models such as bank failures. Peltonen (2006) proposes such a setup as
Early Warning System. This model works in three layers, an input layer (the eco-
nomic characteristics), a hidden layer, and an output layer (the crisis signal). The
inputs affect the hidden variables in the middle layer and these in turn determine
whether or on there is a crisis signalled. This ‘black box’ mechanism has a few
drawbacks. Firstly, the strength of the ANN model, its extreme flexibility to fit
well to the data can lead to overfitting. Secondly, a closed form solution is not
guaranteed. This makes interpreting the coefficients more difficult than with linear
models. When compared with a probit model on a dataset of 24 emerging coun-
tries, the ANN model performs only marginally better than the probit. Due to its
low transparency and difficult to interpret output combined with only marginally
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improved results, the ANN approach does not make an attractive practical Early
Warning System.
Whereas most studies aim to identify the situations in which a currency crisis
is most likely to occur, Osband and Van Rijckeghem (2000) take the opposite route
by identifying ‘safety zones’. Based on these safety zones, the values of macroe-
conomic fundamentals are identified for which currency crises never occur. These
fundamentals can then be used as guidelines for policymakers to keep the currency
free of speculative attacks. This coincides with the theory about the possibility of
multiple equilibria and the self-fulfilling expectations (Obstfeld, 1994). The exis-
tence of multiple equilibria however, depends on the fundamentals. Specifically,
under sufficiently strong fundamentals, a speculative attack may even never occur
(Krugman, 1979; Jeanne, 1997; Flood and Marion, 1999). The identification of
safety zones might be troubled by a possible drawbacks. Suppose that somewhere
in the past a crisis has occurred in a situation in which the fundamentals were
pretty solid. This could then lead to very high thresholds of guaranteed safety.
As a result very few observations are considered ‘safe’, thereby removing almost
all practical use of the model. A second issue is that the model is in essence not
an EWS. Nevertheless, it can be used in combination with other early warning
systems. By filtering out ‘safe’ currencies first, the fit of the existing EWS can
improve as the danger of pooling non-homogenous data reduces.
1.3 Concluding Remarks
The literature on Early Warning Systems has soared along with the increased
occurrence of financial turmoil. In this chapter many types of Early Warning Sys-
tems for currency crises have been discussed, each with their own strengths and
weaknesses. Notwithstanding the vast amount of literature, several issues have
not (yet) been resolved. Nor has an Early Warning Systems been developed that
perfectly predicts all crises. One thesis is not enough to tackle all these issues at
once, therefore the choice is made to tackle some in our view very problematic ones
on the way to hopefully a better Early Warning System. Therefore, the models in
this thesis will also have some shortcomings. This section gives an overview of the
specific issues that will be addressed in the remaining chapters of this work.
A considerable amount of papers (inter alii Berg and Coke, 2004; Esquivel and
Larrain, 1998; Caramazza et al., 2004; Kumar et al., 2003; Bussiere and Fratzscher,
2006; Weller, 2001), adopt a panel data framework where data for several countries
are pooled. This pooling is mainly motivated by an efficiency argument because
pooling countries increases the number of useful observations. As such, it should
lead to a gain in accuracy when estimating the underlying models. In this setup,
it is important however to verify the cross-sectional homogeneity of the individual
country models. Through pooling one makes the assumption that not only the
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same factors are supposed to explain adequately financial crises, but also that the
parameters may be assumed constant and homogenous across the cross section
dimension. Under these restrictive assumptions, heterogeneity can then be cap-
tured by a fixed effect dummy and all other features of the models are assumed
to be common to all the countries in the panel. This assumption contradicts how-
ever two well-known features of financial crises: First, not all crises have the same
underlying causes. While some are the consequences of macroeconomic funda-
mentals, others might be driven by psychological factors such as the self-fulfilling
prophecy or by a weak bank balance sheet. Second, the literature on the Asian
Crisis of 1997-98 has shown that spill-over effects are important determinants in
the transmission of a financial crisis. This means that turmoil can be transmitted
from one country to another, possibly leading to dynamic cross-sectional depen-
dence. The aggregation and pooling of these countries might not only lead to a loss
of information, but when the cross-sectional dependence is not accounted for, it
could also severely affect the estimation and inference. Chapter 2 focusses on this
poolability issue. Applying a panel-logit model of emerging market economies, it
is shown that researchers should not naively pool all the data available for a max-
imum number of countries, because the quality of the prediction would seriously
decrease. A preliminary analysis of optimal country clusters before setting up the
panel-logit model is proposed.
From Chapter 3 on, the analyses are based on the duration approach. This
approach facilitates that the probability of crisis can depend on the duration since
the last crisis, which acts as an approximation for the sentiments of market agents.
This duration dependence was recognised by Klein and Marion (1997) and devel-
oped into an EWS by Tudela (2004). In Chapter 3 a fully parametric alternative
is proposed to the semiparametric duration model of Tudela. The model is also
used to examine the probability to exit the crisis state. This information is useful
for policymakers to adjust their strategy for dealing with an ongoing crisis.
The duration EWS as developed in Chapter 3 does not allow for any time
dynamics. It may be expected however that the expectation of the duration of
the current period until crisis depends on the most recent durations. Therefore,
in Chapter 4 a modified version of the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH)
model by Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) is used to introduce these dynamics. In
the original ACH, the probability of transition could drop below 0. The proposed
modification ensures that this probability stays between 0 and 1. The ACH model
combines the dynamics of the Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) ap-
proach of Engle and Russell (1997) with time-varying economic fundamentals into
a model for the probability of transition from one state to another. The analysis
in Chapter 4 focusses on explaining all tension on the exchange market as opposed
to focussing only on tension that resulted in a currency crisis. This approach has
two advantages: Firstly, there is no need to define an ad hoc threshold value to
determine the extreme values of the index that proxies the crisis. Secondly, the
problem of too few useful data points (i.e. the number of crises) reduces, as peri-
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ods of increasing tension are defined irrespective of the severity of the tension.
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. The chapter summarises the results and limi-
tations of the preceding chapters. One of the shortcomings in the literature that
is not addressed in the preceding chapters, is the issue of capturing and modelling
market sentiments. Because market agents’ expectations are at the core of the
self-fulling prophecy and financial contagion, an empirical exercise is performed
with survey data as explanatory variables. This is applied to the EWS of Chap-
ters 3 and 4. The thesis ends with some additional insights based on the performed
exercise with the survey data, along with possible extensions to the literature.
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Chapter 2
A Cautious Note on Using
Panel Models to Predict
Financial Crises
Fortunately, most countries don’t get hit by a financial crisis too often. Conse-
quently, modelling crises for a single country becomes very difficult as there are
often so few observations that a model cannot be properly specified. To counter
this issue, a panel data framework across countries is often used to build Early
Warning Systems for financial crises. In this chapter we investigate the implicit
homogeneity assumption that is made when pooling data in a panel setup. In case
of the Early Warning Systems the implicit assumption is that crises are homoge-
nously caused by identical factors. It turns out that this assumption is not always
valid. In this chapter we therefore suggest a preliminary step aiming at forming
optimal country clusters based on Hausman test results for poolability.1
2.1 Introduction
The financial turmoils in the last decades have stimulated researchers in explain-
ing and predicting crises. As a consequence, academic literature on financial crises
has soared. As the branch of literature is extensively discussed in Chapter 1, we
here only provide a short recap of the papers that are of most interest for this
chapter. One of the first to address the causes of a financial crisis were Eichen-
green, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995, 1998). Afterwards, the literature focussed more
on developing countries (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, Calvo,
and Cooper, 1996). Simultaneously, models to predict the occurrence of a finan-
cial crisis have been developed. The first idea, proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo,
1This chapter is based on the paper Van den Berg, Candelon, and Urbain (2008) published
in Economics Letters 101(1), 80-83.
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and Reinhart (1998), involves building an Early Warning System (EWS) using a
signalling approach. They consider a large set of indicators relating to the exter-
nal position, the financial sector, the real sector, the institutional structure and
the fiscal policy of a particular country. When these indicators cross a certain
threshold, the model signals the probability of a future financial crisis. Berg and
Pattillo (1999) show that a simple probit-based model strongly outperforms the
signal approach using within sample and out-of-sample forecasts and recommend
the use of discrete choice techniques. The endogenous variable (Chi,t) represents
the occurrence of a crisis at most h-months ahead. If a crisis occurs within the
next h periods Chi,t takes a 1, otherwise a 0.
2 Several major criticisms have been
addressed to these models.
First, the results highly depend on the definition of the crisis. The literature
provides several methods to date financial crises. For example, the definition of
the financial crisis can be more strict or less strict and can encompass only success-
ful attacks or also unsuccessful ones. Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) for example
propose to consider a post-crisis regime, such that the crisis variable takes a zero
in tranquil periods, a one before and during the crisis and a two for post-crisis pe-
riods. This modification is expected to tackle the problem of the post-crisis bias.
Lestano, Jacobs, and Kuper (2003) distinguish between currency crises, banking
crises and debt crises. They use 4 different crisis determinants for currency crises
and determine the banking and debt crises with the help of IMF reports and cen-
tral banks.
Second, as pointed out by Berg and Coke (2004), the approach advocated by
Berg and Pattillo (1999) results in artificial serially correlated errors due to (i)
the fact that often forecast horizons are longer than the frequency at which the
forecast is being updated, (ii) the way the the crises variable is constructed as a
binary variable that takes the value one for the periods [t− h, t− 1] when a crises
occurs at time t. Consequently, the standard errors will be biased. Berg and Coke
(2004) propose to use a robust HAC covariance matrix or bootstrap method to
calculate the standard errors. Recently however, it has been shown by Harding
and Pagan (2011) that the serial dependence of the constructed dependent vari-
able even threatens the consistency of the estimation. The alternating sequences
of zeros and ones in the dependent variable gives the variable a Markov process
type time dependence. Failing to take into account this specific dependence, could
therefore lead to potentially invalid inference.
Third, several studies (in particular Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin, 2003)
have noticed that crisis events are less frequent than non-crisis ones. Indeed, the
probit model is not adequate to model events that are in the tail of a distribution,
and a logit model is preferred.
Fourth, seminal EWSs such as Berg and Pattillo (1999) exclusively focus on
2Berg and Pattillo (1999) found that the model performed at best when h = 24 months.
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individual countries. Several papers however (Shortland, 2004; Fuertes and Kalo-
tychou, 2007; Kumar et al., 2003, inter alii), have considered the possibility of
adopting a panel data framework where data for several countries are pooled.
Such an extension is mainly motivated by an efficiency argument since pooling
countries increases the number of useful observations and is supposed to lead to
a gain in accuracy when estimating the underlying discrete choice models. A cru-
cial untested assumption however is the homogeneity of the parameters, e.g. the
assumption that not only the same factors are supposed to explain adequately
financial crises, but also that the parameters may be assumed constant and ho-
mogenous across the cross-section dimension. Under these restrictive assumptions,
heterogeneity can be captured by a fixed effects dummy and all other features of
the models are assumed to be common to all the countries in the panel and the
data can be pooled for estimation and inference. This contradicts nevertheless two
well-known features of financial crises: First, not all crisis are the consequences
of macroeconomic fundamentals, but they might also be driven by psychological
factors as the self-fulfilling prophecy or by a weak bank balance sheet. Second,
the recent literature has shown that spill-over effects are important determinants
in the transmission of a financial crisis, meaning that “ground-zero” countries are
first hit and then transmit the turmoil, leading to strong , possibly dynamic cross-
sectional dependence. Aggregating and pooling these countries might not only lead
to a loss of information but could also severely affect the estimation and inferences.
This chapter proposes a deeper analysis of the panel-logit model as EWS. Based
on the arguments of Harding and Pagan (2011), it can be questioned whether a
static probit or logit should be used at all to model the constructed binary crisis
indicator. In this chapter however, the focus is exclusively on the poolability issue.
We show that emerging market forecasters should not naively pool all the data
available for a maximum number of countries, because the quality of the predic-
tion would seriously decrease. We advise them to perform a preliminary analysis
of optimal country clusters before setting up the panel-logit model. The chapter is
organised as follows: In Section 2.2, the competing models (full, regional, cluster
and individual) are presented. In Section 2.3, the ability of these models to predict
financial crises is investigated. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Empirical Models
Four different models are investigated. The first one, called “Naive Model” (NM)
integrates all the countries and all the data available in a pooled panel-logit frame-
work. The second model, called “Regional Model” (RM), only integrates countries
in the same geographical region. In this model, it is assumed that financial crisis
will affect all the countries lying in the same region similarly and simultaneously.
The third model, called “Cluster Model” (CM) only includes countries which can
be statistically pooled. In order to determine these clusters of countries, we follow
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the iterative approach of Kapetanios (2003).
The procedure of Kapetanios (2003) allows the researcher to not only test if a
panel is ‘poolable’ (i.e. the homogeneity assumption is not violated), but it also
determines which of the members of the cross-section is causing the rejection of
poolability. Through a sequence of tests, the method distinguishes the poolable
from the non-poolable series. The poolable series then form an optimal cluster.
Consider our panel logit:
Chi,t = αi + β
′
iXi,t−1 + εi,t, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T, (2.1)
with εi,t Normally distributed and Cov(εi,t, εj,t) = 0 for i 6= j.3 Furthermore,
Chi,t is the binary constructed crisis variable signalling a crisis h months ahead and
Xi,t−1 is the k−dimensional matrix of explanatory variables. For the purpose of
the test, the nature of the cross-sectional individual effect αi does not need to be
specified as the test holds for both random and fixed effects. The null hypothesis
of the test for poolability is of course given by:
H0 : βi = β ∀i = 1, . . . , N. (2.2)
Under the assumption that there exists a
√
NT -consistent, asymptotically normal
estimator (β˜) for β, and a
√
T -consistent, asymptotically normal estimator (βˆi)
for βi, a simple Hausman type statistic can be employed. For a given i, a test that
βˆi = β˜ can be based on the test statistic:
HMi = (βˆi − β˜)′V ar(βˆi − β˜)−1(βˆi − β˜), (2.3)
which is distributed χ2(k). A sequential procedure is employed to determine an
optimal cluster m (CLm) of countries.
4 Starting at the full sample (Naive Model),
this test is performed for each country separately, resulting in N test statistics.
If the supremum of these statistics rejects the null hypothesis, the series with the
maximum difference between the individual estimate of the vector β and its es-
timate obtained using the pooled dataset, is considered as non-poolable and is
removed from the dataset. The poolability test is then applied to the remaining
series and the procedure is then repeated until the poolability test does not reject
the null hypothesis for some subset (CLm) of the original set of series or until
we are left with a set of one series. After a poolable cluster has been found, the
procedure is re-applied to the remaining series that were previously considered
non-poolable in order to detect a potential second cluster. This process ends when
no more clusters are found. The remaining countries do not belong to any cluster
and are modelled individually.
The fourth model, called “Country model” (CoM) is the logit model estimated
for each individual country and constitutes a benchmark. With the exception of
3Cross-sectional dependence is not considered here and is left for further research.
4A set of countries is called an optimal cluster if βi = βm, for all countries in the set, where
βm is the vector of coefficients corresponding to the complete cluster.
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the Country Model, we are dealing with panel-logit models. Therefore particular
attention was devoted to the correct specification of country-specific terms, which
can be fixed or random. Hausman tests conclusively determine the fixed effects
model superior in all cases.5
2.2.1 Data, Crisis Indicator and Performance Indicators
The dataset covers 12 countries from the regions Latin-America and Asia: Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. Data are at monthly frequency, adjusted for
seasonality and run from January 1985 to January 2005.6 The data is obtained
via Datastream7.
As explanatory variables for the hazard rate we selected several macroeconomic
variables relating to different aspects of the economy. Corresponding to those used
in Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin (2003), we use variables from the external sec-
tor, the financial sector and the real sector. Notice that all explanatory variables
enter the regression one month lagged. This way, at time t, the probability of a
crisis is affected only by variables which are observable at time t. Following Kumar
et al. (2003), the impact of extreme values is reduced by dampening every variable
via the transformation yNewt = (sign of yt) ∗ ln(1 + | yt| ).
The external sector can be separated into the current account and the capital
account. Because we use monthly data, we cannot use the quarterly data for the
current account and capital account directly. We therefore approximate these fac-
tors by other variables that are available on a monthly basis. The first variable
relating to the current account is the annual growth rate of exports. Because a
decrease in exports indicates a loss in international competitiveness, it can lead to
a recession and business failures (Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes, 1995). Hence
we expect a decrease in exports to increase the probability of a crisis. The other
variable related to the current account is the imports annual growth rate. For
imports the theory is not so clear. On the one hand an decrease in imports could
be an indication of weakening of economic activity, while on the other hand an
increase in imports can be caused by a strong overvaluation of the real exchange
rate (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). To proxy the capital account, the real in-
terest rate differential with respect to the United States as well as the growth in
international reserves are used. For the latter we expect that a decrease in re-
serves lowers the leverage of the central bank to deal with speculative attacks and
therefore increases the probability of crisis. A high real interest rate differential
is typically associated with a high amount of pressure on the currency as the in-
creased domestic interest rate could be a response to excess supply of the currency
5Models are estimated by Newton Raphson’s Maximum Likelihood using Stata 10.1 software.
6Due to the limited data availability is was unfortunately not possible to construct a consis-
tent dataset dating further back than 1985.
7Sources are the IMF-IFS database and the national banks of the respective countries.
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(see Eichengreen et al., 1995).
The second aspect of the economy we consider is the financial sector. It has
been shown by McKinnon and Pill (1996) that currency crises, most notably those
accompanied by a banking crisis (labelled as “twin crises”), have often been pre-
ceded by periods of financial liberalisation. Facilitated by the more relaxed reserve
requirements for banks, the financial liberalisation tends to make people and banks
overconfident in the stability of the currency, leading to excessive (foreign) borrow-
ing. The banking sector now becomes vulnerable to speculative attacks (Krugman,
1979). Overborrowing results in an increase in the M2 multiplier as well as growth
of domestic credit relative to GDP (McKinnon and Pill, 1998). For both these
variables it holds that a higher ratio indicates higher vulnerability and therefore a
higher probability of crisis. To capture the credit risk rating and the willingness of
banks to lend, the ratio lending rate over deposit rate is included. An increase in
this ratio indicates that banks require a high risker premium on their loans. The
higher risk premium is a direct consequence of a lower economic stability. We also
include the ratio M2 over reserves. An increase of the ratio is caused both by an
increase in M2 money and decrease in reserves. The higher this ratio, the more
vulnerable is the economic system to speculative attacks (Calvo and Mendoza,
1996). The ratio M2 over reserves is included both as levels and as growth rate,
because not only an increase in the ratio increases the vulnerability, but also a ra-
tio that is simply high. The final financial variable is the growth of bank deposits.
A decrease in this variable shows capital flight and bank runs, a clear indicator of
an imminent crisis (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1997).
The last aspect of the economy captured by the variables, is the real sector
of the economy. As a proxy for output growth we use the industrial production
growth rate. A decrease in industrial production growth is the sign of a weakening
domestic economy and therefore an increase in the probability of crisis.
The reason for the transformation of most of the explanatory variables to their
annual growth rates is not only the benefit that we can have data at a monthly
frequency. As a crisis is by definition a sudden change with respect to a previ-
ous time period, we believe that we must also use the changes in our explanatory
variables instead of the levels. The transformation also makes data for different
countries more comparable: Even though the level of, for example, international
reserves can differ substantially at any point in time, the percentage changes in
reserves will be a lot closer together and are also likely to react in a similar way
across countries in case of a crisis. Furthermore, missing values in the middle of
the sample are interpolated using cubic splines. Missing values at the beginning
or end of the sample are dropped.
The periods of crisis are determined via the Exchange Market Pressure In-
dex (EMPI) (see Eichengreen et al., 1995). This EMPI is the weighted average
between the 6-month change in the exchange rate with respect to the US dollar
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and (the negative of) the 6-month change in the international reserves where the
weights are chosen such that the variance of the two factors are equal. The sample
is split into high inflation periods and low inflation periods, because volatility is
typically higher in periods of high inflation. The cutoff point is when the 6-month
inflation is more than 50%. For both subsamples, a crisis is signalled when the
EMPI exceeds the threshold of the mean plus two times the standard deviation.8
The respective quality of the four models in consideration is measured in terms
of the performance as crisis predictor. For this purpose, three traditional in-sample
goodness-of-fit indicators (see Diebold, 2004) are defined as:
QPS =
1
T
T∑
t=1
2(Pt − C24,t)2, (2.4)
LPS =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[(1− C24,t) ln(1− Pt) + C24,t ln(Pt)] , (2.5)
KS =
A
A+ C
− B
B +D
, (2.6)
where T is the sample size, Pt is the fitted crisis probability, A is the number of
correctly predicted crises, B counts the number of false alarms, C are the missed
crises and D stands for the correctly predicted tranquil periods. It is straightfor-
ward to notice that the quality of a model increases as QPS and LPS move close
to 0, and KS approaches 1.9
2.3 The Results
As mentioned in the previous section, the procedure to find poolable country clus-
ters by Kapetanios (2003) is an iterative process. The intermediate and final
results of this process are presented in this section as well as a reverse method to
validate the findings.
Table 2.1 shows the intermediate results of the Kapetanios approach. The top
two panels in the table show the process towards the formation of two clusters in
Latin America. We start with the full regional sample. It turns out that Uruguay
has the highest Hausman statistic and in the next stage it is removed from the
sample. In the second stage Brazil is deleted followed by Argentina in the third
stage, finally leading to a ‘poolable’ cluster of three countries: Mexico, Peru and
Venezuela. After the cluster has been identified, it is checked if the remaining
8As pointed out in Chapter 1, this method of defining periods of crisis has its shortcomings.
In the absence of a universal consensus about which dating method is best, we choose the method
that comes closest to capturing the fluctuations on the exchange rate market.
9Alternative criteria based on the Receiving Operating Characteristic curve to evaluate the
forecasting ability of models for binary variables are also available (see Candelon et al., 2009)
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Country
Stage of cluster-finding process
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3st Stage 4th Stage 5th Stage
Argentina 26.34 30.99 54.86 - -
Brazil 61.72 79.46 - - -
Mexico 49.85 58.72 44.58 42.75 -
Peru 30.25 24.11 41.79 14.48 -
Uruguay 78.12 - - - -
Venezuela 39.15 38.61 37.62 41.55 -
Argentina 36.74 36.01 - - -
Brazil 59.18 49.10 - - -
Uruguay 77.70 - - - -
Indonesia 29.16 29.09 27.81 30.04 26.33
Korea 29.77 29.57 29.13 46.66 1.94
Malaysia 43.70 52.09 63.60 - -
Philippines 63.31 61.74 56.17 53.91 -
Taiwana 69.94 - - - -
Thailanda 69.94 65.04 - - -
Malaysia 27.61 9.04 - - -
Philippines 75.22 - - - -
Taiwana 53.68 28.66 - - -
Thailanda 53.68 28.66 - - -
Starting at the regional sample, the country with the highest Hausman statis-
tic (current sample vs single country) is deleted in each stage (in bold). The
countries in the cluster are then removed from the sample and for the remaining
countries the process is repeated.
aThe single-country models of both Taiwan and Thailand result in a perfect
fit due to collinearity between the dependent variable and the explanatory vari-
ables. For Taiwan and Thailand the Hausman test is therefore performed with
respect to their joint 2-country model.
Table 2.1: Intermediate top-down results for finding optimal clusters
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Base
Country
Paired Country
Argentina Brazil Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela
Argentina - 36.01 76.47 52.01 62.51 84.32
Brazil 49.10 - 60.37 55.61 90.15 85.50
Mexico 48.80 48.50 - 43.81 55.94 39.99
Peru 46.91 51.03 11.90 - 94.59 28.58
Uruguay 51.07 60.28 98.02 73.59 - 41.99
Venezuela 48.69 59.34 73.96 35.14 59.80 -
Base
Country
Paired Country
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
Indonesia - 26.33 45.19 60.21 32.52 46.30
Korea 1.94 - 64.34 73.70 29.20 85.68
Malaysia 49.35 36.52 - 42.93 32.09 13.03
Philippines 60.66 26.14 48.40 - 28.01 77.70
Taiwana 75.78 39.70 26.54 65.18 - -
Thailanda 61.66 53.83 27.94 62.11 - -
In each row the Hausman test statistics of the 2-country models vs the single-country
model of the base country are presented. The statistics for the countries in the same
cluster are given in bold.
aFor Taiwan and Thailand, the Hausman tests are performed with respect to their joint
2-country model. Their bilateral poolability test is therefore degenerate.
Table 2.2: Bilateral poolability test results
country set still includes another poolable (sub)set. A second cluster is identified,
namely Argentina and Brazil, leaving Uruguay as part of no clusters. For the
Asian region a similar process leads to the identification of two clusters: Indonesia
and Korea, and Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. The Philippines do not belong to
any cluster.10 Due to the sequential form of the cluster-finding process, it might
be the case that for some countries a non-optimal clustering occurs. We therefore
examine the bilateral poolability of the countries. Hausman tests are performed
to compare the parameter estimates of the model based on the single country
with the two-country models. The results are summarised in Table 2.2. For each
country, with only one exception, it can be seen that the lowest values for the
Hausman statistic (per row) correspond to the respective cluster partners. This
result confirms that the identified clusters are indeed the groups of most poolable
countries.
As it turns out, the optimal clusters are smaller than the regional samples.
It means that pooling the data, even by region, is rejected by Hausman’s test.
Economically, it signifies that the factors explaining the recent crises are generally
not identical across the countries. The four clusters that are found turn out to
10Notice here that in the first stage of the first Asian cluster Thailand could have been removed
instead. This case was explored and it leads to the same end-result as Taiwan would be removed
from the sample in the very next stage.
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Country Cluster
vs Total Sample vs Region vs Cluster
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.
Argentina Brazil 61.13 0.0000 53.08 0.0000 36.01 0.0001
Brazil Argentina 67.59 0.0000 61.72 0.0000 49.10 0.0000
Mexico Peru, Venezuela 59.54 0.0000 49.85 0.0000 42.75 0.0000
Peru Mexico, Venezuela 34.03 0.0007 30.25 0.0026 14.48 0.2709
Uruguay - 80.28 0.0000 78.12 0.0000 - -
Venezuela Mexico, Peru 42.76 0.0000 39.15 0.0001 41.55 0.0000
Indonesia Korea 46.99 0.0000 29.16 0.0037 26.33 0.0096
Korea Indonesia 30.40 0.0024 29.77 0.0030 1.94 0.9995
Malaysia Taiwan, Thailand 12.47 0.4084 43.70 0.0000 9.04 0.6996
Philippines - 63.74 0.0000 63.31 0.0000 - -
Taiwan/
Thailanda
Malaysia 57.84 0.0000 69.94 0.0000 28.66 0.0073
For each country three Hausman-based test are performed: The model estimated using only the
individual country versus respectively the total sample, the regional sample and the cluster.
aDue to their degenerate single-country models, For this reason the comparisons are per-
formed with respect to their joint 2-country model.
Table 2.3: Results of the Kapetanios test for poolability
be very reasonable from an economic point of view. Argentina and Brazil were
in the late 80’s characterised by hyper inflation (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1995). Fi-
nancial crises match these periods of extreme inflation rates and end with the
stabilisation plans established in the early 90’s. Inflation is here the fundamental
underlying variable that affects the EWS in this cluster. The cluster Mexico, Peru
and Venezuela seems to have less economic basis, although it must be noted that
all three countries are characterised by a powerful minority with political power,
thereby making economic reforms towards a free market and globalisation very
difficult Philip (1999). On the contrary, the occurrence of the Asian crisis (for
most of the Asian countries the only crisis episode detected in our sample) in both
Indonesia and Korea is similar and has been driven by excessive borrowing and
risk taking (see Evrensel and Kutan, 2006) leading to the moral hazard problem
(Haggard and MacIntyre, 2001). With respect to the cluster Malaysia, Taiwan
and Thailand, the structural similarity around the Asian crisis is straightforward.
As they were characterised by poor institutional local financial markets, the de-
crease in the returns on investments has forced these countries to an increase in
short-term foreign exchange borrowing (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 1999; Kuo,
2001) making the economies vulnerable to speculation.
2.3.1 Comparing the Four Models
For each country we have defined four models, the Naive Model (NM), the Re-
gional Model (RM), the Cluster Model (CM) and the Country Model (CoM).11 In
this section we examine the poolability of the three panel models and evaluate the
11The full estimation results are tabulated in Appendix A at the end of this chapter.
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Optimal Cluster Goodness of fit NM RM CM CoM
Brazil
QPS 0.2461 0.2409 0.2135 0.1895
Argentina LPS -0.3833 -0.3738 -0.3362 -0.2844
KS 0.4245 0.4437 0.5025 0.5862
Argentina
QPS 0.3366 0.3868 0.3009 0.2349
Brazil LPS -0.5296 -0.5778 -0.4619 -0.3859
KS 0.4095 0.2942 0.4923 0.5675
Peru,
Venezuela
QPS 0.2662 0.2653 0.2256 0.0639
Mexico LPS -0.4733 -0.4319 -0.3390 -0.1082
KS 0.5285 0.5194 0.5625 0.9220
Mexico,
Venezuela
QPS 0.1833 0.1818 0.0867 0.0961
Peru LPS -0.3235 -0.3150 -0.2556 -0.1827
KS 0.7116 0.8055 0.9333 0.8994
(none)
QPS 0.3855 0.3672 0.0996 0.0996
Uruguay LPS -0.6032 -0.5739 -0.1583 -0.1583
KS 0.3065 0.3329 0.8393 0.8393
Mexico, Peru
QPS 0.3866 0.3431 0.2731 0.1678
Venezuela LPS -0.5616 -0.5130 -0.4297 -0.2587
KS 0.3656 0.4748 0.5553 0.7613
Korea
QPS 0.2898 0.2145 0.1321 0.1109
Indonesia LPS -0.4521 -0.3313 -0.2071 -0.1738
KS 0.1822 0.6687 0.7351 0.7583
Indonesia
QPS 0.1885 0.1623 0.1241 0.0452
Korea LPS -0.3183 -0.2607 -0.1903 -0.0749
KS 0.1537 0.5990 0.5990 0.9245
Taiwan,
Thailand
QPS 0.1786 0.0929 0.0443 0.0269
Malaysia LPS -0.2848 -0.1663 -0.0748 -0.0420
KS 0.4580 0.8164 0.9032 0.9466
(none)
QPS 0.3688 0.2915 0.1187 0.1187
Philippines LPS -0.5502 -0.4444 -0.1909 -0.1909
KS -0.0200 0.4358 0.7716 0.7716
Malaysia,
Thailand
QPS 0.1481 0.0558 0.0668 -
Taiwana LPS -0.2397 -0.0871 -0.1101 -
KS 0.6813 0.8863 0.8663 -
Malaysia,
Taiwan
QPS 0.1917 0.2328 0.1325 -
Thailanda LPS -0.3109 -0.3686 -0.2012 -
KS 0.3366 0.2367 0.6580 -
aThe single-country models of both Taiwan and Thailand result in a perfect fit due to
collinearity between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. For this reason they
are removed from the table.
Table 2.4: In-sample performance of the empirical models
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performance of all four models in terms of within sample goodness-of-fit. To eval-
uate the forecasting capabilities of the models, one might argue that out-of-sample
estimations are needed. Inoue and Kilian (2006) show however, that the compari-
son of within-sample and out-of-sample performance give very similar results. We
therefore deem it sufficient to evaluate only the within-sample performance.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the Hausman test on the comparison between
the panel models and the single-country models. For most countries the regional
model is closer to the single-country model than the naive model, indicating that
regional pooling at least should give slightly better results than a naively pooled
model. However, the cluster model is by far, and consistently for all countries,
better poolable than the other two models. This confirms once more that the
implicit homogeneity assumption made when pooling data, must first be checked.
The outcome that the optimal clusters are smaller than the regional samples is
supported by the goodness-of-fit indicators. Table 2.4 shows that the CM always
outperforms NM and RM. Even if the CoM still performs slightly better than the
CM in terms of in-sample prediction, the gain due to the higher precision of the es-
timator might be justified in this case. To illustrate the predicting power of each of
the models, the probability of a financial crisis is plotted in Figure 2.1. The results
outlined by the goodness-of-fit indicators are confirmed. Nevertheless the figure
points out that the loss due to the use of naive or regional panel-logit models is
particularly large for Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this chapter suggests that crisis forecasters should not naively pool
all the data available for a maximum number of countries, because the quality of
the prediction would seriously decrease. We advise them to perform a preliminary
analysis of optimal country clusters before setting up the panel-logit model.
In this chapter we propose to examine the poolability of a panel using Haus-
man tests. Based on the results of these tests, optimal clusters can be formed.
Unsurprisingly it turns out that the optimal clusters are smaller than the whole
set of countries and also smaller than the set of countries located in the same
region. This means that pooling data, even by region, might not be valid. Eco-
nomically, this leads to the conclusion that the factors explaining currency crises
are generally not identical across countries. Four optimal clusters are found: a)
Argentina and Brazil, b) Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, c) Indonesia and Korea
and d) Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. As the optimal clusters are formed such
that the homogeneity assumption is not violated within them, one would expect
that the Cluster Model performs better in terms of predicting and explaining crisis
periods. This hypothesis is indeed supported by our goodness-of-fit measures.
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2.A Appendix: Full Estimation Results
This appendix contains the estimation results for the naive, regional, cluster and
country models tabulated separately per country.
Table 2.5: Estimation Results for Argentina
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -0.050 -1.296 1.956 -
(0.319) (0.380) (0.806) (1.449)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -1.925∗∗ -3.363∗ +/-
(0.311) (0.375) (0.800) (1.774)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ -0.442 -2.025 -
(0.333) (0.382) (0.651) (1.322)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 -0.145 -0.295 -0.950∗∗ +
(0.201) (0.193) (0.245) (0.415)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 1.121∗∗ 0.716 2.280 +
(0.428) (0.451) (0.746) (1.639)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 -0.783∗∗ 0.611 -2.169∗∗ +
(0.290) (0.361) (0.538) (1.045)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ 0.135 2.089 +
(0.294) (0.323) (0.502) (2.571)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ 5.408∗∗∗ 3.589∗∗ +
(0.304) (0.330) (0.765) (1.532)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 0.555 0.099 0.415 +
(0.331) (0.384) (0.769) (1.861)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ 0.154 -0.401 -
(0.246) (0.300) (0.573) (0.971)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -0.924 -4.118∗ -13.987∗∗∗ -
(0.237) (0.922) (2.234) (5.260)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -637.83 -182.76 -65.117
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results for Brazil
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -0.050 -1.296 -5.411∗∗∗ -
(0.319) (0.380) (0.806) (1.356)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -1.925∗∗ 1.350 +/-
(0.311) (0.375) (0.800) (1.182)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ -0.442 3.306∗∗ -
(0.333) (0.382) (0.651) (1.365)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 -0.145 -0.295 -0.620 +
(0.201) (0.193) (0.245) (0.413)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 1.121∗∗ 0.716 2.543∗ +
(0.428) (0.451) (0.746) (1.316)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 -0.783∗∗ 0.611 2.761∗∗ +
(0.290) (0.361) (0.538) (1.117)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ 0.135 1.340∗ +
(0.294) (0.323) (0.502) (0.705)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ 5.408∗∗∗ 8.804∗∗∗ +
(0.304) (0.330) (0.765) (1.407)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 0.555 0.099 0.337 +
(0.331) (0.384) (0.769) (1.119)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ 0.154 5.612∗∗∗ -
(0.246) (0.300) (0.573) (1.999)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -0.924 -4.118∗ -1.623 -
(0.237) (0.922) (2.234) (3.446)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -637.83 -182.76 -88.365
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
Table 2.7: Estimation Results for Mexico
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -0.050 0.375 9.415∗∗ -
(0.319) (0.380) (0.605) (4.463)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -0.750 -19.225∗∗∗ +/-
(0.311) (0.375) (0.594) (7.380)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ -0.433 12.942∗∗∗ -
(0.333) (0.382) (0.683) (3.573)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 -0.145 -1.031 17.416∗∗ +
(0.201) (0.193) (1.074) (7.231)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 1.121∗∗ -3.034∗∗∗ -22.045∗∗∗ +
(0.428) (0.451) (0.984) (5.526)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 -0.783∗∗ -0.429 22.267∗∗∗ +
(0.290) (0.361) (0.740) (6.921)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ -10.791∗∗∗ -53.675∗∗∗ +
(0.294) (0.323) (1.320) (12.581)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ 1.950∗∗∗ 2.697 +
(0.304) (0.330) (0.667) (2.912)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 0.555 2.284∗∗ 13.311∗∗∗ +
(0.331) (0.384) (0.659) (4.168)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ -3.641∗∗∗ -8.364∗∗∗ -
(0.246) (0.300) (0.589) (2.182)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -0.924 3.091∗∗ -8.389 -
(0.237) (0.922) (1.367) (14.030)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -637.83 -234.56 -24.771
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results for Peru
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -0.050 0.375 -3.677 -
(0.319) (0.380) (0.605) (2.336)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -0.750 1.357 +/-
(0.311) (0.375) (0.594) (1.530)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ -0.433 -2.512 -
(0.333) (0.382) (0.683) (1.730)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 -0.145 -1.031 -2.705 +
(0.201) (0.193) (1.074) (2.623)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 1.121∗∗ -3.034∗∗∗ -3.649 +
(0.428) (0.451) (0.984) (2.989)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 -0.783∗∗ -0.429 1.085 +
(0.290) (0.361) (0.740) (1.722)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ -10.791∗∗∗ -9.293∗∗∗ +
(0.294) (0.323) (1.320) (2.813)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ 1.950∗∗∗ 1.212 +
(0.304) (0.330) (0.667) (1.689)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 0.555 2.284∗∗ -1.636 +
(0.331) (0.384) (0.659) (1.666)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ -3.641∗∗∗ -11.096∗∗∗ -
(0.246) (0.300) (0.589) (3.207)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -0.924 3.091∗∗ 14.824∗∗∗ -
(0.237) (0.922) (1.367) (5.227)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -637.83 -234.56 -41.848
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
Table 2.9: Estimation Results for Uruguay
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -0.050 - 2.242 -
(0.319) (0.380) (2.242)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ - -4.362∗ +/-
(0.311) (0.375) (2.313)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ - 0.552 -
(0.333) (0.382) (6.236)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 -0.145 - 44.461∗∗∗ +
(0.201) (0.193) (16.740)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 1.121∗∗ - 1.549 +
(0.428) (0.451) (5.419)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 -0.783∗∗ - -5.873∗∗ +
(0.290) (0.361) (2.994)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ - -5.240∗∗ +
(0.294) (0.323) (2.601)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ - -13.872∗∗∗ +
(0.304) (0.330) (4.302)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 0.555 - 5.369 +
(0.331) (0.384) (5.647)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ - 2.314 -
(0.246) (0.300) (5.856)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -0.924 - -6.242 -
(0.237) (0.922) (5.864)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -637.83 - -36.245
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
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Table 2.10: Estimation Results for Venezuela
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -0.050 0.375 0.785 -
(0.319) (0.380) (0.605) (1.096)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -0.750 -0.608 +/-
(0.311) (0.375) (0.594) (1.120)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.866∗∗∗ -0.433 -8.529∗∗∗ -
(0.333) (0.382) (0.683) (2.838)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 -0.145 -1.031 -1.328 +
(0.201) (0.193) (1.074) (2.987)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 1.121∗∗ -3.034∗∗∗ -11.402∗∗∗ +
(0.428) (0.451) (0.984) (3.383)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 -0.783∗∗ -0.429 -10.561∗∗∗ +
(0.290) (0.361) (0.740) (2.803)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ -10.791∗∗∗ -5.009∗ +
(0.294) (0.323) (1.320) (3.019)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗ 1.950∗∗∗ 77.691 +
(0.304) (0.330) (0.667) (70.768)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 0.555 2.284∗∗ 4.463∗ +
(0.331) (0.384) (0.659) (2.579)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗ -3.641∗∗∗ -0.666 -
(0.246) (0.300) (0.589) (1.864)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -0.924 3.091∗∗ 7.242∗∗∗ -
(0.237) (0.922) (1.367) (2.689)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -637.83 -234.56 -59.247
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
Table 2.11: Estimation Results for Indonesia
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -3.137∗∗∗ -13.011∗∗∗ -14.643∗∗∗ -
(0.319) (0.811) (2.348) (3.500)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ 1.489∗∗ 2.941∗∗ -0.092 +/-
(0.311) (0.730) (1.357) (1.961)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.932∗∗∗ -10.624 -20.865∗∗∗ -
(0.333) (0.713) (2.213) (5.700)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 9.740∗∗∗ 33.140∗∗∗ 72.624∗∗∗ +
(0.201) (2.659) (7.150) (18.961)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 4.565∗∗∗ 7.163∗∗∗ 0.476 +
(0.428) (1.171) (2.377) (6.199)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 2.612∗∗∗ -2.502 -1.036 +
(0.290) (0.649) (2.283) (3.099)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗ 6.176∗∗ 4.631 +
(0.294) (0.991) (2.681) (6.519)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 5.289∗∗∗ 39.741∗∗∗ 121.547∗∗∗ +
(0.304) (0.713) (8.370) (33.358)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 -1.388∗ -12.409∗∗∗ -20.486∗∗∗ +
(0.331) (0.778) (0.659) (5.191)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗ 16.764∗∗∗ 15.374∗∗∗ -
(0.246) (0.634) (0.589) (3.562)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -4.715 -6.004∗∗ -12.485∗∗∗ -
(0.237) (1.173) (2.879) (4.057)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -379.80 -90.993 -39.796
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
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Table 2.12: Estimation Results for Korea
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -3.137∗∗∗ -13.011∗∗∗ -41.490∗∗∗ -
(0.319) (0.811) (2.348) (12.129)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ 1.489∗∗ 2.941∗∗ 12.634 +/-
(0.311) (0.730) (1.357) (9.380)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.932∗∗∗ -10.624 -37.908∗∗∗ -
(0.333) (0.713) (2.213) (12.908)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 9.740∗∗∗ 33.140∗∗∗ 14.525 +
(0.201) (2.659) (7.150) (49.440)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 4.565∗∗∗ 7.163∗∗∗ 19.411∗∗ +
(0.428) (1.171) (2.377) (8.537)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 2.612∗∗∗ -2.502 63.632∗∗∗ +
(0.290) (0.649) (2.283) (23.120)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗ 6.176∗∗ 55.267∗∗∗ +
(0.294) (0.991) (2.681) (18.779)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 5.289∗∗∗ 39.741∗∗∗ 112.948∗∗∗ +
(0.304) (0.713) (8.370) (33.517)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 -1.388∗ -12.409∗∗∗ -43.710∗∗∗ +
(0.331) (0.778) (0.659) (16.852)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗ 16.764∗∗∗ 67.869∗∗∗ -
(0.246) (0.634) (0.589) (19.248)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -4.715 -6.004∗∗ 73.616∗∗∗ -
(0.237) (1.173) (2.879) (27.530)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -379.80 -90.993 -17.152
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
Table 2.13: Estimation Results for Malaysia
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -3.137∗∗∗ -9.258∗∗∗ -0.252 -
(0.319) (0.811) (3.172) (9.682)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ 1.489∗∗ 1.550 -21.470 +/-
(0.311) (0.730) (2.630) (15.383)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.932∗∗∗ 3.127 31.522 -
(0.333) (0.713) (2.221) (23.643)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 9.740∗∗∗ -29.084∗ 232.246 +
(0.201) (2.659) (16.619) (198.54)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 4.565∗∗∗ -5.104 34.741 +
(0.428) (1.171) (3.346) (33.385)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 2.612∗∗∗ 21.467∗∗∗ 116.411∗ +
(0.290) (0.649) (4.587) (60.496)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗ -9.380∗∗∗ -105.479 +
(0.294) (0.991) (2.790) (86.208)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 5.289∗∗∗ 5.333∗∗∗ 3.661 +
(0.304) (0.713) (0.864) (2.475)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 -1.388∗ 7.330∗∗∗ 5.275 +
(0.331) (0.778) (2.530) (3.980)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗ -3.007∗∗∗ 8.702 -
(0.246) (0.634) (1.159) (10.886)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -4.715 3.483 -29.492 -
(0.237) (1.173) (3.238) (38.923)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -379.80 -88.434 -9.6082
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
42
2 A Cautious Note on Using Panel Models
2.A Appendix: Full Estimation Results
Table 2.14: Estimation Results for the Philippines
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -3.137∗∗∗ - 1.328 -
(0.319) (0.811) (2.584)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ 1.489∗∗ - 8.518∗∗∗ +/-
(0.311) (0.730) (2.913)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.932∗∗∗ - -17.155∗∗∗ -
(0.333) (0.713) (3.862)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 9.740∗∗∗ - -25.201∗∗ +
(0.201) (2.659) (11.749)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 4.565∗∗∗ - 35.820∗∗∗ +
(0.428) (1.171) (7.650)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 2.612∗∗∗ - 1.736 +
(0.290) (0.649) (1.298)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗ - 0.670 +
(0.294) (0.991) (3.344)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 5.289∗∗∗ - 85.564∗∗∗ +
(0.304) (0.713) (15.379)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 -1.388∗ - -2.578∗∗∗ +
(0.331) (0.778) (0.512)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗ - 13.133∗∗∗ -
(0.246) (0.634) (2.967)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -4.715 - -6.937 -
(0.237) (1.173) (4.140)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -379.80 -88.434 -43.709
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
Table 2.15: Estimation Results for Taiwan / Thailand
Variable
Naive Regional Cluster Country Exp.
Model Model Model Model Sign
Exports Growth -0.612∗ -3.137∗∗∗ -9.258∗∗∗ - -
(0.319) (0.811) (3.172)
Imports Growth -0.619∗∗ 1.489∗∗ 1.550 - +/-
(0.311) (0.730) (2.630)
Reserves Growth -1.972∗∗∗ -1.932∗∗∗ 3.127 - -
(0.333) (0.713) (2.221)
Real Int. Rate Differential -0.155 9.740∗∗∗ -29.084∗ - +
(0.201) (2.659) (16.619)
M2 Multiplier Growth 1.992 4.565∗∗∗ -5.104 - +
(0.428) (1.171) (3.346)
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth 0.146 2.612∗∗∗ 21.467∗∗∗ - +
(0.290) (0.649) (4.587)
Lending/Deposit Rate -2.511∗∗∗ -3.766∗∗∗ -9.380∗∗∗ - +
(0.294) (0.991) (2.790)
M2/Reserves 2.070∗∗∗ 5.289∗∗∗ 5.333∗∗∗ - +
(0.304) (0.713) (0.864)
M2/Reserves Growth -0.335 -1.388∗ 7.330∗∗∗ - +
(0.331) (0.778) (2.530)
Bank Deposits Growth -0.685∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗∗ -3.007∗∗∗ - -
(0.246) (0.634) (1.159)
Industrial Production Growth -1.284∗∗ -4.715 3.483 - -
(0.237) (1.173) (3.238)
Log-likelihood -1153.3 -379.80 -88.434 -
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
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Chapter 3
Using Proportional Hazards
Models to Predict Currency
Crises
This chapter aims at explaining the occurrence of currency crises using the du-
ration of the time spent in the tranquil (or non-crisis) period as well as macroe-
conomic variables. A duration model is estimated for 17 countries from Latin
America and Asia over the period 1985-2005. We use fully parametric methods
to estimate a proportional hazards model and examine if the time already spent
in the tranquil state is a determinant of the probability to exit into a crisis state.
The results indicate that the baseline hazard increases exponentially with time for
the crises in Asia, whereas the crises in Latin America exhibit a constant baseline
hazard. Performance measures indicate that the model works exceptionally well
for the Asian countries. The baseline hazard of recovery increases with time for
all types of crises.
3.1 Introduction
A few decades ago, Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) made an ini-
tial effort to explain the collapse of fixed exchange rate regimes as a result of
balance-of-payments problems. Later, Frankel and Rose (1996); Eichengreen,
Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) examined the behaviour of macroeconomic variables
around episodes of financial turmoil. The information that the behaviour of these
variables can contain information about an imminent crisis soon led to the first
Early Warning Systems (EWS). Early Warning Systems have appeared in several
forms. Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) developed a signalling model in
which a large set of macroeconomic variables is monitored for signals to indicate
an upcoming crisis. Alternatively, probit- and logit-models have been proposed in-
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cluding macroeconomic fundamentals as explanatory variables (Berg and Pattillo,
1999; Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin, 2003). For crisis periods caused by ‘bad’
fundamentals, the first generation crisis models (e.g. Flood and Garber, 1984), the
above EWS models perform very well (e.g. the Tequila crisis).1 However, not all
periods of crisis are caused by bad fundamentals; such as for example the 1997-
98 Asian crisis. As the macro economic characteristics of these countries are not
‘poor’ in the months prior to the crises, the above Early Warning Systems do not
perform so well in terms of picking up these type of crisis. Evidently other factors
play a role in determining currency stability and hence the probability of a crisis
occurring. We turn to the duration framework to examine if the time that has
passed since the last crisis is a good way to measure currency stability.
Duration models are most frequently used in failure-time frameworks such as
unemployment models (e.g. Kiefer, 1988; Pudney and Thomas, 1995; Grogan and
Van den Berg, 2001), bank-failure models (e.g. Whalen, 1991; Sales and Tannuri-
Pianto, 2005; Dabo´s and Escudero, 2004) or the medical literature (e.g. Douglas
and Hariharan, 1994; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997). In the unemployment lit-
erature for example, the probability of finding a job is modelled as depending on
the duration of unemployment moderated with the characteristics of the subjects.
Typically, a person’s characteristics such as education, working experience etc.,
do not change in a spell of unemployment. If one wishes to apply a duration
model to explain the probability of going into crisis, it cannot be assumed that the
characteristics of a country (the macro economic variables) are constant through-
out the time between two crises. For this reason the duration approach is not
widely used to model currency crises. As far as we know, only Tudela (2004) uses
a modified duration model allowing for time-varying explanatory variables that
can be applied to modelling currency crises. Specifically the semi-parametric Cox-
Proportional Hazards (PH) model (Cox, 1972) is adapted. In the Cox-PH model,
the time dependent part is effectively not estimated. The effect of the elapsed
time since the last crisis on the probability of crisis is only measured as a residual
of the estimation.
This chapter’s contribution is threefold. First, we propose a fully parametric
alternative to the semiparametric Cox Proportional Hazards model as described
in Tudela (2004) to be able to use the time dimension more strongly. This is de-
sirable as the time dimension of the hazard function (the baseline hazard) is used
to capture those determinants of the probability of crisis that are not captured
by the macroeconomic explanatory variables. We allow for different parameteri-
sations of the baseline hazard in order to find the optimal form. Second, next to
the probability to enter a crisis, the exit out of the crisis situation is also mod-
elled as it might be interesting to see which factors contribute to a fast recovery
from a crisis. This information can be used by policymakers to determine their
strategy of dealing with a crisis. Third, for both the entry and exit of the crisis
1As in the previous chapter, only the for this chapter relevant papers are mentioned here.
For an extensive discussion of the crisis literature, please refer to Chapter 1.
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we examine the influence of regional effects via subsamples and evaluate the pre-
dictive power of the model. As noticed by Glick and Rose (1999), contagion often
spreads regionally, independent of macroeconomic characteristics of the countries.
The baseline hazard in the subsample estimation can capture this regional effect.
An Early Warning System based on duration analyses should therefore be more
suitable for second or third generation crisis models.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: In Section 3.2 we present
the model as well as other methodological issues. Section 3.3 provides a short
description of the data and the definition of a crisis. In Section 3.4 we determine the
optimal form of the hazard function, evaluate our regression results and examine
the predictive performance of our models. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Parametric Proportional Hazards Model
A duration analysis is used to model the probability that a country moves from a
tranquil state to a state of crisis or vice versa. Just like traditional early warning
systems, the duration model makes use of macroeconomic explanatory variables
to determine the probability of entering (or exiting) a crisis state. In addition,
the duration model also takes into account the time already spent in the current
state, as a proxy for beliefs of market agents about currency (in)stability.2 This
setup allows for the fact that these beliefs can change as the period in the current
state lengthens. A baseline hazard decreasing with time would mean that investors
believe that a longer duration of the period in the current state signals stability
and expect this to continue. If the hazard increases as the duration of the current
period lengthens, the opposite is true; the longer the period of tranquility, the
sooner investors expect it to end.
In this paper we only employ duration models from within the proportional
hazards (PH) framework. The PH framework has the convenient property that the
hazard function3 can be decomposed into two different parts. One part depending
on the explanatory variables and one part depending on the time already spent
in the current state. Under PH, we can therefore write the hazard function for
country i at time t as:
λi,t(Xit,β, λ0(t)) = λ0(t)g(Xit,β), (3.1)
where we can take the most commonly used form for g(·):
g(Xit,β) = exp(β
′
Xit), (3.2)
2See Lancaster (1990) and Kalbfleish and Prentice (2002) for an extensive discussion of
duration models.
3In continuous time, the hazard function is defined as the instantaneous probability of tran-
sition from State 1 to State 2 at time t, given that we are currently in State 1. In discrete time,
the hazard function represents the probability of transition to State 2 at time t given that we
are in a State 1 at time t− 1.
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with Xit denoting the set of time-varying explanatory variables and λ0(t) being
the time dependent part also known as the baseline hazard function. The baseline
hazard function is exactly that part of the hazard function that remains when the
effect of the explanatory variables is filtered out by setting it to zero. In practice
this means that g(·) = exp(β0) if β′Xit includes a constant or that g(·) = 1 if there
is no constant. Under the semi-parametric Cox-PH model, the function λ0(t) is
left unspecified. The time dependent part is then implied by the part that depends
on the explanatory variables, but it has no impact on the estimation of the coeffi-
cients. In our model, the baseline hazard takes a specific parametric form such that
the effect of the time already spent in the current state can be explicitly estimated.
Within the proportional hazards framework, the baseline hazard can be based
on one of the following three distributions: i) Exponential, ii) Weibull, or iii)
Gompertz (Kalbfleish and Prentice, 2002). The associated functional forms of the
baseline hazard are listed in Table 3.1. When the duration of the time spent in a
certain state does not hold any information, the baseline hazard function is con-
stant and the exponential distribution is obtained. Under the Exponential form
the beliefs of investors therefore do not influence the probability of crisis. In this
situation the occurrence of crises can be best predicted by macroeconomic vari-
ables only. Both the Weibull and the Gompertz hazard function are generalised
forms of the Exponential case that allow for the hazard rate to depend on the
time already spent the current state. Under the Weibull distribution the hazard
can increase or decrease with duration depending on the value of p. Notice that
when p = 1, the baseline hazard becomes constant and the Weibull reduces to the
Exponential form. Under the Gompertz distribution the hazard rate can increase
or decrease exponentially with time spent in the current state. When γ = 0, the
hazard rate becomes constant as in the Exponential case. In the estimation of the
parametric PH duration models, an intermediate model in which the coefficients
of the explanatory variables (except for the constant) are kept at zero is estimated
first. This intermediate model is the parametric baseline hazard function and its
likelihood serves as the null likelihood for estimation of the full model. In this full
model the ancillary parameter and the coefficients of the explanatory variables are
estimated jointly by maximum likelihood.
Baseline Ancillary
Model Hazard (λ0) Parameter
Exponential exp(β0) -
Weibull p tp−1 exp(β0) p
Gompertz exp(γt) exp(β0) γ
Table 3.1: Parametric Forms for the Proportional Hazards Model
We prefer to use one of the fully parametric models over the partially non-
parametric Cox-PH model, because the Cox-PH model does not exploit the extra
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information from the durations like the fully parametric models do. A disadvan-
tage is that we now have to determine which specification of the baseline hazard
should be used. A formal comparison of the possible forms is performed using
information criteria4. The optimal form of the hazard function is determined sep-
arately for each of the different models.
In duration models, the survival function St is the probability that the time of
transition to another state is later than time t. In terms of the survival function,
the hazard rate is defined as the (negative) percentage change in the survival
function: λi,t = −S′t/St. Transferring this to a discrete time crisis model, the
hazard rate represents the probability of moving to a crisis at time t given that
we are in a tranquil state at time t − 1. Noticing that the survival function can
be represented as St = exp(−
∫ t
0
λ(v)dv), the hazard function for an individual i
at time t in a proportional hazards setting can be formulated as:
λi,t =
St−1 − St
St−1
= 1− St
St−1
= 1− exp[− exp(β′Xit + Γt)], (3.3)
where
Γt = ln
[∫ t
t−1
λ0(v)dv
]
. (3.4)
As can be seen from equation (3.4), Γt is defined as (the logarithm of) the total
amount of baseline hazard (λ0) the country is exposed to in the period between
time t − 1 and time t. The Γt does not depend on the explanatory variables
and represents the time dependent part of the hazard rate. Notice that Γt takes
different forms under the different distributions
Γt = β0 under Exponential Distribution,
Γt = β0 + p ln(t) under Weibull Distribution,
Γt = β0 − ln(γ) + γt under Gompertz Distribution.
The likelihood function can be decomposed into the contributions of each of
the periods spent consecutively in one state. One such a period is terminated
via one of two ways; either because there is a transition into the other state, or
because we have reached the end of the dataset before a transition could occur. In
the latter situation the period is said to be censored5, whereas in the former case
it is called uncensored. Suppose that country i experiences some period j in the
tranquil state which ends in the interval (tj − 1, tj]. The contribution to the log
4Bradburn, Clark, Love, and Altman (2003) show in their paper that the Akaike or Bayesian
Information Criterion can be used to determine which of the forms of the parametric baseline
hazard function performs best.
5A period is right censored when it is cut off at the end of the sample and left censored when
cut off at the beginning of the sample.
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likelihood made by this period is:
li,j(β, λ0) = dj ln(λi,tj ) +
tj−1∑
u=1
ln(1− λi,u)
= dj ln
(
1− exp[− exp(β′Xi,tj + Γtj )]
)− tj−1∑
u=1
exp(β′Xi,u + Γu),
(3.5)
where dj is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the period j is uncensored and
0 if it is censored.
Because a country can experience multiple transitions, we know that it may
also have multiple contributions to the likelihood function. Naturally, only the
last period of country can be censored. Suppose country i experiences Ci periods
of tranquility. Let now di = 1 if the last period of country i is censored and di = 0
otherwise. Also, let λci,sic,t denote the hazard function at time t of period c for
country i that started at time sic. The elapsed duration of the current period is
then t−sic. Suppose that the period c of country i ends in the interval (tic−1, tic].
A country’s contribution to the log likelihood, given that it experiences Ci periods
now becomes:
li(β, λ0) =
Ci−1∑
c=1
[
ln(λci,sic ,tic) +
tic−1∑
u=sic
ln(1− λci,sic,u)
]
+ di ln(λ
Ci
i,siCi ,tiCi
) +
tiCi−1∑
u=siCi
ln(1− λCii,siCi ,u).
(3.6)
As the above expression is the contribution to the log likelihood of one country,
we take the sum of these contributions over all countries to get the overall log
likelihood function of our duration model.
From the model description in Equations (3.5) and (3.6) it is clear that the
model is estimated jointly for all countries. This implies the undesirable restriction
that a crises has the same macro economic causes in each country throughout the
sample. This homogeneity assumption is quite heroic, but avoiding it is to face
the finite-sample problem (see Chapter 2). Unfortunately the number of crises are
not sufficient to have a country by country analysis. To allow for some heterogene-
ity, we also estimate the duration model for regional subsamples, which as saw in
Chapter 2, is a step towards more homogenous samples.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Dataset
We are interested to find out the difference of the time effect between first gener-
ation crisis models on the one hand and crises where the link between macro eco-
nomic fundamentals and the crisis occurrence is not always clear on the other hand.
Our dataset therefore covers 17 countries from the regions Latin-America and Asia:
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, China,
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. We use
monthly data from January 1985 to January 2005, obtained from Datastream6.7
The set of explanatory variables we use in this chapter is the same as the set of
variables used in Chapter 2. Because the hazard rate is defined as the probability
of transition between states of the world, the effect of the variables on the hazard
rate is expected to be similar to the effect on the probability of a crisis as discussed
in the previous chapter. This section is included here such that it is not necessary
for readers to have read Chapter 2 beforehand. The reader that did read the data
section of Chapter 2, can feel free to skip ahead to Subsection 3.3.2.
As explanatory variables for the hazard rate we selected several macroeconomic
variables relating to different aspects of the economy. We use variables from the
external sector, the financial sector and the real sector. Notice that all explana-
tory variables enter the hazard rate one month lagged. This way, at time t, the
probability of a crisis is affected only by variables which are observable at time t.
The external sector can be separated into the current account and the capital
account. Because we use monthly data, we cannot use the quarterly data for the
current account and capital account directly. We therefore approximate these fac-
tors by other variables that are available on a monthly basis. The first variable
relating to the current account is the annual growth rate of exports. Because a
decrease in exports indicates a loss in international competitiveness, it can lead to
a recession and business failures (Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes, 1995). Hence
we expect a decrease in exports to increase the probability of a crisis. The other
variable related to the current account is the imports annual growth rate. For
imports the theory is not so clear. On the one hand an decrease in imports could
be an indication of weakening of economic activity, while on the other hand an
increase in imports can be caused by a strong overvaluation of the real exchange
rate (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). To proxy the capital account, the real in-
terest rate differential with respect to the United States as well as the growth in
international reserves are used. For the latter we expect that a decrease in re-
serves lowers the leverage of the central bank to deal with speculative attacks and
6The sources used are the IMF-IFS database and the national banks of the respective coun-
tries.
7Due to the limited data availability is was unfortunately not possible to construct a consis-
tent dataset dating further back than 1985.
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therefore increases the probability of crisis. A high real interest rate differential
is typically associated with a high amount of pressure on the currency as the in-
creased domestic interest rate could be a response to excess supply of the currency
(see Eichengreen et al., 1995).
The second aspect of the economy is the financial sector. It has been shown by
McKinnon and Pill (1996) that currency crises, most notably those accompanied
by a banking crisis (labelled as “twin crises”), have often been preceded by periods
of financial liberalisation. Facilitated by the more relaxed reserve requirements for
banks, the financial liberalisation tends to make people and banks overconfident
in the stability of the currency, leading to excessive (foreign) borrowing. The
banking sector now becomes vulnerable to speculative attacks (Krugman, 1979).
Overborrowing results in an increase in the M2 multiplier as well as growth of do-
mestic credit relative to GDP (McKinnon and Pill, 1998). For both these variables
it holds that a higher ratio indicates higher vulnerability and therefore a higher
probability of crisis. To capture the credit risk rating and the willingness of banks
to lend, the ratio lending rate over deposit rate is included. An increase in this
ratio indicates that banks require a high risker premium on their loans. The higher
risk premium is a direct consequence of a lower economic stability. We also include
the ratio M2 over reserves. An increase of the ratio is caused both by an increase in
M2 money and decrease in reserves. The higher this ratio, the more vulnerable is
the economic system to speculative attacks (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). The ratio
M2 over reserves is included both as levels and as growth rate, because not only
an increase in the ratio increases the vulnerability, but also a ratio that is simply
high. The final financial variable is the growth of bank deposits. A decrease in
this variable shows capital flight and bank runs, a clear indicator of an imminent
crisis (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1997).
The last aspect of the economy captured by the variables, is the real sector
of the economy. As a proxy for output growth we use the industrial production
growth rate. A decrease in industrial production growth is the sign of a weakening
domestic economy and therefore an increase in the probability of crisis.
The reason for the transformation of most of the explanatory variables to their
annual growth rates is not only the benefit that we can have data at a monthly
frequency. As a crisis is by definition a sudden change with respect to a previ-
ous time period, we believe that we must also use the changes in our explanatory
variables instead of the levels. The transformation also makes data for different
countries more comparable: Even though the level of, for example, international
reserves can differ substantially at any point in time, the percentage changes in
reserves will be a lot closer together and are also likely to react in a similar way
across countries in case of a crisis. Furthermore, missing values in the middle of
the sample are interpolated using cubic splines. Missing values at the beginning
or end of the sample are dropped.
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Other researchers in this area (e.g. Kumar et al., 2003) claim that the extreme
observations should be dampened to lower the relative importance of these outliers
in the estimation. The transformation they propose to dampen this effect is:
yNewt = (sign of yt) ∗ ln(1 + | yt| ). We have checked the robustness of our results
against this transformation and see that the differences are only marginal, the
qualitative results remain unchanged8. As the transformation does not seem to
have a significant impact on the results, we decide against the transformation in
order to keep the clarity of the model as high as possible.
3.3.2 Definition of a Crisis
Before we can start modelling any transition from a tranquil state to a state of
crisis or vice versa, it must first be decided how a crisis is defined. Since we
are interested in the probability of crisis, information about speculative attacks
is required. Not all speculative attacks lead to a devaluation or revaluation of
the currency. In order to capture both successful and unsuccessful speculative
attacks, the periods of crisis are determined via the Exchange Market Pressure
(EMP) index (see Eichengreen et al., 1995). This EMP-index is the weighted
average between the 6-month change in the exchange rate with respect to the
US dollar and (the negative of) the 6-month change in the international reserves.
The weights are chosen such that the variance of both factors are standardised
to one. A crisis is signalled when the EMP-index exceeds a certain threshold.9
In our model, a period of crisis is initiated when the EMP-index increases more
than one and a half standard deviations above its mean. It might be argued that
the threshold of 1.5 standard deviations is not sufficiently high to capture only
extreme events. However, we have also tried to estimate the model with more
extreme threshold such as 2 or 3 standard deviations. The problem with those
higher thresholds is that the number of crises decreases to a level at which we
no longer have a sufficient number of observations to conduct sensible inference.
The threshold of 1.5 standard deviations seems to be a reasonable compromise
between having sufficient observations and capturing only extreme events (crises).
Additionally, the volatility of the determinants of the EMP-index tends to be a lot
higher in periods of high inflation. To make sure that the periods of high inflation
do not crowd out possible crisis events during low inflation, the sample is split into
two subsamples. One for periods of high inflation and one for low inflation. The
cutoff point is when the 6-month inflation is more than 50%.
It is argued by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) that after a crisis period it
takes time before the macroeconomic characteristics of a country settle down to
normal values. This can be seen for example if we take look at the EMP-index
for Venezuela and the Philippines in Figure 3.1. As can be seen from the figure,
8The estimation results from the dampened model are available from the author upon request.
9As pointed out in Chapter 1, this method of defining periods of crisis has its shortcomings.
In the absence of a universal consensus about which dating method is best, we choose the method
that comes closest to capturing the fluctuations on the exchange rate market.
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most of the time the EMP-index drops well below its normal level in the period
right after a crisis has occurred. These huge fluctuations are perfectly in line with
the argument of Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) that after a crisis we first have an
adjustment period before the economy returns to its normal, tranquil state. In our
model the tranquil state only starts after this adjustment period. Instead of ig-
noring these periods right after the crisis, which is common practice, we explicitly
formulate a duration model for these periods as well to see if we can also predict
how long it will take until the economy settles down again.
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Figure 3.1: Exchange Market Pressure Index and Periods of Crisis
In the twenty years that are covered by our database, we classify 46 distinct
periods of crisis divided over the 17 countries. We identify slightly more crisis
periods than most other studies, which is due to the lower threshold. Because we
also have a censored period of tranquility at the end of the sample for each of the
countries, the total number of tranquil periods is therefore 63 in the crisis entry
model. The model that tries to explain the transition from a state of crisis into a
tranquil state, the crisis exit model, covers exactly those 46 periods of crisis. The
number of crisis periods per country varies from 5 in Venezuela to only one crisis
in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Among the crisis periods, we find the 1995
Mexican crisis, the 2002 crisis in Argentina, and of course the Asian crisis. Out of
the 9 Asian countries, only China and India do not have a crisis in 1997-98. This
is not so strange as these countries were not severely affected by the Asian crisis.
3.4 Estimation and Performance
3.4.1 Estimation Results
When estimating a proportional hazards model with a parametric hazard function,
one needs to both choose an appropriate form for the baseline hazard function and
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determine which explanatory variables should be included. As we take the side
to remain agnostic and to impose as little a priori beliefs as possible about the
general form of the hazard, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is estimated
to determine the optimal form of the hazard function. As a consequence, we must
simultaneously determine which explanatory variables should be included in the
model and which is the optimal form for the hazard function. To make sure that
our final models are not misspecified due to the decisions made in the estimation
procedure, the general-to-specific and specific-to-general methods10 are applied to
decide which are the explanatory variables to include. We do this for each of the
three potential forms of the baseline hazard function. It turns out that the opti-
mal choice of explanatory variables is relatively robust to the form of the baseline
hazard. Only in two cases11 there is a slight difference in the variables that are
significant. In those cases one of the parametric forms has one or two different
significant variables, but most variables are the same. Robustness between the
different forms of the hazard was to be expected as the proportional hazards ap-
proach explicitly separates the time dependent part of hazard from the part that
depends on the explanatory variables.
As mentioned, our sample of countries consists of two main regions, Latin
America and Asia. The vast literature on the topic would lead us to suspect that
crises in Latin America have different underlying causes than crises in Asia (Berg,
1999; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). We therefore estimate the duration model
based on the full sample as well as models based on the regional subsamples. Be-
tween these models we not only allow for different explanatory variables but also
for a different form of the baseline hazard. Ideally, one would also like to allow for
country-specific effects but this would mean that we need to estimate at least one
additional parameter per country. Given our already limited sample size of 35 and
28 periods of tranquility in Latin America and Asia respectively, the estimation
of such a model will not provide reliable results as the number of parameters to
be estimated would almost exceed the number of observations.
In Table 3.2 we compare the three different forms of the hazard function for
each of the three (sub)samples. The reported statistics correspond to the models
with only the significant explanatory variables. The top panel of the table con-
10The general-to-specific method starts off with the model that includes all potential explana-
tory variable and step by step removes the variable that contributes least to the model via the
BIC. This procedure is continued until only significant variables are left in the model. The
specific-to-general method does exactly the opposite: It starts off with a model that has only a
constant. For each of the potential explanatory variables it is checked (with BIC) which variable
contributes most to the model. This variable is included in the model and the procedure is
repeated step by step until there are no more significant variables to add.
11The first difference is in the crisis entry model for the Latin American sample. The model
with the Weibull hazard has the growth of international reserves and the level of ratio M2 over
reserves as significant variables where both other forms have bank deposits growth as significant
variable instead. The second difference is in the crisis exit model for the Asian sample, where
the Gompertz hazard model has international reserves growth and industrial production growth
as additional significant variables compared to the other two forms of the hazard.
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Crisis entry
Model LL(null)a LL(model) df BIC
Exponential (Full Sample) -94.95 -53.86 7 164.01
Gompertz (Full Sample) -94.95 -53.40 8 171.13
Weibull (Full Sample) -94.71 -53.86 8 172.04
Exponential (Latin America) -56.27 -40.20 5 116.46
Gompertz (Latin America) -55.56 -39.93 6 123.14
Weibull (Latin America) -55.47 -33.45 7 117.40
Exponential (Asia) -36.61 -5.556 9 70.84
Gompertz (Asia) -35.34 -1.986 10 63.71
Weibull (Asia) -36.16 -2.764 10 65.27
Crisis exit
Model LL(null)a LL(model) df BIC
Exponential (Full Sample) -49.65 -31.18 4 89.47
Gompertz (Full Sample) -29.05 -20.18 5 74.26
Weibull (Full Sample) -24.94 -17.10 5 68.09
Exponential (Latin America) -29.49 -15.80 4 56.68
Gompertz (Latin America) -17.83 -10.27 5 51.89
Weibull (Latin America) -16.27 -9.305 5 49.96
Exponential (Asia) -20.14 -12.01 5 53.31
Gompertz (Asia) -10.89 -2.734 8 52.33
Weibull (Asia) -8.203 -2.129 6 39.41
aThe null log-likelihood (LL) is the likelihood of the intermediate model in which
only the ancillary parameter and the constant are estimated.
Table 3.2: Determining the hazard function for the crisis entry and crisis exit
model. (Crisis if EMP -index > mean + 1.5 stdev)
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tains the model that explains the transition from tranquil to the crisis state. From
the Bayesian Information Criterion we see that for the Latin American and full
sample the exponential form of the baseline hazard is preferred by a small margin,
whereas for Asia the Gompertz form for the hazard is best. These results indicate
that for Latin America the hazard to fall into crisis is relatively constant with re-
spect to time, the time dimension therefore plays only a small role in determining
the probability to fall into crisis, leaving more room for the macroeconomic ex-
planatory variables. This is consistent with the message for first generation crisis
models. For Asia we see that the baseline hazard increases with time exponen-
tially (γ > 0). Basically this means that the hazard of transition into crisis can
increase even without any macroeconomic fundamentals causing it. This shows
that in Asia other factors than weak fundamentals also play a role in determining
whether a crisis will occur. We may therefore conclude that the forms we find for
the baseline hazard corresponds to what we would expect in the respective regions.
The bottom panel of Table 3.2 shows that the Weibull is the optimal form
for the baseline hazard function of the model that explains the transition from a
state of crisis back into the tranquil state. The Weibull form is optimal for all
samples. If we also consider that the estimated value of the parameter p, which
determines the form of the Weibull hazard (see Table 3.4), is larger than 1 in all
(sub)samples, we can conclude that for all countries the ‘hazard’ of moving back
into the tranquil state increases as time passes. This is a sensible result as the
panic that is associated with the outbreak of a crisis eventually will settle down
as time passes. Interestingly it is the same for both regions.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 shows the estimation results of the models with the optimal
form of the baseline hazard and the explanatory variables that are significant at a
10% significance level. A first glance at the tables reveals that for both the crisis
entry and crisis exit model the results of the full sample are very close to those of
the Latin American Sample. This indicates that the estimation of the full sam-
ple model is dominated by the Latin American countries. This could mean that
the macroeconomic fundamentals change more severely in Latin America. This is
in line with the general consensus about having first generation models in Latin
America and second generation models in Asia. Note also that the standard errors
are calculated using a robust estimator for cluster correlation (see Williams, 2000).
This variance estimator does not only allow for heteroscedasticity, it also corrects
for serial correlation of the observations within one country, whereas independence
is assumed between countries.
Taking a closer look at the results of the crisis entry model, we see that the
majority of the parameters has the expected sign. In total, 10 macro economic
variables have a significant effect on the hazard rate in at least one of the three
samples. Only 3 of them exhibit an unexpected sign; the M2 multiplier growth,
the lending rate over deposit rate ratio and the growth of the M2 over reserves.
Interesting differences between the two regional samples emerge. For example the
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Full LA Asian
Variable Sample Sample Sample Exp. Sign
Exports Growtht−1 -2.873 -
(1.608)
Imports Growtht−1 3.199 +/-
(1.522)
Reserves Growtht−1 -3.701 -16.97 -
(1.197) (3.408)
Real Int. Rate Differentialt−1 0.199 0.218 16.71 +
(0.016) (0.015) (4.081)
M2 Multiplier Growtht−1 -2.554 -3.133 +
(0.729) (0.825)
Lending/Deposit Ratet−1 -0.595 -0.653 -0.378 +
(0.235) (0.344) (0.125)
M2/Reservest−1 0.096 0.130 +
(0.023) (0.077)
M2/Reserves Growtht−1 -6.313 +
(1.343)
Bank Deposits Growtht−1 -1.197 -2.354 -
(0.608) (0.610)
Industrial Prod. Growtht−1 -3.937 -
(2.085)
Constant -3.310 -3.121 -4.741
(0.409) (0.588) (0.647)
γ 0.016
(0.005)
LL Full Sample = -53.86, LL Latin American Sample = -40.20,
LL Asian Sample = -1.986
Table 3.3: Estimation Results Crisis Entry Models
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Full LA Asian
Variable Sample Sample Sample Exp. Sign
Reserves Growtht−1 0.643 0.807 +
(0.127) (0.129)
Real Int. Rate Differentialt−1 7.040 -
(0.881)
M2 Multiplier Growtht−1 0.034 0.044 3.661 -
(0.008) (0.005) (1.442)
Lending/Deposit Ratet−1 0.600 -
(0.069)
M2/Reservest−1 -0.188 -
(0.063)
Industrial Prod. Growtht−1 1.396 1.367 +
(0.246) (0.226)
Constant -7.690 -7.290 -11.17
(0.777) (0.905) (1.503)
ln(p) 0.878 0.801 1.185
(0.104) (0.117) (0.158)
Implied p 2.41 2.23 3.27
LL Full Sample = -17.10, LL Latin American Sample = -9.305,
LL Asian Sample = -2.129
Table 3.4: Estimation Results Crisis Exit Models
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current account variables, the imports and exports growth rates, are not signifi-
cant for Latin America, but both enter the Asian model. This indicates that Asian
countries are more vulnerable when their external position weakens, whereas for
Latin American this does not seem to be the case. We also see that in contrast to
Latin America, crises in Asia are preceded by a decrease in international reserves.
This might be an indication that the Asian central banks are more involved in
trying to keep the exchange rate stable, whereas in Latin America the currency is
on average allowed to float a bit more freely. Further, the decrease in the growth
rate of bank deposits is a precedent of a crises in Latin America, but not in Asia.
This difference could indicate that people in Latin America have less faith in the
banking sector and are more likely to withdraw their money at the first signs of
distress. Also, industrial production growth has a significant negative effect on
the hazard rate of transition into crisis in the Asian sample, but not in the Latin
American or the full sample. Finally, we see that the ancillary parameter γ of the
Gompertz baseline hazard in the Asian sample is positive such that the hazard
function increases with time. From the vast amount of differences in the significant
variables between the two regional subsamples we may conclude that pooling both
regions together probably does not yield the most desirable model.
The results for the crisis exit model show us first of all that there are less
significant explanatory variables across the samples. This supports the view that
a country automatically recovers from a crisis irrespective of the macro economic
fundamentals. Once more, the estimates for the Latin American sample and the
full sample are close together whereas the Asian sample has different significant
variables. Just like in the crisis entry model, the M2 multiplier growth and the
lending over deposit rate ratio have the sign opposite from expected. We see that
the real interest rate differential has a positive effect on the hazard rate of ending
the crisis period in the Asian sample. This effect is opposite from the expected
negative sign which comes from the observation of Eichengreen et al. (1995) that
a high real interest rate differential is typically associated with a high amount of
pressure on the currency and hence a low real interest rate should be associated
with an increased probability of exiting the crisis. However, in a period of crisis the
government can try to shorten the crisis by making the domestic currency more
attractive to investors through a higher real interest rate. Following this argument
we should find a positive sign and that is indeed the case. The remaining variables
show the expected signs. Finally, notice that for all three samples, the ancillary
parameter p is larger than 1, which means that the probability of going back to a
tranquil state increases as the duration of the crisis increases.
3.4.2 Prediction Performance
The goal of an Early Warning System is of course to signal crises before they actu-
ally happen. The performance of the model should therefore also be measured in
terms of how well it predicts the currency crises. We measure this performance by
the behaviour of the probability to go into a crisis right before crises occur, where
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the forecast horizon is varied between 6 and 24 months. Unlike in the logit and
probit models, the probability of a crisis is not directly estimated in the duration
model. Before we can proceed, we must therefore first define this probability.
At any point t in time, we measure the probability of going into a crisis as the
inverse of the probability of surviving longer than time t given that the current
period of tranquility started at some time t0. This survival probability is defined
as the product of the t − t0 probabilities to survive one more period conditional
on reaching the previous period. The estimated probability of crisis is shown in
Figures 3.2-3.4. Ideally we would like to have a model for which the probability of
crisis is low when no crisis is at hand and jumps up some time before a crisis. In
the figures the periods of crisis are denoted by the grey areas. The probability of
transition for the full sample is depicted as the dashed line, whereas the solid line
denotes the probability constructed from the regional subsample. We can see that
especially for the Latin American countries the two curves are close together. This
result follows directly from the fact that the estimated model for the full sample
is strongly dominated by the Latin American sample. For the Asian countries, we
see a more profound difference in the two probability lines. The figures show a
generally lower probability of crisis. This is desired as the estimated probability
based on the full sample is very high, even in periods where it should not be.
From the figures it also seems that the probability of crisis from the Asian sample
performs better than the probability from full sample because the increases in
probability are more focussed on the months before the crises.
Note that also the crisis exit models are included in the figures. As they try
to explain the exit out of the crisis into the tranquil state, their probabilities ‘live’
on the grey areas in the figures. To keep the crisis entry and exit model in one
figure, we plotted the probability to stay in the crisis state for the exit model
instead of the transition probability. This means that the estimated probability
is transformed into the cumulative survival probability to remain in a state of crisis.
Because we would like to have a more formal measure of prediction perfor-
mance, we also examine the probability of transition into crisis numerically. To
do this, we use the signalling method as originally used by Kaminsky (1999).
In this approach we compare the cases when the model signals a crisis to those
when we would like it to signal a crisis. The model is said to signal a crisis if
the probability of a crisis crosses a certain threshold percentage. This signalling
threshold is determined individually per country. Following Fuertes and Kalo-
tychou (2007), we try to find the optimal threshold level by minimising a loss
function of a policy-maker that is a weighted average of the type I and type II
errors12: LF = θ ∗ (% Type I Errors) + (1− θ) ∗ (% Type II Errors). As a missed
crisis typically brings larger costs to a policy-maker than a false alarm, the weight
θ most likely will be larger equal than 0.5. To check the sensibility of the results
we use three different weights: 0.5, 0.67 and 0.8. This way minimising type I errors
12A type I error means failing to signal a crisis. A type II error means giving out a false alarm.
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Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of a Crisis in the Next Period (1)
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Figure 3.3: Predicted Probability of a Crisis in the Next Period (2)
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Prediction Horizon = 24 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 36.3% 24.0% 32.6% 30.6%
0.67 22.3% 46.8% 20.1% 48.5%
0.8 20.3% 49.9% 17.5% 53.4%
Prediction Horizon = 18 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 42.1% 22.3% 40.4% 30.2%
0.67 24.0% 46.0% 22.8% 48.0%
0.8 22.8% 47.5% 20.5% 53.6%
Prediction Horizon = 12 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 38.2% 27.6% 32.3% 29.8%
0.67 24.8% 42.4% 20.9% 45.3%
0.8 19.3% 54.2% 16.9% 54.6%
Prediction Horizon = 6 Months)
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 36.7% 25.6% 30.9% 27.7%
0.67 27.3% 34.6% 18.0% 43.9%
0.8 20.1% 48.0% 18.0% 43.9%
Table 3.5: Prediction performance in Latin America with threshold levels based
on different weights in the loss function. Type I error: Missed Crisis. Type II
error: False Alarm.
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Prediction Horizon = 24 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 24.9% 9.8% 28.9% 11.4%
0.67 24.3% 10.4% 18.2% 20.9%
0.8 19.0% 19.2% 17.4% 22.4%
Prediction Horizon = 18 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 27.2% 11.5% 28.5% 13.9%
0.67 23.2% 15.9% 19.8% 22.3%
0.8 21.8% 19.1% 19.1% 23.3%
Prediction Horizon = 12 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 29.9% 10.8% 29.4% 14.4%
0.67 24.6% 15.2% 20.9% 23.4%
0.8 24.2% 16.3% 20.9% 23.4%
Prediction Horizon = 6 Months
Full Sample Regional Sample
Type I Type II Type I Type II
θ Error Error Error Error
0.5 39.4% 4.8% 26.6% 15.9%
0.67 22.9% 15.6% 21.1% 21.0%
0.8 22.9% 15.6% 21.1% 21.0%
Table 3.6: Prediction performance in Asia with threshold levels based on different
weights in the loss function. Type I error: Missed Crisis. Type II error: False
Alarm.
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is respectively equally important, twice as important or four times as important
than minimising type II errors. For the moments at which the model ideally should
signal a crisis we also take different values. We require that the model should start
signalling a crisis respectively 6, 12, 18 or 24 months ahead of a crisis. The perfect
fit would be if the signal of the model coincide exactly with the required signals.
We therefore count the number of correct signals (A), the number of times the
model did not give a signal when it actually should have (C), the number of false
alarms (B) and the number of correct no-signals (D). In Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we
provide per region the percentage of type I errors [C/(A+C)] and the percentage
of type II errors [B/(B +D)] that are obtained using the different combinations
of the type I error weights and prediction horizons.
For both regions the performance of the full and the regional sample models
is similar. In general, the regional models have a slightly lower percentage of type
I errors at the expense of a slightly higher percentage type II errors. We do find
a difference in performance between the two regions. Whereas the model per-
formance is average for the Latin American countries, the results for the Asian
countries are pretty good. As existing Early Warning Systems traditionally have
troubles picking up the Asian crisis, this result is confirmation that the duration
model can capture causes of a crisis other than macro economic fundamentals.
Even though the numerical prediction performance measures do not show a
great difference between the full sample model and the regional models, the esti-
mation results show that the underlying causes of a crisis differ greatly between the
two regions here under examination. It is therefore wise to allow for heterogeneity
between the countries, for example by estimating regional models. In contrast to
existing early warning systems, we find that the duration model works well for
Asian countries.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter parametric proportional hazards models are estimated to explain
and predict currency crises in Latin America and Asia. Our model is an addition
to existing work because our fully parametric proportional hazards model allows
us to use the time dimension of the duration model more explicitly than the semi-
parametric Cox-PH model.
A duration model was fitted to the full sample of countries as well as to the two
regional subsamples. We found that the crises in Latin America can be explained
by changes in macroeconomic fundamentals in the periods preceding the crises.
The resulting model has an exponential baseline hazard function and therefore
does not depend on the time passed since the last crisis. In the Asian sample,
the time dimension of the duration model plays a much more prominent role in
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the prediction of a crisis. This can be seen from the Gompertz distribution for
the baseline hazard that increases exponentially as the time spent in the tranquil
state lengthens. This supports the theory that it was not only weak macroeco-
nomic fundamentals that was at the basis of and caused the spreading of the crises
in Asia. We can therefore conclude that in order to predict all crises we need a
model that also includes factors other than macroeconomic variables. The predic-
tion performance measures show that the duration model works well especially for
the Asian countries. The duration model thereby appears fit to model crises for
which weak fundamentals are not necessarily the sole cause.
Next to modelling the transition dynamics of going into a crisis, we also mod-
elled the process that gets an economy out of a crisis. The most interesting finding
of this exit model is that the duration of the crisis plays an identical role in all
countries. The Weibull distribution of the baseline hazard shows that the proba-
bility to get back into the tranquil state increases as time progresses. This shows
that even if the governing bodies do not act to accelerate the recovery process, the
probability that the crisis will end in the next period increases with time.
In this chapter we perform in-sample forecasts. As the survival probability up
to time t depends on the values of the economic fundamentals until time t−1, it is
not possible to come up with sensible multi-step out-of-sample forecasts without
simulating the future realisations of the fundamentals. We could extend the base-
line hazard multiple steps ahead to get an indication, but then we would only have
the average hazard for all countries (within the subsample) as the best estimate. A
solution to this problem could be to use a technique from the financial literature,
autoregressive conditional duration (ACD). This method might be helpful because
here the duration of the current spell is defined as a function of past durations
and conditional durations. Additionally, one could merge the crisis entry and crisis
exit together as the current setup assumes independence between the duration of
the tranquil and crisis periods.
Another aspect to our model that can be improved in the future, is the inclusion
of contagion. Currently, we model regional dependence by simply taking regional
subsamples. It is safe to assume that the dependence between the countries within
those regions also differs per country-pair. Neighbouring countries are probably
more closely related than countries that are further apart. Spatial econometrics
could be a good way to model this effect.
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Chapter 4
Modelling Exchange Rate
Tensions: A Dynamic
Duration Approach
This chapter aims at modelling tension on the exchange rate market. A dynamic
duration model is estimated for 19 countries from Latin America and Asia over
the period 1985-2005 to explain the occurrence and duration of this tension. A
modified version of the autoregressive conditional hazards model (Hamilton and
Jorda´, 2002) is used to allow for time dynamics as well as macroeconomic explana-
tory variables in the duration model. The results indicate that the probability of
transition into and out of tension increases with time spent in the current state.
Moreover, as our model has its roots in the high-frequency data domain, our num-
ber of observations is relatively small. A Monte Carlo exercise is performed to
check the behaviour of the ACD component of our model in a small sample.
4.1 Introduction
A large branch of literature has been devoted to financial distress ever since the
theoretical framework was laid down by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber
(1984). As financial crises became more frequent, the need for predicting the oc-
currence of turmoil increased and so did the literature on it.1 Throughout the
literature, many different definitions of crisis have been used, ranging from ex-
treme periods of depreciation of the currency (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996; Flood
and Marion, 1997; Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin, 2003) to extreme values of a
pressure index (e.g. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995, 1998; Sachs, Tornell,
Velasco, Calvo, and Cooper, 1996; Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; Berg
1For an extenstive overview of the literature please refer to Chapter 1.
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and Pattillo, 1999; Tudela, 2004). Naturally, the decision on what is the best index
to use as a basis to proxy the crisis periods is open for debate. Even disregard-
ing this issue, two problems can be distinguished that are common to all. Both
problems are inherently related to the fact that a crisis is by default an extreme
event. The first problem lies indeed with the definition of an extreme value. How
to detect an extreme value? Typically some ad hoc threshold level is chosen and a
crisis is identified when the index to proxy the crisis exceeds this threshold. The
second problem is a data availability problem. Because crises are extreme values,
they occur by default only very infrequently. As a result, one only has only very
little information to work with. In order to circumvent these problems, we con-
sider tension on the exchange market in this chapter instead of crisis episodes.
We define tensions on the exchange market as periods in which there is a depre-
ciating pressure on the currency of interest. The pressure is measured via a version
of the Exchange Market Pressure (EMP)-index of Eichengreen et al. (1998). Under
a flexible exchange rate regime this pressure causes a depreciation of the currency.
In a fixed regime the depreciating pressure has to be fended off by the central
bank through the sale of foreign currency. The decrease in international reserves
and/or depreciation of the currency could lead to further investors withdrawing
their investments thereby further increasing the pressure on the currency. When
the pressure starts to decrease, we know that the investors’ confidence in the cur-
rency is reestablished. This turning point defines the end of the tension.
In addition to the modelling benefits, we believe that it is of importance to
model all tensions on the exchange market instead of only the tensions that leads
to a crisis, because we know that any increase in the EMP-index is the direct con-
sequence of increasing pressure on the currency. Under floating exchange rates it
results in a depreciation, while under fixed rates it is detectable via either a loss in
international reserves or an increase of the interest rate. Either way, the increased
tension on the exchange market has at the very least an psychological effect on
investors, irrespective of the size of the adjustments. If we model crises instead of
tension periods, this effect is missed completely if the effect on the pressure index
is not large enough for it to exceed the threshold level.
Following the binary nature of a crisis or tension indicator, the popular choices
for modelling crises or tension have been limited dependent variable models such
as probit and logit. These types of models traditionally have problems to capture
crises that are not preceded by weak macroeconomic fundamentals. By means
of a duration model Tudela (2004) moves a step closer to capturing the hidden
factors causing the crises. The idea behind the duration model is that the time
since the last crisis influences the expectation of the probability of crisis. However,
the standard duration model does not allow for any time dynamics. As shown by
Candelon, Dumitrescu, and Hurlin (2010), time dynamics can play an important
role in the Early Warning System however. Thus it may be expected that the
expectation of the duration of the current period depends the strongest on the
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most recent durations. Therefore, we use a modified version of the Autoregres-
sive Conditional Hazard (ACH) model by Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) to introduce
these dynamics. In the ACH model the dynamics of the Autoregressive Condi-
tional Duration (ACD) approach by Engle and Russell (1997) is combined with
time-varying economic fundamentals into a model for the hazard rate of transition
into and out of tension.
Because we use macroeconomic data, the time series dimension of our sample is
significantly shorter than the high-frequency datasets to which the ACD and ACH
techniques are usually applied. For this reason we perform a simulation study to
examine the behaviour of the estimators in the ACD model when the sample size
decreases.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 it is ex-
plained how we model tension on the exchange market. The methodology of the
ACH framework is presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 contains the results of
the Monte Carlo simulations on the small sample performance of the model. The
empirical results are presented in Section 4.5, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Exchange Rate Tension
The variable to be analysed in this paper is the duration of periods of increasing
and decreasing pressure on the exchange market. Unlike most other studies, we
focus on explaining tension on the exchange market rather than the occurrence
of currency crises. One of the main reasons for this different approach is the fact
that when modelling crises, one only takes into account very strong attacks on the
currency that lead to a crisis whereas with tension also the smaller attacks are
taken into account. Under the assumption that investors are risk-averse, they will
be more reluctant to invest in a currency that is tending towards a depreciation
than investing in a currency that is tending to appreciate. A tendency to depre-
ciate hence creates reluctance to invest or tension on the market that cannot be
disregarded.
The impact of the market fluctuations is modelled using the chartist funda-
mentalist approach (e.g. Day and Huang, 1990; Huang and Day, 1993; Chiarella,
Dieci, and Gardini, 2004; Farmer and Joshi, 2002; Wieland and Westerhoff, 2005;
Manzan and Westerhoff, 2007). In this approach we distinguish two types of agents
on the exchange market. On the one hand there are the fundamentalists who base
their investment decisions on the relative position of the exchange rate with re-
spect to its fundamental value. The chartists on the other hand, operate based
on their beliefs about market fluctuations. If they perceive a bullish or bearish
market, they trust that the current tendency on the market is a good predictor for
the immediate future and thus trade accordingly. As a result, the overall exchange
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rate market dynamics could be quite different depending on the market’s trend.
We define tension on the exchange market as periods of increasing pressure
on the currency. We use a version of the Exchange Market Pressure (EMP)-index
originally proposed by Eichengreen et al. (1998) as a measure of that pressure. The
version of the EMP-index that we use is a weighted average between the percentage
change in the nominal exchange rate and the (negative of the) percentage change
in international reserves, where the weights are chosen such that the variances of
the two terms are equal.2 The index for exchange market pressure then becomes:
EMPi,t = (%∆exri,t)/σ
exr
i − (%∆resi,t)/σresi , (4.1)
where exri,t denotes the price of a US dollar in country i’s currency at time t;
resi,t denotes the amount of international reserves of country i at time t; and σ
exr
i
and σresi are the respective country-specific standard deviations. The EMP-index
goes up when either the exchange rate starts to depreciate or when the amount
of international reserves starts to decrease. The latter event occurs under fixed
exchange rates when the currency is suffering from excess supply and the central
bank intervenes through the sale of its international reserves. The former is the
result of excess supply under a pure floating exchange rate. Intermediate exchange
rate regimes lead to a mixture of the events, unambiguously leading to an increas-
ing EMP-index.
The periods of tension are defined as the periods in which the general direction
(slope) of the EMP-index is upward. To identify the turning points of the slope of
the EMP index, we employ a technique that is closely related to the dating algo-
rithm of Bry and Boschan (1971).3 As we apply the technique to the EMP-index,
the intuition of the peaks and troughs and hence of the bears and bulls deviates
from the traditional stock market intuition. In the stock market index the period
from a trough to a peak embodies a booming (bullish) market. In our case, the
period from a trough to a peak entails a period in which the pressure is increasing,
hence a period of tension and vice versa.
4.3 The Modelling Framework
Tudela (2004) shows that the duration of the time spent in a spell of tranquility
has an effect on the probability of a crisis occurrence. As tension is a related
2The EMP-index as originally proposed in Eichengreen et al. (1998) is a weighted average of
three terms: Exchange rate changes, reserve changes and changes in interest rate difference. The
interest rate differential is not included in our index because unfortunately it is not possible to
find the same interest rate for all countries. If different interest rates were to be used for different
countries in the construction of the pressure index, the dependent variable of our model would
be not be same for all countries. Pooling across such a panel is not recommended.
3The exact implementation of the dating algorithm and the associated issues about window
length will be tackled in Section 4.5.
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phenomenon on the same market, a duration model can also be useful in our case.
Tudela’s duration model is completely static, it is therefore very difficult to make
any statements about expected future durations. The Autoregressive Conditional
Duration (ACD) framework of Engle and Russell (1997, 1998) allows for these
dynamics. In the ACD the expected duration of the next period conditional on
the past durations is modelled as a function of lagged observed durations and of
lagged conditional expected durations.
Our setup with monthly observations differs from the high frequency data to
which the ACD framework usually is applied. As the length of the durations is
measured in months as opposed to seconds, the number of observations will be
substantially lower in our tensions model than in common applications by default.
Our dataset offers only up to 10 durations per country. By pooling all countries,
the total number of durations can be increased to almost 150. This amount re-
mains well below the number of observations in more common applications. For
further discussion about the small sample behaviour of the ACD estimation, we
refer to the simulation in Section 4.4. To pool data over different countries means
that an implicit assumption is made that dynamics of the duration process are
homogenous across the countries. Van den Berg, Candelon, and Urbain (2008)
note that one should construct clusters that find the balance between allowing for
enough heterogeneity and having sufficient observations. We will use the simu-
lation study in Section 4.4 to get an indication about the minimum number of
observations required within a cluster to perform sensible inference.
Let {zi,1 . . . zi,Ni(T )} denote the durations of all spells of tension for country
i = 1, . . . ,K, where Ni(t) is a counting process that counts the number of spells
up to date t = 1, . . . , T . Also, let ψi,n denote the expectation of zi,n conditional
on the past durations:
ψi,n = E(zi,n|zi,n−1 . . . zi,1). (4.2)
Because the ψi,n cannot be negative, the estimation of the standard ACD model
is subject to some nonnegativity constraints. To circumvent these constraints,
Bauwens and Giot (2000) proposed the Logarithmic ACD (LACD) model4 that is
based on the logarithm of the conditional expected duration:
ln(ψi,n) = ω +
q∑
j=1
αj ln(zi,n−j) +
p∑
j=1
βj ln(ψi,n−j). (4.3)
4The version of the LACD model that is used here is the LACD1 model of Bauwens and
Giot (2000). Alternatively one could use the LACD2 model in which the log expected duration
depends on its lagged value and on the lagged ‘excess duration’ instead. As the two LACD
models yield very similar results, only the LACD1 version is employed here.
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In this model there is only the constraint that |αj + βj | < 1 for all j. This is to
ensure covariance stationarity of ln(ψi,n).
The standardised durations, ǫi,n = (zi,n/ψi,n), are assumed i.i.d. with some
density f0, such that all time dependence comes from the process described in
Equation (4.3). We allow the density of the standardised durations to be either
Exponential (ELACD) or Weibull (WLACD). Under the Exponential density the
hazard rate, i.e. the probability of ending the current period, is constant with
respect to the time spent in the current period. The Weibull density is a generali-
sation of the Exponential density; conditional on the value of the shape parameter
γ the hazard rate can increase or decrease with time spent in the period. A haz-
ard rate increasing with time means that investors believe an already long period
between transitions is going to end sooner rather than later. This is consistent
with the principle of business cycles. A decreasing hazard rate with time would
mean in contrast that investors do not believe in cyclicality of the market.
From Engle and Russell (1997) we know that the log likelihood function of the
LACD model is simply the sum of (the logarithm of) the densities of the standard-
ised durations (zi,n/ψi,n). As our pooled regression implies common parameters
across countries, the sum of the likelihood does not run only over all durations in
one series, but also over all countries. Let θ denote (ω, α′, β′)′. The log likelihood
(LL) functions of the ELACD and WLACD models are then given by:
LLELACD(θ) = −
K∑
i=1
Ni(T )∑
n=1
[
ln(ψi,n) +
zi,n
ψi,n
]
,
LLWLACD(θ, γ) = −
K∑
i=1
Ni(T )∑
n=1
[
ln
(
γ
zi,n
)
+
γ ln
(
Γ(1 + 1
γ
) zi,n
ψi,n
)
−
(
Γ(1 + 1
γ
) zi,n
ψi,n
)γ ]
.
(4.4)
It is shown by Engle and Russell (1998) and Grammig and Maurer (2000) that
a maximum likelihood estimator with a correctly specified density is a consistent
and efficient estimator of the LACD model.
4.3.1 The Autoregressive Conditional Hazard Model
From the ACD model, an expected duration is found for each of the periods of
tension as well as for each of the periods of decreasing pressure. As one such
period progresses, information about the macroeconomic situation of the respec-
tive country comes available. We would like to include this information into the
determination of the probability that the period ends. Because the ACD model
is only able to handle information that is constant throughout a period, a modi-
fied version of the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) model developed by
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Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) is used here.
The ACH model is based on the ACD model, but it has its focus on the hazard
rate instead of on the duration. Because the hazard rate is defined in calendar
time, the ACH allows us to include monthly observations of explanatory variables.
The hazard rate then depends on both the a priori expected duration of the cur-
rent period and the explanatory variables.
The hazard rate of the ACH model is found by writing up the hazard rate
of the ACD in calendar time and adding the explanatory variables. Because we
are interested in the probability of a period of (non-)tension ending in the next
month, the hazard rate should be expressed not as an instantaneous transition
rate in continuous time, but in discrete form as the rate of transition between time
t+1 and time t.5 Whereas Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) propose to incorporate the
explanatory variables into their model as a modifier of the expected duration in
an additive way, we let the variables enter in a multiplicative way. More precisely,
the expected duration is divided by the exponent of the explanatory variables.
This setup is chosen in order to ensure positivity of the hazard rate and achieve
the intuitive interpretation that a positive (negative) estimated coefficient for a
variable means that an increase in that variable leads to an increase (decrease) in
the hazard rate. Let Xi,t denote the set of explanatory variables for country i at
time t and let Ii,t−1 be the complete information set available up to time t − 1.
Depending on the assumption of Exponential or Weibull distributed durations,
the discrete time hazard rate for country i at time t conditional on information
available at time t− 1 is given by:
λELACH(i, t| Ii,t−1) = 1− exp
(
−exp(δ
′Xi,t−1)
ψi,N(t)+1
)
,
λWLACH(i, t| Ii,t−1) = 1−
exp
[
−
(
Γ(1+ 1
γ
) exp(δ′Xi,t−1)
ψi,N(t)+1
(t∗ + 1)
)γ]
exp
[
−
(
δ′Xi,t−1·Γ(1+
1
γ
)
ψi,N(t)+1
t∗
)γ] ,
(4.5)
where t∗ stands for the time already spent in the current period.
Because the hazard rate is defined as the probability that the current period
ends within one unit of time, it is fairly straightforward to build the log-likelihood
function using this hazard rate. Consider a dummy variable Di,t that takes the
5In discrete form, the hazard function is defined as the probability of failure before or at time
t+ 1 given survival up to time t (Lancaster, 1990). In a formula this is given by:
P [Tf ≤ t+ 1|Tf > t] =
F (t+ 1)− F (t)
S(t)
= 1−
S(t + 1)
S(t)
where Tf , F (t) and S(t) denote respectively the time of failure, the distribution function and
the survival function.
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value 1 whenever a period ends and 0 otherwise. The probability of observing Di,t
is then
P [Di,t | Ii,t−1; Θ] = (λXLACH(i, t))Di,t(1 − λXLACH(i, t))1−Di,t , (4.6)
with Θ representing all parameters to be estimated6. The Log-Likelihood function
follows immediately:
LLXLACH(Θ) =
K∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
{Di,t ln[λXLACH(i, t)]
+ (1−Di,t) ln[1− λXLACH(i, t)]} ,
(4.7)
which can be maximised numerically with respect to Θ.
4.4 Small Sample Performance of the ACD
In this section we examine the properties of the ACD model in a small sample. It
has already been shown by Grammig and Maurer (2000) that a misspecification
of the distribution of the durations has serious consequences for the consistency
of the estimation. We therefore focus on the case in which we know the true form
of the distribution.
The expected durations (ψi,n) in the ACH model are not updated as a period
progresses, they are therefore essentially only identified by the information that
is also used in the pure ACD model. As the ACD model has originally been
developed for high frequency data and as our durations are measured in terms of
months, we have a rather small amount of observations to estimate the expected
durations. To cope with the finite sample we pool the series of all countries. A
large drawback of pooling is that one implicitly assumes homogeneity among the
countries. As a compromise between having a larger number of observations and
still having a panel that does not violate the homogeneity assumption, Van den
Berg et al. (2008) propose to pool only clusters of similar countries. In our sample,
this means that the number of durations in such a cluster would be around 50 or
even lower. As we will find from the simulation study below, at this amount
of observations the ACD estimations do not give reliable results even under the
strongly simplifying assumptions of homogeneity and independence of the series.
4.4.1 Setup of the Simulations
In our simulation we mimic a LACD(1,1) model. In the LACD(1,1) we have from
equation (4.3) the following relationships between the actual durations zi,n, the
6Specifically, for the Exponential-LACH, Θ = (δ′, θ′)′, and for the Weibull-LACH, Θ =
(δ′, θ′, γ)′,
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expected durations ψi,n, and the innovations ǫi,n:
ln(ψi,n) = ω + α ln(zi,n−1) + β ln(ψi,n−1), (4.8)
zi,n = ψi,nǫi,n. (4.9)
In our simulations we assume the ǫi,n i.i.d. and distributed either Exponential(1)
or Weibull(1,γ). The errors are standardised such that their asymptotical mean
equals 1. For given individual-specific starting values ψi,0, the durations zi,n and
expected durations ψi,n can then be built iteratively.
We focus on two different data generating processes (DGP) based on equations
(4.8)-(4.9). The first DGP is an Exponential-LACD(1,1) process. The parameters
ω, α and β are chosen such that they roughly mark the process of our empirical
application. The second DGP is a Weibull-LACD(1,1) where the parameters ω,
α and β are chosen similarly and γ = 2. Notice that for the Weibull(1,2) density
the first moment of the innovations ǫi,n is not equal to one. In order to keep the
expected value of the simulated durations xi,n at the intended value ψi,n, we need
to rescale the innovations such that their first moment is equal to one. For each of
the DGPs we simulate an N ∗K panel of durations and expected durations with
four different sample sizes. The number of individuals is kept constant at K = 10,
whereas the number of durations per individual is set at N = 5, 10, 100 or 1000.
The simulation study is based on 1000 replications per series.
4.4.2 Simulation Results
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the distribution of the estimated parameters. The tables
containing the numerical results corresponding to the figures can be found in the
appendix to this chapter.
Figure 4.1 contains the results of the Exponential-LACD for the varying sizes
of N . We can see that the estimation works fine if the sample is large enough,
i.e. N = 100 or N = 1000 per individual. Also, the estimation of the α coeffi-
cient appears remain consistent even if the sample size decreases. The two other
coefficients however, suffer from consistency problems when N becomes smaller.
At N = 10 (i.e. 100 observations in total), the estimation of ω is slightly skewed
to the left, whereas the for the β coefficient it is skewed to the right. When the
sample decreases further, to N = 5, both distributions even have a second local
maximum, ω at around 0 and β slightly below 1. The observations that are located
in these hump are from the same replications. In these replications the sum of the
α and β coefficient is very close to one, a sign of a high degree of persistence in
ln(ψi,n). It follows that the value of ω needs to be close to zero in order to keep
the expected value at a reasonable level.
For the Weibull-LACD(1,1) model (Figure 4.2), the results in the very small
samples are very similar to those of the ELACD model. Additionally, the shape
coefficient of the distribution, γ, shows a right tail that is a little too heavy, re-
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sulting in an upward bias that disappears as the sample size grows.
From this small simulation exercise we may conclude that even under the sim-
plifying assumptions of homogeneity, knowing the correct distribution as well as
independence of the innovations with respect to both dimensions of the panel,
the LACD model suffers from convergence problems in small samples (50 obser-
vations). When the sample size is doubled however, the problems in the ELACD
and the WLACD are within reasonable bounds. These results indicate that one
must be very careful when estimating an ACD in small samples, especially when
the number of observations is below 100.
(a) ω, value = 5.6 (b) α, value = 0.2
(c) β, value = -0.6
Note: K = 10. The vertical black line represents the true value of the parameter.
Figure 4.1: Simulated ELACD estimation results when the innovations are Expo-
nential.
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(a) ω, value = 5.5 (b) α, value = 0.2
(c) β, value = -0.6 (d) γ, value = 2.0
Note: K = 10. The vertical black line represents the true value of the parameter.
Figure 4.2: Simulated WLACD estimation results when the innovations are
Weibull.
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4.5 Empirical Application
4.5.1 Data
Our dataset consists of monthly data from January 1985 to January 2005. It covers
19 countries from the regions Latin America and Asia: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, China, India, In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand. The data
is obtained via Datastream7
In order to identify the periods of increasing and decreasing pressure, we em-
ploy a technique closely related to the dating algorithm of Bry and Boschan (1971)
to the Exchange Market Pressure index. This procedure aims to identify periods
in which the trend is generally increasing, named bulls, and periods in which the
trend generally decreases, named bears. The main purpose of the algorithm is to
locate the turning points i.e. the local maxima (peaks) and minima (troughs).
These turning points signify the points in time when the general trend switches
from upward to downward, or vice versa. Let Yi,t denote the exchange market
pressure index for country i at time t. In the series for country i, a peak (trough)
then occurs when Yit is a local maximum (minimum) in a window of 12 months.
In a formula it looks as follows.
{
peak at t if Yi,t > Yi,t−j and Yi,t > Yi,t+j for j = 1 . . . 6,
trough at t if Yi,t < Yi,t−j and Yi,t < Yi,t+j for j = 1 . . . 6.
In case of more than one consecutive peaks (troughs), the highest peak (lowest
trough) remains whereas the others are removed such that the series constitutes a
alternating sequence of peaks and troughs.
Applying the Bry and Boschan (1971) based algorithm described above, we
identify a total of 246 peaks and 240 troughs in our sample. These turning points
give us 250 separate periods of tension (trough-to-peak) of which 9 are left-censored
and 4 are right-censored8. The average length of these periods is approximately 9
months. The average time from a peak to a trough is slightly shorter: 8 months.
There are a total 255 of such periods without tension, 10 of which are left-censored
and 15 are right-censored. The exact dates of the turning points are provided in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
The set of explanatory variables we use in this chapter is almost the same as
the set of variables used in the previous chapters. The economic reasoning behind
the inclusion of these variables remains the same. The effect on the hazard rate
is slightly different than in Chapter 3 however. This difference comes from the
7Sources are the IMF-IFS database and the national banks of the respective countries.
8A period is called to be censored if not the entire period in included in the sample. A
left-censored period is a period that started some time before the first observation in the sample.
A right-censored period is a period of which the end is not observed.
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ARG BOL BRA CHI ECU MEX PAR PER URU VEN
Peak 86/03
Trough 86/07 86/08 86/05 86/05 86/10 86/03
Peak 87/10 87/08 87/05 87/05 86/04 86/08 87/02 87/04 87/04 86/12
Trough 88/08 88/10 88/09 89/05 87/03 87/04 87/07 88/08 87/10
Peak 89/04 89/09 88/11 88/01 89/03 89/11 89/04
Trough 90/08 90/10 90/09 89/08
Peak 91/06 90/05 90/03 91/09 91/05
Trough 91/12 90/11 90/12 91/06 91/02
Peak 92/01 92/09 92/10 92/12
Trough 92/06 92/05 92/06 93/02 93/04 93/02
Peak 93/02 94/06 93/12 94/09 94/06
Trough 94/08 95/04 94/07 94/08 94/12
Peak 95/03 95/11 96/01 96/02 95/03 96/02 95/06 96/05
Trough 96/02 95/10 95/07 96/08 96/08 96/11
Peak 96/10
Trough 98/09 97/09 97/06 97/05 98/04
Peak 99/09 98/05 99/02 98/04 98/09 98/04 99/02 98/10 98/09
Trough 99/12 98/12 99/09 98/12 99/05 99/09 00/05 99/05 00/11
Peak 00/07 99/06 00/02 00/09 00/11 01/02
Trough 01/07 01/03 00/11 01/05 01/09 01/11
Peak 02/06 02/07 02/12 02/02 03/02 02/09 02/07 02/06 02/09 02/06
Trough 03/07 03/06 03/03 03/08 03/05 03/07 03/03 03/08 03/07
Peak 04/01 04/05 03/08 04/03 04/07 03/09 04/07 04/10
Trough 05/01 04/09
Table 4.1: Dates of the Peaks and Troughs Identified for Latin America
definition of tension compared to periods of crisis. When an increase in one of
the variables is expected to increase the tension on the market, the hazard rate
for transitioning out of tension should decrease, whereas in the model for moving
into tension the hazard rate is expected to increase. The included explanatory
variables relate to different aspects of the economy. We use variables from the
external sector, the financial sector and the real sector. Notice that all explana-
tory variables enter the hazard rate one month lagged. This way, at time t, the
probability of a turning point within the next month is affected only by variables
which are observable at time t.
Within the external sector the current account and the capital account can
be distinguished. Because we use monthly data, the quarterly data for the cur-
rent account and capital account cannot be used directly. We therefore include
monthly variables as approximation. The first variable relating to the current ac-
count is the annual growth rate of exports. Because a decrease in exports indicates
a loss in international competitiveness, it would lead to a recession and business
failures (Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes, 1995). Hence we expect a decrease in
exports to add to the tension on the market. Secondly, we have the imports annual
growth rate. For imports the theory is not so clear. On the one hand an decrease
in imports could be an indication of weakening of economic activity, while on the
other hand an increase in imports can be caused by a strong overvaluation of the
real exchange rate (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The overall impact on the
durations of the tension depends on which of these two effects is strongest. It is
also examined if the ratio trade balance over GDP has an impact on the hazard
rate. A lower trade balance (more imports, less exports) could indicate that the
domestic currency is overvalued. This creates additional tension and as such is
expected to extend its duration. To capture the capital account, the real interest
rate differential with respect to the United States as well as the growth in inter-
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CHN IND INO KOR MAL PHI SRL TAI THA
Peak 86/11 86/11 87/01 86/05 86/07 86/07
Trough 87/10 87/05 87/07 87/03 86/08 87/01
Peak 88/09 88/05 88/02 88/08
Trough 88/06 88/06 89/05 89/05
Peak 90/01 90/06 90/04 89/09 90/06
Trough 90/07 90/03 91/03 90/10 89/12 90/03
Peak 91/07 91/04 90/11
Trough 92/02 93/03 92/09 91/07 92/01
Peak 94/01 93/03 94/07 94/05 93/05 93/09 93/01 93/07 92/08
Trough 94/12 94/03 94/01 94/04 93/07 95/04 93/10
Peak 96/04 96/02 95/03 95/05 95/11 95/11 95/03
Trough 97/01 97/07 97/04 95/11 96/07 96/08 97/11 97/01 95/09
Peak 98/12 98/01 98/01 98/01 98/01 98/01 98/11 98/01 97/12
Trough 99/03 98/07 99/02 99/04 98/07
Peak 99/10
Trough 00/03 00/04 99/12 00/02
Peak 00/10 01/02 01/04 01/03 00/11 01/02 00/12 00/10
Trough 02/02 02/07 02/02 02/01 02/07 02/07
Peak 02/08 03/03 03/01 02/11 03/01 03/02
Trough 03/11 04/04 03/04 03/10 04/08 03/09 04/04
Peak 04/05 04/10 04/10 04/10 04/10 04/10
Table 4.2: Dates of the Peaks and Troughs Identified for Asia
national reserves are used as proxies. For the latter we expect that a decrease in
reserves will extend the duration of the tension period. A high real interest rate
differential is typically associated with a high amount of tension of the market (see
Eichengreen et al., 1995). The argument behind this could be that the interest
rate has been increased in a response to an excess supply of the currency.
The second aspect of the economy is the financial sector. It has been shown by
McKinnon and Pill (1996) that currency crises, most notably those accompanied
by a banking crisis (labelled as twin crises), have often been preceded by periods
of financial liberalisation. Facilitated by the more relaxed reserve requirements
for banks, the financial liberalisation tends to make people and banks overconfi-
dent in the stability of the currency, leading to excessive (foreign) borrowing. The
banking sector now becomes vulnerable to speculative attacks (Krugman, 1979).
Overborrowing results in an increase in the M2 multiplier as well as growth of
domestic credit relative to GDP (McKinnon and Pill, 1998). For both these vari-
ables it holds that a higher ratio indicates higher vulnerability and therefore more
tension for the investors. To capture the credit risk rating and the willingness of
banks to lend, we include the ratio lending rate over deposit rate. An increase in
this ratio indicates that banks require a high risker premium on their loans. This
signal that investments are more insecure, creates tension for the investors on the
market. We also include the ratio M2 over reserves. An increase of the ratio is
caused both by an increase in M2 money and decrease in reserves. The higher this
ratio, the more vulnerable is the economic system to speculative attacks (Calvo
and Mendoza, 1996). The ratio M2 over reserves is included both as levels and as
growth rate, because we believe that tension is created not only by an increasing
ratio, but also by a ratio that is simply high. The next variable is the ratio foreign
liabilities over GDP. A high ratio means more outstanding debt and hence a weaker
position of the economy. The duration of a tension period is expected to increase
with this ratio. The final financial variable is the growth of bank deposits. A
decrease in this variable shows capital flight and bank runs (Goldfajn and Valdes,
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1997). The loss of confidence in the banking sector increases tension on the market.
The last aspect of the economy included, is the real sector of the economy. As a
proxy for output growth we use the industrial production growth rate. A decrease
in industrial production growth is the sign of a weakening domestic economy and
therefore a more vulnerable economy. As a result we expect the period of tension
to last longer as the industrial production growth rate decreases.9
4.5.2 Estimation Results
In this section we report the estimation results of the Autoregressive Conditional
Hazard models and compare them with results from static duration models. Notice
that this static duration model is the model we developed in Chapter 3. We have
a separate model for the periods of tension and for the periods without tension.
As shown in the simulation study, we are only able to produce consistent results
when we use the complete panel of countries. Notice that next to the implied
homogeneity of the countries, we also make the assumption that the countries’
series are mutually independent. In order to have some country specific effect,
we allow for a different starting value of the expected duration in equation (4.3)
for each country. Because the starting value used is the mean of all durations
of that country, it acts like a fixed effect to capture the difference in stability of
the economies. This then results in a different baseline risk that is assigned to a
country by the investors. Model specifications with regional dummies in both the
ACD part and the explanatory variables part were also estimated. In all cases the
regional dummy was highly insignificant. This might seem surprising. It is likely
however that the country specific effects already capture the differences between
the regions. The section ends with an analysis of how well the models can predict
the transitions into and out of tension.
The estimation results of the models for the probability of transition from ten-
sion periods to non-tension periods are presented in Table 4.3. The table contains
the parameter estimates of both the Exponential- and Weibull-LACH model.10
The results of the two models are qualitatively very similar. The signs of the co-
efficients are the same for all explanatory variables and also the ACD parameters
are very close to each other. From the values of the ACD parameters we see that
the log expected duration depends negatively on its own lag. The lagged observed
durations have no significant effect. This indicates that expectations about dura-
tions are pretty constant over time. Additionally, the shape parameter γ = 1.768
of the Weibull distribution supports the idea that the hazard rate increases as the
time spent under tension lengthens. It also indicates that the true distribution of
the durations most likely is not Exponential, for then γ should have been close to 1.
9Note that most explanatory variables enter the model as the one-month lag of the annual
growth rate.
10The ACH version of the Gompertz duration model did not converge properly making a
comparison with the static duration model impossible.
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Two variables related to the external sector have a significant effect on the
hazard rate. First there is the exports growth for which the expected positive sign
is found. The positive coefficient indicates that an increase in probability of the
end of the tension period is associated with a rise in exports growth. This supports
the theory that an increase in exports is a sign of a strong economy. The second
significant variable is the growth rate of international reserves. The coefficient is
negative in both models whereas a positive coefficient was expected; an increase
in the reserves growth should decrease tension. This counter-intuitive finding can
be explained by the fact that currency crises are in fact extreme peaks of the
EMP-index and therefore coincide with some of the peaks that signal the end of
a tension period. Huge reserves losses are a sign that a crisis (= peak) is near,
leading to a negative coefficient. The final significant variables relates to the finan-
cial sector. The ratio M2 over reserves has the expected negative sign; a decrease
in the growth rate of the ratio increases the probability of transition out of tension.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the static duration models for the transition out
of tension. In the estimation of these static models, the ACD part of the model
is disregarded. The expected durations, ψi,N(t)+1, in Equation (5.2) are replaced
by the simple country by country means of the observed durations to allow for a
country-specific scaling effect. Comparing the estimated coefficients of the static
models with those of the dynamic duration models, we see that the same variables
are significant with the same signs. These results of the static duration models
confirm therefore the findings of the LACH models.
Table 4.5 contains the estimation results of the ELACH and WLACH mod-
els for the probability of transition from periods without tension into periods of
tension. The dependence structure of the durations of periods without tension
is completely different from the tension periods. The expected duration depends
heavily on the previous expected duration, indicating strong persistence11 in the
expected duration length. Surprisingly, it depends negatively on the last observed
duration. This might indicate that market agents expect that short and long peri-
ods of tension alternate over time. Even though the model suffices the conditions
for stationarity, the sum of α and β is very close to the bound which might ham-
per the convergence. As the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution is larger
than one, the hazard rate of transition out of a period without tension increases
proportionally to the time spent in the period.
As we are now modelling the transition into a period of tension instead of the
transition out of the period of tension, we expect the explanatory variable to affect
the hazard rate opposite than before. We see however that different variables are
significant. This time around there is also a difference between the Exponential-
and Weibull-LACH model.
11Fernandes and Grammig (2006) show that necessary and sufficient conditions for covariance
stationarity are |α+ β| < 1 and E(ǫmi,n) exists.
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Variable ELACH WLACH Expected Sign
ω 4.042 4.040
(0.666) (0.337)
α -0.016 -0.016
(0.064) (0.032)
β -0.811 -0.812
(0.324) (0.163)
γ 1.768
(0.083)
Exports Growtht−1 0.417 0.275 +
(0.241) (0.130)
Reserves Growtht−1 -1.953 -0.739 +
(0.272) (0.138)
M2/Reserves Growtht−1 -0.641 -0.332 -
(0.241) (0.110)
Constant 0.144 -0.033
(0.073) (0.044)
Log-Likelihood ELACH = -8614.1, Log-likelihood WLACH = -8113.1
Table 4.3: Estimation results of LACH models for transition out of tension.
Variable Expon. Weib. Expected Sign
Exports Growtht−1 0.438 0.317 +
(0.243) (0.132)
Reserves Growtht−1 -1.964 -0.751 +
(0.275) (0.141)
M2/Reserves Growtht−1 -0.582 -0.275 -
(0.198) (0.105)
Constant 0.140 -0.038
(0.073) (0.044)
Log-L. Exponential Model = -8592.6, Log-L. Weibull Model = -8060.2
Table 4.4: Estimation results of the static duration models for transition out of
tension.
85
Variable ELACH WLACH Expected Sign
ω 0.015 0.014
(0.064) (0.032)
α -0.115 -0.114
(0.032) (0.016)
β 1.098 1.098
(0.034) (0.017)
γ 1.951
(0.090)
Reserves Growtht−1 0.485 -
(0.111)
M2/Reservest−1 -0.029 +
(0.012)
M2/Reserves Growtht−1 -0.648 0.229 +
(0.221) (0.126)
Industrial Production Growtht−1 0.454 -
(0.055)
Constant -0.140 -0.138
(0.066) (0.047)
Log-Likelihood ELACH = -7566.3, Log-likelihood WLACH = -6706.7
Table 4.5: Estimation results of LACH models for transition into tension.
As in the opposite model, the growth of international reserves is significant
with the wrong sign for the WLACH model. Also, the growth rate of M2 over
reserves is significant with the expected sign like before. The level of this ratio
now is significant as well, but with the opposite from expected sign. As the point
of transition into tension lies in the trough of the EMP-index the level of reserves
has been increasing in the periods just before the turning point. Since an increase
in the level of reserves lowers the M2/reserves ratio, the negative sign could be
caused by this effect. In the ELACH model only the growth rates of the ratio
M2 over reserves and of the industrial production are significant. Both have the
wrong sign even though M2/reserves growth had the expected sign in the opposite
model. The poor performance is evidence that the exponential form for the hazard
function is not adequate to explain this transition process. This is supported by
the fact that the shape parameter of the Weibull is significantly larger than 1. In
the static duration models (see Table 4.6), none of the explanatory variables show
any expected signs. That the Exponential duration model behaves like its dynamic
counterpart is not entirely unexpected, but the static Weibull model now also fails.
86
4 Modelling Exchange Rate Tensions
4.5 Empirical Application
Variable Expon. Weib. Expected Sign
Reserves Growtht−1 0.343 -
(0.087)
M2/Reserves Growtht−1 -0.667 +
(0.222)
Industrial Production Growtht−1 0.474 0.233 -
(0.055) (0.130)
Constant -0.152 -0.222
(0.066) (0.040)
Log-L. Exponential Model = -7576.5, Log-L. Weibull Model = -6823.2
Table 4.6: Estimation results of the static duration models for transition into
tension.
From Tables 4.3 and 4.5 it turns out that the macroeconomic variables have
very similar impacts in the ELACH model and WLACH model. Nevertheless,
from the estimated values of the shape parameter γ, we can conclude that the
Weibull-LACH model should be preferred. This view is confirmed by the graphs
of the implied probabilities of transition as presented in Figures 5.1-5.3. These
graphs show the probability that the current period will end from both types of
models. The grey-shaded areas denote the periods of tension and the white areas
are the periods without tension. If we notice that the probability of transition
should increase when a period is approaching its end and remain low before that
time, we see that almost everywhere the Weibull-LACH does a better job than the
Exponential-LACH in predicting this probability.
Because a more formal comparison of prediction performance is desirable, the
probability of transition into and out of tension is examined numerically as well.
To do this, we use the signalling method as originally used by Kaminsky (1999).
In this approach we compare the cases when the model signals a turning point to
those when we would like it to signal one. The time window ahead of the turning
points at which the model ideally should start signalling, is varied between 1 and 6
months in advance. The model signals a turning point if the probability of a crisis
crosses a certain threshold percentage. This signalling threshold is determined
per country. It is set at the level that minimises missed turning points and false
signals. The perfect fit would be if the signals of the model coincide exactly with
the required signals. We therefore count the number of correct signals (A), the
number of times the model did not give a signal when it actually should have (C),
the number of false alarms (B) and the number of correct no-signals (D). These
numbers are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 for the different model specifications
and prediction horizons. The goodness-of-fit of the model is calculated as the
average of the percentages of missed turning points and false alarms. As such, a
87
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(a
)
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(b
)
B
o
li
v
ia
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(c
)
B
ra
zi
l
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(d
)
C
h
il
e
F
ig
u
re
4
.3
:
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
p
er
io
d
o
f
te
n
si
on
to
p
er
io
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
te
n
si
o
n
a
n
d
v
ic
e
v
er
sa
(1
)
88
4 Modelling Exchange Rate Tensions
4.5 Empirical Application
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(a
)
E
cu
a
d
o
r
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(b
)
M
ex
ic
o
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(c
)
P
a
ra
g
u
ay
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(d
)
P
er
u
F
ig
u
re
4
.4
:
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
p
er
io
d
o
f
te
n
si
on
to
p
er
io
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
te
n
si
o
n
a
n
d
v
ic
e
v
er
sa
(2
)
89
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(a
)
U
ru
g
u
ay
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(b
)
V
en
ez
u
el
a
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(c
)
C
h
in
a
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(d
)
In
d
ia
F
ig
u
re
4
.5
:
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
p
er
io
d
o
f
te
n
si
on
to
p
er
io
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
te
n
si
o
n
a
n
d
v
ic
e
v
er
sa
(3
)
90
4 Modelling Exchange Rate Tensions
4.5 Empirical Application
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(a
)
In
d
o
n
es
ia
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(b
)
K
o
re
a
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(c
)
M
a
la
y
si
a
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(d
)
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
F
ig
u
re
4
.6
:
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
p
er
io
d
o
f
te
n
si
on
to
p
er
io
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
te
n
si
o
n
a
n
d
v
ic
e
v
er
sa
(4
)
91
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(a
)
S
ri
L
a
n
ka
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(b
)
T
a
iw
a
n
0.2.4.6.81 19
85
m
1
19
90
m
1
19
95
m
1
20
00
m
1
20
05
m
1
Ti
m
e
Te
ns
io
n
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 W
LA
CH
H
az
ar
d 
Ra
te
 E
LA
CH
(c
)
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
F
ig
u
re
4
.7
:
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
p
er
io
d
o
f
te
n
si
on
to
p
er
io
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
te
n
si
o
n
a
n
d
v
ic
e
v
er
sa
(5
)
92
4 Modelling Exchange Rate Tensions
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Prediction Horizon = 6 Months
Model Ia IIa IIIa IVa GoFa
Exponential-LACH 65.5% 34.5% 31.4% 68.6% 0.3296
Static Exponential 61.0% 39.0% 33.1% 66.9% 0.3605
Weibull-LACH 61.7% 38.3% 28.1% 71.9% 0.3320
Static Weibull 57.4% 42.6% 30.7% 69.3% 0.3668
Prediction Horizon = 5 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 65.7% 34.3% 33.5% 66.5% 0.3392
Static Exponential 61.0% 39.0% 35.9% 64.1% 0.3743
Weibull-LACH 64.1% 35.9% 27.9% 72.1% 0.3186
Static Weibull 59.5% 40.5% 30.2% 69.8% 0.3534
Prediction Horizon = 4 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 67.4% 32.6% 38.0% 62.0% 0.3533
Static Exponential 60.1% 39.9% 38.1% 61.9% 0.3901
Weibull-LACH 68.3% 31.7% 29.0% 71.0% 0.3034
Static Weibull 62.1% 37.9% 31.5% 68.5% 0.3469
Prediction Horizon = 3 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 64.1% 35.9% 37.1% 62.9% 0.3648
Static Exponential 56.2% 43.8% 37.1% 62.9% 0.4044
Weibull-LACH 71.8% 28.2% 30.1% 69.9% 0.2917
Static Weibull 63.7% 36.3% 32.4% 67.6% 0.3435
Prediction Horizon = 2 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 68.6% 31.4% 41.5% 58.5% 0.3646
Static Exponential 58.8% 41.2% 41.1% 58.9% 0.4114
Weibull-LACH 71.5% 28.5% 29.4% 70.6% 0.2894
Static Weibull 63.2% 36.8% 30.0% 70.0% 0.3339
Prediction Horizon = 1 Month
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 66.5% 33.5% 36.9% 63.1% 0.3517
Static Exponential 52.5% 47.5% 35.7% 64.3% 0.4161
Weibull-LACH 77.6% 22.4% 33.9% 66.1% 0.2815
Static Weibull 67.7% 32.3% 33.4% 66.6% 0.3287
Table 4.7: Prediction performance of the different model specifi-
cations in Latin America.
aI is the number of signals for a turning point (A) as a percentage of the
total number of periods in which a signal should be given (A + C). II is the
percentage of non-signals (C/(A+C)). III is the percentage of times a signal
is given by the model (B) when none is desired (B+D). IV is the percentage
of correct non-signals (D/(B+D)). The Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) is calculated
as (II+III)/2.
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Prediction Horizon = 6 Months
Model Ia IIa IIIa IVa GoFa
Exponential-LACH 68.0% 32.0% 32.2% 67.8% 0.3214
Static Exponential 66.8% 33.2% 38.5% 61.5% 0.3584
Weibull-LACH 63.8% 36.2% 29.1% 70.9% 0.3261
Static Weibull 61.7% 38.3% 30.6% 69.4% 0.3444
Prediction Horizon = 5 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 71.1% 28.9% 39.0% 61.0% 0.3395
Static Exponential 69.8% 30.2% 45.6% 54.4% 0.3792
Weibull-LACH 67.4% 32.6% 30.9% 69.1% 0.3177
Static Weibull 65.4% 34.6% 33.2% 66.8% 0.3392
Prediction Horizon = 4 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 71.1% 28.9% 41.6% 58.4% 0.3525
Static Exponential 69.2% 30.8% 47.6% 52.4% 0.3920
Weibull-LACH 74.2% 25.8% 37.9% 62.1% 0.3187
Static Weibull 71.0% 29.0% 39.4% 60.6% 0.3422
Prediction Horizon = 3 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 66.9% 33.1% 40.0% 60.0% 0.3657
Static Exponential 65.7% 34.3% 46.1% 53.9% 0.4021
Weibull-LACH 74.6% 25.4% 37.3% 62.7% 0.3133
Static Weibull 70.7% 29.3% 39.4% 60.6% 0.3434
Prediction Horizon = 2 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 64.0% 36.0% 38.9% 61.0% 0.3747
Static Exponential 62.9% 37.1% 44.1% 55.9% 0.4059
Weibull-LACH 80.4% 19.6% 42.8% 57.2% 0.3119
Static Weibull 73.9% 26.1% 44.4% 55.6% 0.3525
Prediction Horizon = 1 Month
Model I II III IV GoF
Exponential-LACH 60.3% 39.7% 37.1% 62.9% 0.3840
Static Exponential 58.3% 41.7% 42.8% 57.2% 0.4225
Weibull-LACH 83.5% 16.5% 44.0% 56.0% 0.3025
Static Weibull 75.2% 24.8% 44.9% 55.1% 0.3486
Table 4.8: Prediction performance of the different model specifi-
cations in Asia.
aI is the number of signals for a turning point (A) as a percentage of the
total number of periods in which a signal should be given (A + C). II is the
percentage of non-signals (C/(A+C)). III is the percentage of times a signal
is given by the model (B) when none is desired (B+D). IV is the percentage
of correct non-signals (D/(D+D)). The Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) is calculated
as (II+III)/2.
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perfect fit would yield a goodness-of-fit measure of 0 whereas the worst possible
fit would yield 1. If we now compare the performance of the four models we see
that the Weibull models do better than their Exponential counterparts on the all
forecasting horizon except the 6-month horizon. This result is expected as the
estimated values for the shape parameter γ are well above 1. When comparing the
dynamic duration models with the static models, there is clear evidence that the
dynamic model works better. In all cases the dynamic model has a goodness-of-fit
measure closer to 0 than the static version.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter a dataset of 19 countries from Latin America and Asia is used to
estimate Autoregressive Conditional Hazard models to explain the occurrence and
duration of tension on the exchange rate market. Our model is an addition to
existing work for several reasons. First, we model periods of tension instead of pe-
riods of crisis in order to overcome the problems that are commonly encountered
when modelling crises. Second, we extend the static duration model of Tudela
(2004) to allow for time dynamics. To achieve this a modified version of the ACH
model as originally proposed by Hamilton and Jorda´ (2002) is considered. As the
time series dimension is too short to properly estimate the time dynamics, pooled
panel estimations are performed. Third, we perform a Monte Carlo experiment
to examine the behaviour of this model to see what happens to the estimation
when applied to a panel with a short time dimension relative to the traditional
high-frequency single series datasets to which the ACH usually is applied.
When pooling data, one should wonder whether the data actually is poolable
(Van den Berg et al., 2008). The simulation study showed however, that we need
the complete panel of countries in order to get reliable estimation results. We
found that a single country or clusters of similar countries do not provide suf-
ficient durations to consistently estimate the time dynamics in the ACH model,
thereby rendering it impossible to perform any subsample analysis. As regional
dummies turned out to be highly insignificant and a model with country dummies
is unfeasible, a country specific effect is incorporated into the model by allowing
the starting value of the expected duration to be different for each country. This
way, every country has its own baseline risk.
In the empirical application we used Exponential-LACH and Weibull-LACH
models. Both the probability of transition from periods of tension to periods with-
out tension and the probability of transition from non-tension periods to tension
periods are subject to analysis. It results that assuming a Weibull density for the
durations works better than assuming an Exponential density in terms of predict-
ing the probability that the current period will end in the next month. This finding
holds for both directions of transition. The estimation of the time dynamics re-
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veals that the expected duration of the period of tension depends negatively on
the expectation for the previous period, but not on the lagged observed duration.
In contrast, the expectation of the duration of the periods without tension shows
very high persistence in the expectations and depends negatively on the lagged
observed duration. Overall, the lagged expected durations have a stronger impact
on the current expectation than the lagged observed durations. Comparison of
the dynamic with the static duration models shows that the inclusion of dynamics
definitely helps in the prediction of the turning points between periods of tension
and non-tension. This finding warrants the use of ACH techniques despite its
shortcomings in the finite sample.
4.A Appendix: Monte Carlo Results
This appendix contains the Monte Carlo simulations results that were used to
examine the small sample performance of the ACD model.
ELACD(1,1), N=5, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.6 5.5206 5.5796 2.8770 2.1004 [-0.0129; 10.774]
α 0.2 0.2006 0.1907 0.1323 0.1224 [-0.0440; 0.4716]
β -0.6 -0.5929 -0.6622 0.7132 0.5106 [-1.8084; 0.9229]
ELACD(1,1), N=10, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.6 5.5350 5.6964 1.5240 1.1400 [ 2.1663; 8.2926]
α 0.2 0.2069 0.2001 0.0883 0.0798 [ 0.0398; 0.3881]
β -0.6 -0.5946 -0.6539 0.3587 0.2627 [-1.1569; 0.2754]
ELACD(1,1), N=100, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.6 5.5711 5.5959 0.3528 0.3429 [ 4.8478; 6.1862]
α 0.2 0.2022 0.2022 0.0243 0.0242 [ 0.1563; 0.2496]
β -0.6 -0.5950 -0.6019 0.0800 0.0776 [-0.7357;-0.4271]
ELACD(1,1), N=1000, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.6 5.6040 5.6092 0.1044 0.1054 [ 5.3920; 5.7932]
α 0.2 0.2000 0.1999 0.0074 0.0076 [ 0.1857; 0.2151]
β -0.6 -0.6012 -0.6026 0.0237 0.0237 [-0.6451;-0.5518]
Table 4.9: Estimation results of the ELACD when the innovations are Exponential.
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WLACD(1,1), N=5, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.5 5.5911 5.7213 2.8166 1.9059 [-0.0181; 10.622]
α 0.2 0.2010 0.1912 0.1344 0.1145 [-0.0496; 0.4843]
β -0.6 -0.6304 -0.7074 0.6989 0.4586 [-1.7718; 0.9203]
γ 2.0 2.1136 2.0857 0.2567 0.2314 [ 1.6832; 2.6727]
WLACD(1,1), N=10, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.5 5.5283 5.6598 1.5388 1.1009 [ 2.1451; 8.2993]
α 0.2 0.2054 0.1995 0.0890 0.0771 [ 0.0344; 0.3930]
β -0.6 -0.6143 -0.6710 0.3584 0.2527 [-1.1890; 0.2069]
γ 2.0 2.0539 2.0373 0.1663 0.1599 [ 1.7705; 2.4433]
WLACD(1,1), N=100, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.5 5.4727 5.4967 0.3546 0.3433 [ 4.7547; 6.1093]
α 0.2 0.2022 0.2020 0.0243 0.0241 [ 0.1562; 0.2494]
β -0.6 -0.5952 -0.6025 0.0799 0.0774 [-0.7350;-0.4276]
γ 2.0 2.0067 2.0061 0.0496 0.0495 [ 1.9156; 2.1026]
WLACD(1,1), N=1000, K=10
Variable Value
Mean Median St.Dev. of Mean of 95% Conf.
Coeff Coeff Est. Coeff St.Dev. Interval
ω 5.5 5.5044 5.5099 0.1045 0.1059 [ 5.2927; 5.6976]
α 0.2 0.2000 0.1999 0.0074 0.0076 [ 0.1857; 0.2151]
β -0.6 -0.6012 -0.6026 0.0237 0.0238 [-0.6451;-0.5519]
γ 2.0 2.0003 2.0003 0.0157 0.0156 [ 1.9681; 2.0318]
Table 4.10: Estimation results of the WLACD when the errors are Weibull with
γ = 2.
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Chapter 5
On the Use of Market
Agents’ Expectations to
Explain Currency Crises
This chapter concludes the thesis. As each chapter contains its own conclusion, we
will not go into the details here but rather focus on the general conclusion. Next,
we identify some limitations of this work and the currently existing crisis models
in general. One of the shortcomings will then be analysed more closely through
an exercise with survey data as explanatory variables. A discussion of the findings
of the exercise along with possible extensions ends the thesis.
5.1 Overview of previous Chapters
In Chapter 2 we examine the validity of the implied homogeneity assumption that
is made when pooling panel data. It is shown that researchers should not naively
pool all the data available for a maximum number of countries, because the qual-
ity of the prediction severely decreases when homogeneity is wrongfully assumed.
We propose to form optimal clusters instead, based on a series of Hausman tests
for poolability. Within these optimal clusters the homogeneity assumption is not
violated, leading to a better performance of the crisis model in terms of predicting
and explaining crisis periods. If feasible with respect to sample size, we suggest a
preliminary analysis of optimal country clusters before setting up panel model.
In Chapter 3 we introduce the duration framework as crisis model. The use
of the duration model has two advantages over the traditional limited dependent
variable models (logit, probit). First, it is not subject to the problem of low vari-
ability over time of the dependent variable. And second, the time since the last
crisis is added as an additional dimension to capture stability on the exchange
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rate market. With a fully parametric proportional hazards model it is found that
for the Asian countries in the sample, the likelihood of crisis increases as the time
since the last crisis episode passes. For the Latin American part of the sample, the
time since the last crisis yields no extra information. This is consistent with the
consensus (e.g. Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin, 2003)
that the crises in Latin America in the 1980s and 90s can be attributed to mis-
aligned macro-economic fundamentals.
The analysis in Chapter 4 switches the focus to tension on the exchange mar-
ket. Examining periods of tension instead of crisis episodes has two advantages.
First, it is not necessary to define ad hoc measures for finding extreme values
that are usually required for identifying times of crisis. Second, it increases the
number of useful observations per country. In the chapter we develop a modified
version of the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) model by Hamilton and
Jorda´ (2002) to allow for time dynamics in the model for expected durations of
periods of increasing tension and periods of decreasing tension. The findings indi-
cate that the expected duration of the current period of increasing or decreasing
tension depends strongly on previous expected durations and less on previously
observed durations. This indicates that once expectations about the stability of a
currency are formed, it is difficult to change those expectations. For policymakers
this emphasises once more that managing market agents’ expectations is of the
utmost importance. The ACH model has a drawback as well. In the finite sample
convergence is not guaranteed and cross-country pooling is required to produce
reliable results. In the process of pooling we are forced to impose the homogeneity
assumption across the countries, while from Chapter 2 we would expect that it is
unlikely to hold.
One reason for the mixed success of the first-generation crisis models is that not
every crisis is necessarily caused by weak macroeconomic fundamentals. Through
the expectations of agents, bad news alone about for example future fiscal deficits
can already trigger a currency crisis (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999; Burn-
side, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2001; Lahiri and Vegh, 2003). If the expectation
exists that this deficit will be (partly) financed by printing money, the increase in
expected inflation becomes a self-fulling prophecy.
In the previous chapters we attempted to capture the changing expectations
indirectly. Either by including macro-economic variables to approximate expecta-
tions, or by using the expected duration in the ACH model. In this final chapter
we take a more direct approach. In order to explain the phenomena of the self-
fulling prophecy1 and contagion factors more accurately, a number of survey- and
forecast-variables are included in the model to measure how agents perceive the
market. A contagion effect is incorporated through a weighted index of crisis in-
dicators in other countries where the weights are based on the intensity of the
bilateral trade relations.
1See Obstfeld (1986)
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5.2 Model Setup
In the remainder of the chapter we examine whether the inclusion of survey
and forecast variables in a duration model provides additional insight in explaining
currency crises that cannot be explained by misaligned macro-economic variables.
Section 5.2 shortly describes the model. The data and the crisis definition are
shown in Section 5.3, while the results are given in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 con-
cludes.
5.2 Model Setup
The multiple equilibria model by Obstfeld (1994, 1996) originated the theory that
agents’ expectations can trigger a speculative attack. The goal of this chapter is to
capture these expectations and utilise them to explain the occurrence of currency
crises. We therefore aim to extend the Autoregressive Conditional Hazards (ACH)
model of Chapter 4 with a contagion dummy and survey data from the World
Economic Survey (WES) as explanatory variables. As these variables are not
linked directly to the state of the economy, but rather to the economy as perceived
by market agents, we group them as ‘sentiment’ variables. This section proceeds
with a short recap of the modelling framework, followed by a description of the
aforementioned variables. For technical details about the model we refer to the
previous chapter.
5.2.1 Modelling Framework
The model on which we would like to build, is the dynamic duration model as
developed in Chapter 4. The two main equations that define the Weibull Loga-
rithmic Autoregressive Conditional Hazards (WLACH) model are repeated here
from the previous chapter. Equation (5.1) shows the ACD aspect of the model as
it describes how the expectation of the duration of a tranquil period between two
crisis episodes ψi,Ni(t) depends on the durations of the preceding tranquil periods
zi,Ni(t) and on previous expectations. Notice that Ni(t) is a counting process that
counts the number of crises in country i = {1, . . . ,K} that have occurred up to
date t = {1, . . . , T}. The expression for the hazard rate is given in equation 5.2.
The hazard rate, conditional on information available at time t−1, depends on the
expected duration of the ongoing tranquil period ψi,Ni(t)+1, the set of explanatory
variables Xi,t−1 and the time passed since the last crisis t
∗.
ln(ψi,Ni(t)) = ω +
q∑
j=1
αj ln(zi,Ni(t)−j) +
p∑
j=1
βj ln(ψi,Ni(t)−j), (5.1)
λ(i, t| Ii,t−1) = 1−
exp
[
−
(
Γ(1+ 1
γ
) exp(δ′Xi,t−1)
ψi,Ni(t)+1
(t∗ + 1)
)γ]
exp
[
−
(
δ′Xi,t−1·Γ(1+
1
γ
)
ψi,Ni(t)+1
t∗
)γ] . (5.2)
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As shown in Chapter 4, the ACH model suffers from convergence problems in
small samples. Effectively, our dataset provides just over 60 periods of tranquility
that can be used for estimation. As it turns out, consistent estimation of the ACD
parameters is not guaranteed in our setup. We therefore are forced to revert to the
duration model without ACD components from Chapter 3. In terms of the model
above, this means that Equation (5.1) drops out, and that ψi,Ni(t)+1 in Equation
(5.2) reduces to a country-specific constant.
5.2.2 Contagion and Sentiment Variables
In this chapter we develop a second-generation crisis prediction model by incor-
porating market agents’ expectations into the model. From the second-generation
crisis model of Obstfeld (1994, 1996) we know that a change in expectations about
the currency can act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and possibly cause a country
to suffer from a currency crisis without this being caused by misaligned macro-
economic fundamentals. As the market agents’ expectations cannot be measured
directly, we include several different survey variables to approximate it. Further-
more, a trade-weighted composite variable is included to capture a possible conta-
gion effect that could also influence the stability of the currency through the trade
channel.
In order to capture the market agents’ sentiments, we use survey data from
the IFO World Economic Survey retrieved from Datastream. The dataset covers
the agents’ opinions about the current economic situation; the expected economic
situation 6 months ahead; the stability of the national currency with respect to
the US-dollar; the confidence in governments economic policy and the investment
climate for foreign investors. All the series are on a continuous scale from 1 to 10,
with higher values indicating a more positive opinion. As the survey data is on
quarterly basis, it should be transferred to fit the monthly crisis model. We take
the quarterly observation as value for all three months in that quarter.2
As already discovered by Glick and Rose (1999), close trade relationships are a
channel through which a financial crisis could be transferred from one country to
another. In order to capture this contagion effect, a weighted variable is included
in the model. The variable is based on bilateral trade data. It is constructed as
the weighted average of the binary crisis indicator for the other countries in the
sample.
CDi,t =
K∑
j=1
wi,jCj,t i = 1, . . . ,K, t = 1, . . . , T, (5.3)
2Alternatively, the missing months were intrapolated using a linear spline. As the estimation
results of the crisis model were not affected, the simplest solution was given preference.
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where Cj,t indicates a crisis in country j at time t; K denotes the total number
of countries in the sample; and the weight wi,j for countries i and j is given by
the sum of exports and imports between the two countries divided by the total
imports and exports of country i:
wi,j =
Expi,j + Impi,j∑K
j=1(Expi,j + Impi,j)
for i 6= j, (5.4)
with wi,i = 0 for all i. This definition ensures that the weights per country sum to
1. The trade-weighted variable can therefore take values between 0 and 1. It takes
a value of 1 when all other countries (in the sample) are in a crisis and a value of 0
when none of the other countries are suffering from a crisis. Therefore, the closer
this variable is to 1, the stronger is the possibility of contagion and the higher is
the probability of a speculative attack. Notice that when one (or more) of the
country’s major trading partners is in a crisis, the impact on the trade-weighted
variable is larger than when this is the case for any of the weak trade relations. To
avoid the endogeneity problem, this variable is included in the model one month
lagged.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Dataset
Our dataset consists of monthly data from January 1989 to June 2008.3 It cov-
ers 18 countries from the regions Latin America and Asia: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, China, In-
dia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The data is
obtained via Datastream and the sources are the IMF-IFS database, the national
banks of the respective countries and the IFO World Economic Survey.
The set of macroeconomic explanatory variables is the same as in previous
chapters. For a more detailed description, please refer to one of the earlier chap-
ters. It relates to different aspects of the economy. To represent the external sector
we use annual growth rate of exports as well as imports; the real interest rate dif-
ferential with respect to the United States; and the growth rate of international
reserves. For the financial sector, we have the M2 multiplier; growth of domestic
credit to DGP; and M2 over reserves. The real sector of the economy is proxied
by the growth in industrial production.
As described in the previous section, the sentiment variables are survey data on
the current economic situation (CES) and the economic situation 6 months ahead
(ES 6m); the stability of the national currency with respect to the US-dollar (ERS);
the confidence in governments economic policy (CEP) and the investment climate
3The starting date of the sample is determined by the availability of the survey data.
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ES 6m CES ERS CEP IC
Economic Sit. in 6 months (ES 6m) 1
Current Economic Situation (CES) -0.001 1
Exchange rate stability (ERS) -0.016 0.006 1
Confidence Economic Policy (CEP) -0.167 -0.506 0.039 1
Investment Climate (IC) 0.112 0.240 -0.128 -0.485 1
Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix Survey Variables
for foreign investors (IC). Finally, we also include a trade-weighted variable in order
to include a potential contagion phenomenon. Considering that the sentiment
variables are retrieved from the same survey while attempting to capture people’s
feelings about the economy, a concern might be that the variables are highly
correlated. Table 5.1 depicts the bilateral correlations between the five sentiment
variables. From this table, it can be seen that the bilateral correlations are well
within acceptable range with the strongest correlation being -0.5 between the
confidence in the current economic situation and the confidence in economic policy.
Another interesting fact in Table 5.1, is the near zero correlation between the
confidence in the current economic situation and the confidence in the economic
situation in 6 months. As the table reports contemporaneous correlations, this
results is maybe not so surprising. However, when taking the appropriate lags such
that the numbers in the series correspond to the same quarters, the correlation
between the series is still only 0.15. This indicates that agents’ sentiments about
the economy are very changeable over time and perhaps not accurate when the
time between the prediction and the period to which is applied is too large. We
therefore expect that the sentiment variables work best in the short run, i.e. in a
few months leading up to a crisis.
5.3.2 Definition of a Crisis
Before the transition from a tranquil state to a state of crisis can be modelled, it
must first be decided how a crisis is defined. Since we are interested in finding
the probability of crisis, information about speculative attacks is required. Not
all speculative attacks lead to a devaluation or revaluation of the currency. In or-
der to capture both successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks, the periods of
crisis are determined via the Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index (see Eichen-
green et al., 1995). As before, this EMP-index is the weighted average between
the 6-month change in the exchange rate with respect to the US dollar and (the
negative of) the 6-month change in the international reserves. The weights are
chosen such that the variance of both factors are standardised to one. A crisis is
signalled when the EMP-index exceeds its own mean by more than one and a half
standard deviations.4 This relatively low threshold is chosen to ensure that the
4As pointed out in Chapter 1, this method of defining periods of crisis has its shortcomings.
In the absence of a universal consensus about which dating method is best, we choose the method
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number of crisis episodes does not decrease to such a low amount that any crisis
analysis becomes void due to a lack of useful observations.
In the twenty years that are covered by our database, we classify 61 distinct
periods of crisis divided over the 18 countries. Because we also have a censored
period of tranquility at the end of the sample for each of the countries, the total
number of tranquil periods is therefore 79. However, the period leading up to the
the first crisis, is left-censored, i.e. we don’t know how long ago the last crisis
preceding the sample period occurred. For that reason, 18 tranquil periods drop
out from the estimation. Post estimation however, when calculating the hazard
rate, these periods are included as if the January 1989 is also the first month after
the previous crisis. This is done to ensure that each country has at least 1 crisis
that can be explained by the model. The number of crisis periods per country
varies from 6 in Brazil and Chile to only one crisis in Korea, Malaysia and Thai-
land. Among the crisis periods, we find the 1995 Mexican crisis, the 2002 crisis in
Argentina, and of course the Asian crisis. Of the 9 Asian countries, only China
and India do not have a crisis in 1997-98. This is not so strange as these countries
were not that severely affected by the Asian crisis.
5.4 Results
This section discusses the estimation results. We first check whether the ACH
model converges properly. Because the ACD part indeed does not converge, we
proceed with a duration model in the style of Chapter 3. The section proceeds
with a comparison of the model including the sentiment variables to a baseline
alternative. This comparison is performed based on the estimation results as well
as on the performance in terms of predicting crisis episodes.
The estimation results of the WLACH-model can be found in Table 5.2. Be-
fore an analysis can be started, it must be checked if the ACD part of the model
converged properly. Remember that an ACD(p,q) model as in equation (5.1) is
subject to the constraint
∑q
j=1 αj +
∑p
j=1 βj < 1. In our ACD(1,1) model this
reduces to α+ β < 1. From the table we find that the estimates for α and β sum
up to (almost) exactly 1. This means that the estimates are on the boundary of
the constraint. As such, it may be concluded that the estimator has not converged
properly. For this reason, we revert to the duration model without ACD compo-
nents from Chapter 3 for the remainder of the analysis.
The estimation results of the duration models with and without sentiment vari-
ables are presented in Table 5.3. The table also includes the results of the model
without sentiment variables. For both models we find that of all the macroeco-
nomic variables, only the growth in international reserves and the real interest rate
that comes closest to capturing the fluctuations on the exchange rate market.
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Variable Parameter Expected
Estimate Sign
ω -0.089
(0.107)
α -0.122
(0.066)
β 1.122
(0.066)
γ 0.817
(0.080)
Reserves Growtht−1 -1.884
∗∗∗ -
(0.590)
Real Interest Rate Diff.t−1 0.047
∗∗∗ +
(0.018)
Trade-weighted Variablet−1 2.500
∗∗∗ +
(0.921)
Current Economic Situationt−1 -0.227
∗∗∗ -
(0.088)
Economic Sit. in 6 monthst−1 -0.179
∗∗ -
(0.084)
Exchange rate stabilityt−1 -0.225
∗∗ -
(0.091)
Confidence Economic Policyt−1 0.057 -
(0.099)
Investment Climatet−1 0.136 -
(0.149)
Constant 1.756
(1.291)
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
10%, 5% and 1%; Log-Likelihood = -4702.9
Table 5.2: Full model with ACH specification.
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Variable With Without Expected
Sentiment Sentiment Sign
Reserves Growtht−1 -1.881
∗∗∗ -2.404∗∗∗ -
(0.604) (0.564)
Real Interest Rate Diff.t−1 0.049
∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ +
(0.020) (0.018)
Trade-weighted Variablet−1 2.544
∗∗∗ +
(0.921)
Current Economic Situationt−1 -0.195
∗∗ -
(0.083)
Economic Sit. in 6 monthst−1 -0.206
∗∗ -
(0.094)
Exchange rate stabilityt−1 -0.211
∗∗ -
(0.099)
Confidence Economic Policyt−1 0.047 -
(0.066)
Investment Climatet−1 0.075 -
(0.097)
Constant 1.756 -0.129
(1.291) (0.163)
Note: Fixed effects dummies are not included in the table for brevity.
Standard deviations in brackets; ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
10%, 5% and 1%; Log-Likelihood with sentiment variables= -4809.7;
Log-Likelihood without sentiment variables= -5055.4
Table 5.3: Comparing models with and without sentiment variables.
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differential with respect to the US have a significant impact. The negative coeffi-
cient of the reserves growth rate indicates that the probability of a currency crisis
increases as the amount of international reserves decreases. This seems a sensible
result because a rapidly decreasing pool of reserves means that the central bank
has potentially less power to intervene on the exchange rate market in case of a
speculative attack. The positive coefficient of the real interest rate w.r.t. the US
can be explained via the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). When the real in-
terest rate of a country is far above the US rate, the UIP asserts that the expected
exchange rate of the respective currency vis-a`-vis the US dollar is above the ac-
tual exchange rate. The fact that a depreciation of the currency is expected, can
be a tell-tale sign of an imminent currency crisis. Therefore, a high real interest
rate differential should indeed be linked to an increased probability of crisis in our
model. The remaining variables in the table relate only to the model with senti-
ment variables. The trade-weighted variable has the expected positive coefficient.
This signifies that the probability of crisis in a country increases when a crisis
occurs in a country with which it has close trade relations. The other sentiment
variables are defined such that a high value indicates a positive sentiment, while
a low value corresponds to a negative sentiment. Therefore the coefficients are
expected to be negative. Table 5.3 shows positive but non-significant coefficients
for the confidence in economic policy and foreign investment climate variables.
For the current economic situation, the economic situation in 6 months and the
exchange rate stability we find however that the coefficients are indeed negative
and significant. This indicates that the actual probability of a currency crisis will
be low when the market agents believe that the economy is and will be strong.
Similarly, when the agents believe in a stable exchange rate, the likelihood of a
crisis will be small. Basically this means that as long as the market agents have
confidence in the economy and the currency, there is little cause for concern about
any imminent crisis. That being said, the opposite is also true. When the market
agents’ confidence declines, a currency crisis could be triggered without misaligned
fundamentals; thereby making the self-fulfilling prophecy reality. Based on these
results, guidelines for a government to reduce the probability of a currency crisis
would be to keep the confidence of domestic market agents high through solid
economic growth and a stable currency. On the other hand, the type of economic
policy and the climate for foreign investors are less important factors with respect
to occurrence of currency crises.
From the estimation results in Table 5.3, we can calculate the probability of
crisis for each country at any point in time. These probabilities are shown in
Figures 5.1-5.3. The solid line represents the probability from the model with
sentiment variables. The dashed line is the baseline model without sentiment vari-
ables with which we would like to compare our model. Knowing that the gray
areas indicate the times of crisis, the ideal crisis-signalling model would give a
high probability in the months leading up to the crisis (to the left of the gray
areas) and a low probability otherwise. From the figures however, the difference
between the model with and without sentiment variables is not very obvious. A
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Figure 5.1: Probability of crisis in the next month (1)
109
0
.
03
.
06
.
09
.
12
1989m1 1994m1 1999m1 2004m1 2009m1
Prob. of Crisis with Sentiment Crisis
Prob. of Crisis without Sentiment
(a) Paraguay
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
1989m1 1994m1 1999m1 2004m1 2009m1
Prob. of Crisis with Sentiment Crisis
Prob. of Crisis without Sentiment
(b) Peru
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
1989m1 1994m1 1999m1 2004m1 2009m1
Prob. of Crisis with Sentiment Crisis
Prob. of Crisis without Sentiment
(c) Uruguay
0
.
03
.
06
.
09
.
12
1989m1 1994m1 1999m1 2004m1 2009m1
Prob. of Crisis with Sentiment Crisis
Prob. of Crisis without Sentiment
(d) Venezuela
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
.
1
1989m1 1994m1 1999m1 2004m1 2009m1
Prob. of Crisis with Sentiment Crisis
Prob. of Crisis without Sentiment
(e) China
0
.
04
.
08
.
12
.
16
.
2
1989m1 1994m1 1999m1 2004m1 2009m1
Prob. of Crisis with Sentiment Crisis
Prob. of Crisis without Sentiment
(f) India
Figure 5.2: Probability of crisis in the next month (2)
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Figure 5.3: Probability of crisis in the next month (3)
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more formal comparison of prediction performance is therefore desirable. For this
reason, the probability of transition into crisis is examined numerically as well.
To do this, we use the signalling method as originally used by Kaminsky (1999).
In this approach we compare the cases when the model signals a crisis to those
when we would like it to signal one. The time window ahead of the crisis at which
the model ideally should start signalling, is varied between 1 and 6 months in
advance. The model signals a crisis if the hazard rate crosses a certain threshold.
This signalling threshold is determined per country. It is set at the level that
minimises missed crises and false signals. The perfect fit would be if the signals
of the model coincide exactly with the required signals. We therefore count the
number of correct signals (A), the number of times the model did not give a signal
when it actually should have (C), the number of false alarms (B) and the number
of correct non-signals (D). These numbers are presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 for
the different model specifications and prediction horizons. The goodness-of-fit of
the model is calculated as the average of the percentages of missed crises and false
alarms. As such, a perfect fit would yield a goodness-of-fit measure of 0, whereas
the worst possible fit would yield 1.
Comparing the performance of the model including the ‘sentiment’ variables to
the baseline model with only macroeconomic fundamentals, we see that the story
of the figures is mostly confirmed, as the goodness-of-fit measures are similar be-
tween the two models. However, the results indicate slightly lower (better) values
for the model with the sentiment variables. For the Latin American countries,
this difference is persistent for all prediction horizons. For the Asian countries,
the performance of the model with sentiment variables improves relatively to the
baseline model as the prediction horizon shortens. This result indicates that mar-
ket agents’ sentiments play the strongest role in the short run, which makes sense
as only their immediate and possibly next month’s actions are likely to be influ-
enced by their opinion about the economy today.
5.5 Conclusion
In this final chapter our dataset covering 18 countries from Latin America and Asia
is used to examine whether survey-variables can be used to improve the quality
of explaining the occurrence of currency crisis. The survey data are included as
explanatory variables in a duration model along with the more traditional macro-
economic characteristics and a contagion dummy. As expected, the ACH model
developed in Chapter 4 is not feasible due to the finite sample. Therefore we use
the duration model without time dynamics of Chapter 3.
All in all, the addition of sentiment variables to capture market agents’ expec-
tations yielded a mixed bag of results. On the one hand, the model with sentiment
variables provided a better fit, but on the other hand, the improvement is not over-
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Prediction Horizon = 6 Months
Model Ia IIa IIIa IVa GoFa
With Sentiment 37.7% 62.3% 12.3% 87.7% 0.3729
Without Sentiment 31.6% 68.4% 12.9% 87.1% 0.4065
Prediction Horizon = 5 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 42.0% 58.0% 15.7% 84.3% 0.3687
Without Sentiment 33.2% 66.8% 13.0% 87.0% 0.3988
Prediction Horizon = 4 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 42.4% 57.6% 15.7% 84.3% 0.3667
Without Sentiment 34.3% 65.7% 12.8% 87.2% 0.3926
Prediction Horizon = 3 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 43.2% 56.7% 16.1% 83.9% 0.3643
Without Sentiment 35.4% 64.6% 13.8% 86.2% 0.3919
Prediction Horizon = 2 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 38.6% 61.4% 11.3% 88.7% 0.3634
Without Sentiment 33.8% 66.2% 12.9% 87.1% 0.3955
Prediction Horizon = 1 Month
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 40.2% 59.8% 11.5% 88.5% 0.3562
Without Sentiment 30.5% 69.5% 7.7% 92.3% 0.3858
aI is the number of signals for a crisis (A) as a percentage of the total
number of periods in which a signal should be given (A + C). II is the
percentage of non-signals (C/(A+C)). III is the percentage of times a signal
is given by the model (B) when none is desired (B+D). IV is the percentage
of correct non-signals (D/(B+D)). The Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) is calculated
as (II+III)/2.
Table 5.4: Prediction performance in Latin America.
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Prediction Horizon = 6 Months
Model Ia IIa IIIa IVa GoFa
With Sentiment 29.5% 70.5% 14.5% 85.5% 0.4248
Without Sentiment 26.7% 73.3% 9.5% 90.5% 0.4142
Prediction Horizon = 5 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 35.5% 64.5% 18.1% 81.9% 0.4129
Without Sentiment 27.0% 73.0% 9.8% 90.2% 0.4139
Prediction Horizon = 4 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 36.5% 63.5% 17.7% 82.3% 0.4057
Without Sentiment 27.8% 72.2% 9.4% 90.6% 0.4080
Prediction Horizon = 3 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 34.0% 66.0% 14.4% 85.6% 0.4020
Without Sentiment 33.0% 67.0% 15.5% 84.5% 0.4126
Prediction Horizon = 2 Months
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 38.9% 61.1% 14.5% 85.5% 0.3778
Without Sentiment 31.9% 68.1% 12.3% 87.7% 0.4017
Prediction Horizon = 1 Month
Model I II III IV GoF
With Sentiment 40.0% 60.0% 10.9% 89.1% 0.3543
Without Sentiment 35.0% 65.0% 12.1% 87.9% 0.3856
aI is the number of signals for a crisis (A) as a percentage of the total
number of periods in which a signal should be given (A + C). II is the
percentage of non-signals (C/(A+C)). III is the percentage of times a signal
is given by the model (B) when none is desired (B+D). IV is the percentage
of correct non-signals (D/(B+D)). The Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) is calculated
as (II+III)/2.
Table 5.5: Prediction performance in Asia.
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whelming. An explanation for this relatively weak improvement might be that the
survey data is available only at a quarterly frequency while the model tries to cap-
ture monthly probabilities of crisis. As suggested by the low correlation between
the variables capturing the confidence in the current and future economic situation
in Table 5.1, the sentiments are likely to be very changeable over time. A more
frequent monitoring of market agents’ sentiments might therefore be advisable for
governing bodies in order to be able to act quickly in case of a drop in confidence.
From this exercise with a direct approach to measuring market agents’ sen-
timents we learn that the use of survey variables could be good step forward
to predicting currency crises that occur without any identifiable macro-economic
causes. It must be taken into account however, that the explanatory power of the
survey data lies in the short run (1, 2 or 3 months ahead). Thus making it diffi-
cult for policymakers to intervene on the market to counteract market instability
based on survey-data, especially when these data are only updated on a quarterly
or even less frequent basis.
In this thesis we used duration analysis to study the likelihood of a currency
crisis occurring. The use of fully parametric duration models is an innovative
strategy for estimating this probability. This method allows us to include not only
economic variables as determinants of the probability of a currency crash, but
also the duration of spells of tranquility. This duration is important in assessing
currency stability. We found that exchange rate credibility depends not only on
macroeconomic fundamentals, but also on the time already spent in a tranquil
episode. All things considered we may conclude that a financial crisis can be
induced by many different causes. A lot of these causes are not included in models
because they cannot (yet) be quantified, think for example about all the channels
through which contagion is transmitted. Furthermore, no two crises are exactly
the same. This immediately brings up the issue we raised in Chapter 2 about the
implicit homogeneity assumption that is made when pooling data across countries.
It does not stop there however. It is not just across countries that causes for a
crisis may differ, also two different crisis episodes in the same country can have
different causes. In order to keep any model tractable and its estimation feasible,
some simplifying assumptions must be made however. Furthermore, there exists
the possibility of cross-sectional dependence across the countries in our models.
Although this is a very important issue that might influence our estimations, we
did not take it into account in our models. Tackling this problem could be a
good starting point for further research. We must keep in mind however that the
art about empirical modelling lies in balancing completeness and accuracy of the
model with the limitations and restrictions imposed by the data.
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Sinds de val van het Bretton-Woods systeem van vaste wisselkoersen is het aantal
valutacrisissen sterk toegenomen wat geleid heeft tot een stortvloed van literatuur
over dit onderwerp. Tot het midden van de negentiger jaren, spitste het onder-
zoek zich met name toe op het verklaren van valutacrisissen. De eerste empirische
modellen benadrukten dat bij inconsistent macro-economisch beleid, de koppel-
ing tussen wisselkoersen niet volgehouden kan worden. Deze onderzoeken richten
zich op het gedrag van verschillende macro-economische variabelen tijdens of rond
perioden van crisis. Vooral vlak na een financie¨le crisis is de roep om vroegti-
jdige alarmsignalen vanuit de overheid vaak erg groot, zoals na de recente grote
economische crisis in 2008-2009.
In de praktijk heeft dit geleid tot twee belangrijke richtingen in de ontwikkeling
van Vroegtijdige Alarmering Systemen (VAS). De eerste richting is gebaseerd op
het monitoren van een groot aantal economische variabelen. Sterke afwijkingen
ten opzichte van de gemiddelde tendens worden gekenmerkt als signaal. Hoe meer
signalen, des te hoger is dan de kans op een crisis. De andere belangrijke groep van
VAS is gebaseerd op een model met een gelimiteerd afhankelijke variabele. Hierbij
wordt nog onderscheid gemaakt tussen de probit modellen en de logit modellen.
In de probit versie wordt de afhankelijke variabele gemodelleerd op basis van een
normale verdeling, terwijl dat in de logit versie gebeurt met een extreme waarde
verdeling.
Bovengenoemde modellen zijn in de loop der tijd verder ontwikkeld en ver-
beterd. Daarnaast zijn diverse alternatieve modellen ontstaan, elk met hun eigen
voor- en nadelen. Ondanks de vele inspanningen op dit gebied, vertonen de huidige
VAS nog een groot aantal tekortkomingen. In dit proefschrift wordt een poging
gedaan een paar van deze tekortkomingen op te lossen.
In een groot deel van de literatuur wordt gebruik gemaakt van panel data
waarbij economische gegevens van verschillende landen bij elkaar genomen wor-
den. Dankzij het groter aantal bruikbare waarnemingen dat wordt verkregen door
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het samenvoegen van gegevens, kan een betrouwbaardere schatting van het model
gemaakt worden. Belangrijk hierbij is dat de verschillende landen homogeen ge-
noeg zijn. Met andere woorden, de gegevensreeksen van de landen moeten vol-
doende overeenkomsten vertonen. Door dit samenvoegen wordt namelijk impliciet
aangenomen dat dezelfde factoren voor alle samengevoegde landen de crisis op
gelijke wijze voorspellen. Binnen deze beperkende aannames, kan eventuele he-
terogeniteit tussen de betrokken landen alleen gemodelleerd worden door middel
van een zogenoemde fixed effect dummy. Voor alle aspecten waarop deze dummy
niet wordt toegepast, wordt dus homogeniteit tussen de landen verondersteld.
Deze veronderstelling is echter tegenstrijdig met twee bekende kenmerken van fi-
nancie¨le crisissen. Ten eerste hebben niet alle crisissen dezelfde oorzaak. Zo zijn
sommige crisissen het gevolg van zwak macro-economisch beleid, terwijl andere
juist veroorzaakt worden door psychologische effecten of door een slechte han-
delsbalans bij de banken. Ten tweede kan onderlinge be¨ınvloeding ook leiden tot
een financie¨le crisis, zoals geconstateerd is bij de crisis in Azie¨ van 1997-98. Dit
betekent dat financie¨le onrust van het ene land naar een ander land kan overslaan,
wat kan leiden tot dynamische cross-sectionele afhankelijkheid. Het middelen en
samenvoegen van landen kan tot verlies van informatie leiden. Echter, wanneer
cross-sectionele afhankelijkheid niet goed wordt gemodelleerd, heeft dit mogelijk
grote gevolgen voor een juiste schatting en inferentie.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de problematiek rond het samenvoegen van gegevens
behandeld. Door het toepassen van een panel-logit model op opkomende markt
economiee¨n, wordt aangetoond dat onderzoekers niet klakkeloos gegevens van ver-
schillende landen mogen samenvoegen. Er wordt voorgesteld om vooraf een analyse
uit te voeren om vast te stellen welke landen wel en niet bij elkaar genomen mogen
worden. Op de hierdoor gevormde clusters van homogene landen kan daarna het
(panel-)logit model worden toegepast.
Zoals gesteld, vertonen de bestaande Vroegtijdig Alarming Systemen tekortko-
mingen. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een duurmodel ontwikkeld als een alternatief VAS.
Door deze benadering is het mogelijk om de kans op een crisis te laten afhangen van
de verstreken tijd sinds de vorige crisis. Door middel van de tijdsafhankelijkheid
binnen het duurmodel zouden psychologische factoren gesimuleerd kunnen worden.
Het gebruik van een duurmodel als VAS is niet nieuw. Het hier voorgestelde model
is een uitbreiding waarbij het tijdsafhankelijke onderdeel volledig parametrisch
gemaakt wordt. Dit in tegenstelling tot eerdere modellen. Daarnaast wordt het
model ook toegepast om het einde van een crisisperiode te voorspellen. Deze in-
formatie kan beleidsmakers inzicht geven hoe te handelen in tijden van crisis.
In het VAS-duurmodel, ontwikkeld in Hoofdstuk 3, is geen plaats voor tijd-
dynamiek. Verwacht mag worden dat de tijdsduur tot een volgende crisis afhanke-
lijk is van de tijdsduur tussen vorige crisissen. In Hoofstuk 4 wordt daarom een
aangepaste versie van het Autoregressieve Conditionele Hazards (ACH) model ont-
wikkeld. In het oorspronkelijke ACH model was het mogelijk dat de kans op een
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overgang van de ene economische toestand naar de andere negatief zou kunnen wor-
den. Door de voorgestelde aanpassing ligt de kans op overgang wel altijd tussen 0
en 1. Het ACH model combineert de tijddynamiek van het Autoregressieve Condi-
tionele Duurmodel (ACD) met tijdsafhankelijke macro-economische variabelen om
zo de kans op overgang tussen twee economische toestanden te bepalen. In tegen-
stelling tot de andere hoofdstukken, richt de analyse in Hoofdstuk 4 zich op het
verklaren van alle spanningen op de wisselkoersmarkt, in plaats van alleen op de
spanningen die leiden tot een valutacrisis. Deze benadering heeft twee voordelen.
Op de eerste plaats is het niet meer nodig om een (willekeurige) grenswaarde te
kiezen op basis waarvan perioden van crisis bepaald worden. Een tweede voor-
deel is dat het probleem van het hebben van te weinig bruikbare waarnemingen
afneemt. Dit komt doordat perioden van toenemende spanning gedefinieerd wor-
den onafhankelijk van de intensiteit van de spanning.
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de conclusies getrokken en de resultaten en beperkingen
van de behandelde modellen besproken. Een van die beperkingen is het niet of
nauwelijks kunnen modelleren van psychologische invloeden op de markt. Om-
dat deze invloeden juist ten grondslag liggen aan de self-fulling prophecy en fi-
nancie¨le besmetting tussen landen, wordt hier een empirische oefening uitgevoerd
met enqueˆte data als verklarende variabelen. Dit wordt uitgevoerd op het VAS
van hoofdstukken 3 en 4. Het hoofdstuk sluit af met een aantal aanvullende
inzichten gebaseerd op de uitgevoerde oefening, alsmede mogelijke uitbreidingen
voor toekomstig onderzoek.
De in dit proefschrift voorgestelde volledig parametrische duurmodellen zijn
een innovatieve wijze om het ontstaan van valutacrisissen te voorspellen. Binnen
deze methodiek is het mogelijk om naast economische variabelen ook de tijd sinds
de laatste crisis mee te nemen als verklarende variabele. De verstreken tijd sinds
de vorige crisis is een belangrijke graadmeter van de stabiliteit van de wisselkoers.
Alles beschouwende, mogen we concluderen dat financie¨le crisissen verschillende
oorzaken kunnen hebben. Zo ontstaan twee crisissen zelden op een gelijke wijze.
Dit impliceert de tegenstrijdigheid van de aanname van homogeniteit zoals deze
wordt gemaakt bij het samenvoegen van gegevens over verschillende landen. Dit
is echter niet alles. Niet alleen tussen de landen kunnen de oorzaken van een
crisis verschillen, maar ook door de tijd. Om het empirisch model bruikbaar en
betrouwbaar te houden zijn deze vereenvoudigende aannames echter noodzakelijk.
Daarnaast is het mogelijk dat er cross-sectionele afhankelijkheid bestaat tussen de
verschillende landen. Hoewel dit een belangrijk punt is dat de schattingsresultaten
zou kunnen be¨ınvloeden, wordt dit niet meegenomen in de modellen binnen dit
proefschrift. Het implementeren van deze afhankelijkheid in een VAS, zou een
goed beginpunt zijn voor verder onderzoek. We moeten echter niet vergeten dat
het ontwikkelen van een goed empirisch model valt of staat bij het vinden van een
balans tussen compleetheid en nauwkeurigheid van het model aan de ene kant en
de beperkingen opgelegd door de data aan de andere kant.
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